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How do the physical realities of bodily gestures, instrumental and other 
technologies relate to musical meanings as constructed by humans? What 
enables such relations, and on what terms do we analyze them? These 
questions parallel those in the philosophy of language: how does the physical 
manifestation of a speech act—whether as the pure sonic phenomenon of an 
oral utterance or as physical markings on paper—refer to human constructed 
meanings? 
The dissertation takes as axiomatic that any human interaction with the 
material world as well as any subsequent relations between materiality and 
meaning are mediated by the active neurobiological processes which give rise 
to human agency. Though manifested in endlessly flexible ways, I argue that 
these relations are nonetheless bound by a set of logical structures derived 
from how we relate to the world more generally through intentionality—the 
capacity of consciousness to be about states of affairs beyond itself.  
In Part I, I develop a series of arguments that shows how intentionality 
structures the ways in which aspects of musical materiality relate to musical 
meaning. Part II then explores these structures creatively in three case studies.  
As a whole, the dissertation aims to demonstrate that creative acts such 
as music-making partake coherently within the logical structures of the 
physical and biological world of which they are a part. It thus aims to 
establish, in the wake of the material turn, a new framework from which to 
explore musical meaning both creatively and rationally in any and all contexts 
regardless of historical and cultural differences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the past decades musicology has witnessed a paradigm shift, 
from approaching musical works as autonomous entities towards 
approaching music as a network of human practices. The principal new belief 
was that artistic meanings are not inherent in fixed works but are products of 
human agencies and their culturally constructed practices. In this view, 
various musical activities—including performance, improvisation, 
composition, and perception—provide alternative foci for aesthetic and 
hermeneutic reflection. In more recent years, the continued development 
beyond the text and the textual has seen the emergence of a new research 
paradigm that further shifts the sites of interpretation beyond human 
intentions onto aspects of what is called materiality. Broadly defined, 
materiality can refer to physical objects, man-made technologies (such as 
instruments), as well as products of embodied actions—the last can be 
considered as physical objects like any other in the world. On this material 
and technological turn in musicology, Emily Dolan has recently noted that 
 
Increasingly, musical technologies are what hold our fascination, are the objects that 
demand analysis, explanation and contextualization. This disciplinary turn seems to 
signal not only the abandonment of traditional aesthetic concerns, but also a reversal 
of the musical values that have dominated since the nineteenth century…One might 
say, therefore, that research of this kind replaces the aesthetic objects of traditional 
musicology with technological ones.”1 [my emphasis] 
 																																																								1	Emily	Dolan,	“Editorial,”	18th-Century	Music	8/2	(2011):	176.		
	 2	
Critical Organology, as the new research paradigm has recently 
identified itself,2 explores how materiality engenders musical-aesthetic 
discourses across historical contexts and studies how humans interact with 
materiality in both musical and non-musical practices. The notion of 
“instrumentality,” for instance, is defined by Dolan as “the relationship 
between music and those technologies that enable its production”; 
technologies (as a subset of materiality) are hence understood as doing the 
work of mediation in musical practices.3 Critical Organology therefore raises a 
																																																								2	At	the	American	Musicological	Society’s	2013	annual	meeting,	Emily	Dolan	organized	and	chaired	a	special	session	entitled	“Critical	Organology”	that	featured	papers	by	scholars	in	the	field	who	had	been	at	the	time	thinking	and	writing	about	instruments,	technology,	and	materiality	in	musicology	and	ethnomusicology.	In	her	general	description	of	this	field	of	research	(which	can	be	viewed	here:	https://sites.sas.upenn.edu/ams2013-criticalorganology/)	Dolan	writes:	“Instruments,	machines,	and	technology	occupy	an	increasingly	central	position	within	musicology.	It	is	now	possible	to	speak	of	the	birth	of	a	“critical	organology”:	a	subfield	that	blends	the	concerns	of	traditional	organology—the	history	and	classification	of	instruments	and	the	exploration	of	their	construction—with	broader	questions	of	the	impact	and	implications	of	technology.	A	nascent	field,	critical	organology	offers	new	avenues	for	thinking	about	the	relationships	between	material	history,	aesthetics	and	philosophy	as	well	as	for	connecting	music	studies	with	the	histories	of	science	and	technology,	STS,	and	sound	studies.	The	purpose	of	this	panel	is	to	explore	the	aims	and	scope	of	critical	organology,	as	well	as	to	consider	its	role	within	musicology	more	generally.”	The	scholars	that	were	represented	in	the	special	session	were	(in	alphabetical	order):	Joseph	Auner,	Eliot	Bates,	James	Davies,	Jonathan	De	Souza,	Bonnie	Gordon,	Ellen	Lockhart,	Deirdre	Loughridge,	Roger	Moseley,	and	Thomas	Patteson.	The	most	lucid	outlines	of	the	goals	and	methodology	of	this	field	are	to	be	found	in	the	position	papers	delivered	at	this	special	session	as	well	in	Dolan’s	co-authored	article	with	John	Tresch,	“Toward	a	New	Organology:	Instruments	of	Music	and	Science,”	Osiris	28/1	(2013):	278-98.	In	addition	I	mention	here	a	selection	of	other	writings	(several	of	which	by	the	scholars	named	above)	that	similarly	feature	technology	and	materiality	as	their	subjects	of	enquiry:	Emily	Dolan,	“Toward	a	Musicology	of	Interfaces,”	Keyboard	Perspectives	5	(2012):	1-12;	Bonnie	Gordon,	“The	Castrato	Meets	the	Cyborg,”	and	“A	Note	from	the	Guest	Editor,”	Opera	Quarterly	27/1	(2011):	94-122	and	1-3;	Deirdre	Loughridge,	“Haydn’s	Creation	as	an	Optical	Entertainment,”	The	Journal	of	
Musicology	27/1	(2010):	9-54;	Gundula	Kreuzer,	“Wagner-Dampf:	Steam	in	Der	Ring	des	
Nibelungen	and	Operatic	Production,”	The	Opera	Quarterly	27/2-3	(2012):	179-218;		Jonathan	De	Souza,	“Musical	Instruments,	Bodies,	and	Cognition”	(Ph.D.	diss.,	University	of	Chicago,	2013);	Roger	Moseley,	“Digital	Analogies:	The	Keyboard	as	Field	of	Musical	Play,”	Journal	of	the	American	
Musicological	Society,	68/1	(2015):	151-228;	Moseley,	“Playing	Games	with	Music	(and	Vice	Versa):	Ludomusicological	Perspectives	on	Guitar	hero	and	Rock	band,”	in	Taking	It	to	The	Bridge:	
Music	as	Performance,	eds.	Nicholas	Cook	and	Richard	Penttengill	(Michigan:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2013),	279-318;	Eliot	Bates,	“The	Social	Lives	of	Instruments,”	Ethnomusicology	56/3	(2012):	363-95.	3	Dolan,	“Toward	a	Musicology	of	Interfaces,”	Keyboard	Perspectives	5	(2012):	11.	
	 3	
host of questions about the role of materiality in the construction of musical 
meaning that have become central and urgent to historical- and ethno-
musicology today. How does materiality relate to traditional notions of 
musical-aesthetic meaning? More precisely: How do the physical realities of 
bodily gestures, instrumental and other technologies represent, or make 
reference to, meanings constructed by humans? What enables such 
representation in musical (and other) practices? And finally, on what terms do 
we analyze that relation? 
Despite their historical emphases, the various projects of Critical 
Organology make a shared ontological claim about the nature of that 
interaction. The claim—which resonates with those of the New Materialism, 
Media and Affect Theories, and Latourian Actor Network Theory, among 
others 4—is that materiality harbors intrinsic agencies that actively exert on 
																																																								
4	For	a	select	representation	of	the	New	Materialism,	see:	Diane	Coole	and	Samantha	Frost	eds.,	
New	Materialisms:	Ontology,	Agency,	and	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Barbara	Bolt	and	Estelle	Barrett	eds.,	Carnal	Knowledge:	Towards	a	'New	Materialism'	Through	the	Arts	(New	York:	I.B.	Tauris	Publishers,	2013);	William	Connoly,	“The	New	Materialism	and	the	Fragility	of	Things,”	Millennium:	Journal	of	International	Studies	41/3	(2013):	399-412;	Bill	Brown,	“Thing	Theory,”	Critical	Inquiry	28/1	(2001):	1-22;	Janet	Bennett,	Vibrant	Matter:	A	
Political	Ecology	of	Things	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Manuel	De	Landa,	A	Thousand	
Years	of	Non-Linear	History	(New	York:	Zone	Books,	1997).	For	a	select	representation	of	Actor	Network	Theory,	critiques,	and	its	application	in	music	studies,	see:	Bruno	Latour,	Reassembling	
the	Social:	An	Introduction	to	Actor-Network-Theory	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005);	Benjamin	Piekut,	“Actor	Networks	in	Music	History:	Clarifications	and	Critiques,”	Twentieth-
Century	Music	11/2	(2014):	191-215;	Edwin	Sayes,	“Actor-Network	Theory	and	Methodology:	Just	What	Does	It	Mean	to	Say	that	Nonhumans	Have	Agency?”	Social	Studies	of	Science	44/1	(2014):	134-49.	For	a	select	sampling	of	Affect	Theory,	see:	Brian	Massumi,	“The	Autonomy	of	Affect,”	Cultural	Critique	31	(1995):	83-109;	Massumi,	Parables	for	the	Virtual:	Movement,	Affect,	
Sensation	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002);	Eric	Shouse	"Feeling,	Emotion,	Affect,"	
Media/Culture	8(6);	Melissa	Gregg	and	Gregory	Seigworth,	eds.,	The	Affect	Theory	Reader	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Ruth	Leys,	“The	Turn	to	Affect:	A	Critique”	Critical	
Inquiry	37/3	(2011):	434-72.	For	a	very	select	representation	of	Media	Theory,	see:	Friedrich	Kittler,	Gramaphone,	Film,	Typewriter,	trans.	Geoffrey	Winthrop-Young	and	Michael	Wutz	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999);	Marshall	McLuhan,	Understanding	Media:	The	
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human agencies across a wide array of musical and non-musical practices. 
Dolan and John Tresch, when advancing their methodological approach, state 
that 
 
[Our] approach means that we will be applying concepts to nonhuman objects that 
are usually attributed to humans. Exploring the different forms and degrees of agency 
attributed to instruments suggests that the qualities of sentience, activity, and 
intention might not always belong to only to humans but also to objects often classed 
as inanimate, including machines and instruments…If instruments are frequently 
accused of making humans act mechanically, why should we not take seriously 
instruments’ oft-noted lifelike capacities?5 
 
Dolan and Tresch’s statement captures the views of writers for whom 
materiality can be understood, rather than as mere objects made up of 
physical particles, to assume active enabling roles that shape human 
intentions, and by extension, the artistic meanings that derive from those 
intentions.6 With these assumptions, Critical Organology and related 
																																																																																																																																																															
Extensions	of	Man	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	MIT	Press,	1994);	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell,	Picture	Theory:	Essays	on	
Verbal	and	Visual	Representation	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1994).	
5	John	Tresch	and	Emily	Dolan,	“Toward	a	New	Organology,”	284-85.	6	To	cite	in	addition	two	examples	from	writings	in	the	field	of	musicology:	Michael	Gallope	notes	that	Benjamin	Piekut,	in	his	exposition	of	Actor	Network	Theory	(“Actor	Networks	in	Music	History:	Clarifications	and	Critiques”),	observes	that	for	ANT	theorists	“many	objects	and	non-human	actors	can	be	understood	to	have	agency	outside	the	intentionality	of	individuals.”	See	Michael	Gallope,	“Why	Was	this	Music	Desirable?	On	a	Critical	Explanation	of	the	Avant-Garde,”	
The	Journal	of	Musicology	31/2	(2014):	225	n.	89.	Roger	Moseley	makes	a	similar	ontological	claim	in	“Digital	Analogies:	The	Keyboard	as	Field	of	Musical	Play”	by	appealing	obliquely	to	a	
historical	practice	surrounding	Baroque	harpsichord	inscriptions.	Moseley	writes	on	p.	180:	“The	attribution	of	a	degree	of	agency	to	keyboards	has	a	distinguished	pedigree	in	the	form	of	mottoes	inscribed	on	harpsichords	and	other	instruments.	Drawing	on	the	classical	tradition	of	epigrams	that	envoice	objects,	or	oggetti	parlanti,	many	such	mottoes	speak	in	the	first	person	and	are	couched	in	the	pedagogical	terms	of	discipline	and	punishment.”	
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disciplines challenge our commonsensical understanding that human agency 
has a privileged role in determining meaning in music. It is therefore a feature 
of such thinking that for instance, as Benjamin Piekut has observed, Actor 
Network Theory authors’ “grammar of agency constantly shifts from active to 
passive and back again: an actor acts, an actor is enacted.”7 Such authors, 
according to Piekut, “are generally more interested in the effects of actions 
than in their causes.”8 In Critical Organological writings, one likewise finds 
similar chiastic formulations. Roger Moseley, for example (in but one of many 
instances), calls upon a similar trope when he writes: 
 
…“all playing is a being-played,” as Hans-Georg Gadamer phrased it. While 
keyboards invite us to play music, they have also long been invoked to illustrate how 
music can “play”us.9 
 
Such two-way formulations can be seen to follow logically only when agency 
is ascribed equally to materiality—and hence materiality’s claimed ability to 
do the work of mediation.  
By contrast, although the idea that one-is-being-played- by-the-very-
object-one-is-playing might reflect genuine phenomenological experiences on 
the part of the player, I shall argue throughout the course of this dissertation 
that this imagined two-way functioning of agency between human and 																																																								7	Piekut,	“Actor-Networks	in	Music	History,”	194.	8	Ibid.	9	Moseley,	“Digital	Analogies,”	152.	Although	here	Moseley	is	evoking	the	words	of	Gadamer,	chiastic	constructions	that	describe	the	human-materiality	relation	are	symptomatic	of	his	writings	in	this	and	other	articles.	See	also	Moseley,	“Entextualization	and	the	Improvised	Past,”	
Music	Theory	Online	19/2	(2013).		
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inanimate materiality flattens out critical distinctions in terms of their 
contrasting ontological identities. By neutralizing (and effectively broadening) 
the criteria for what constitutes agency and action, the chiasmus prevents the 
identification and understanding of possible enabling resources that engender 
relations between humans and materiality in the first place. It shifts 
accountability away from the actions of conscious agents onto inanimate 
materialities, the latter of which cannot in the end be held accountable, 
because they are not sentient. The trope thus weakens the usefulness of 
important concepts such as action and agency, which we need in order to 
identify the precise origins and workings of historical events and practices. 
My views here echo in general those of Richard Taruskin, who writes: 
“Attributions of agency unmediated by human action are, in effect, lies—or at 
the very least, evasions.”10 As a result, the chiasmus in effect blocks access to a 
more nuanced understanding of the causes of human and nonhuman 
interaction and, crucially, of phenomena that lie beyond the reach of 
immediate phenomenological experience. To cite Taruskin’s recent critique of 
Latourian Actor Network Theory: 
 
…it is consciousness—or even more broadly, sentience—that defines an agent in my 
view. Only conscious beings can be active beings. Only conscious action deserves to 
be called “doing.” Only conscious beings can take responsibility or be held 
responsible. Otherwise, it seems to me, the concept of action is emptied of real 
																																																								10	See	Richard	Taruskin,	The	Oxford	History	of	Western	Music,	Vol.	1:	Earliest	Notations	to	the	
Sixteenth	Century	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	xviii.	
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meaning or, at the least, strained or diluted (with the concept of occurrence) to no good 
purpose.11 [emphases original] 
 
Latour himself names his inanimate “actors” by their traditional name when he refers 
to them as implements. He thus shows himself to be perfectly well aware of the 
existence of implements as a category and the reality of the distinction we draw in our 
everyday (common sense!) language between actors and implements…Why not 
acknowledge these distinctions by differentiating these categories in our 
vocabularies? Are they really so un-meaningful? Do they not make a difference?...I 
want actors to take responsibility, and I think it a waste of time to argue about 
whether a gun, a chanson, or a context is a responsible actor. They can still make all 
the difference they need to make if we call them by more differentiated names: 
implements, products, ideas, atmospheric or geological conditions, constraints, 
enablers, and so on and so forth. Categories are informative. Eliminating distinctions 
coarsens concepts.12 [my emphasis] 
 
Sharing a similar belief in the necessity for refining distinctions, I 
approach questions of musical materiality and meaning by first outlining the 
criteria for distinguishing what constitutes agents and non-agents, and from 
there to delineate the resources that are responsible for engendering potential 
human and nonhuman relations. My aim is to focus not only on the effects of 
actions but equally on their causes and resources. The dissertation takes as 
axiomatic that any human interactions with materiality, as well as any 
subsequent relations between materiality and meaning, are mediated by the 
active neurobiological processes which give rise to human (as well as animal) 																																																								11	Taruskin,	“Agents	and	Causes	and	Ends,	Oh	My,”	The	Journal	of	Musicology	31/2	(2014):	291.	12	Ibid.,	292.	
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agency.  On the basis of the axiom that in a real-world context such 
neurobiological processes occur only in biologically based beings, I argue that 
human agency is not only necessary but sufficient for determining the 
contents of both sets of relations. From these logically and scientifically 
oriented perspectives, I regard human biologically based agency, rather than 
materiality, as the exclusive resource that 1. enables humans’ relation with 
materiality, and 2. enables materiality’s relation with meaning.  
In Chapter One I suggest that the core problems attending to musical 
materiality and meaning parallel core problems in the philosophy of language, 
whose principal question is: How does the physical manifestation of a speech 
act—whether as the pure sonic phenomenon of an oral utterance, as physical 
markings on paper, or as other kinds of material representation—refer or 
make reference to human constructed meanings? To this question, H. P. Grice, 
John Searle, and others who argue for mentalist theories of meaning have 
claimed that the capacity for the materiality of speech acts to relate to meaning 
is an extension of human intentionality: the biological capacity of conscious 
mental states to represent objects and states of affairs of the world.13 That is to 
say, the ability of utterances to represent meaning is not intrinsic to the 
materiality of the utterance itself, but rather derives from more fundamental 
functions of human intentionality. In virtue of this dependent relationship, 																																																								13	John	Searle	makes	this	connection	explicit	in	Intentionality:	An	Essay	in	the	Philosophy	of	Mind,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1983),	160-161.	One	of	the	earliest	proponents	of	“mentalist”	theories	of	meaning	(the	view	that	speaker	meaning	is	distinct	from	sentence	meaning,	that	semantic	notions	such	as	meaning	are	derivative	of	more	fundamental	psychological	states	such	as	beliefs	and	desires)	is	H.	P.	Grice.	See:	Grice,	“Meaning,”	The	
Philosophical	Review	66/3	(1957):	377-88.	For	foundational	texts	on	speech	acts,	see	J.	L.	Austin,	
How	to	Do	Things	with	Words	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1962)	and	Searle,	
Speech	Acts	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1969).	
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Searle argues that the theory of speech acts ought to be understood as a 
branch of the philosophy of mind.14 Analogously, I argue in this dissertation 
that the capability of musical materiality to relate to and represent meaning 
derives from the more general human biological capacity of intentionality; 
that is, for mental states to represent objects and states of affairs. This is to say 
that questions of musical materiality and meaning are dependent on the 
logically prior questions of how humans relate to materiality generally. Any 
satisfactory account of how musical materiality relates to meaning will 
therefore require first an account of how human intentionality relates to 
materiality. 
Example 0.1 illustrates the starting point of my approach. The two 
arrows depict the distinct ways in which human intentionality enables the 
materialities of both speech acts and music to take on representational 
capacities. Although the arrows may look the same, they are not intended to 
represent identical structures; the arrows imply different internal structurings 
of the enabling relation, owing to differences of context between ordinary 
language and music.15 Nevertheless, I will argue in Chapter One that there is 
enough overlap between the intentionalistic structures of these two practices 
that speech act theory can serve as a point of entry for our investigation into 
how musical materiality represents meaning. 
In this study, I base my philosophical framework on a set of 
foundational notions regarding the philosophy of mind which I wish to make 																																																								14	Searle	presents	this	view	in	several	published	writings,	but	in	especially	succinct	terms	in	“Meaning,	Mind	and	Reality,”	Revue	Internationale	de	Philosophie	2/216	(2001):	173-79.	15	Nuances	in	terms	of	their	respective	similarities	and	differences	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	One.	
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explicit here. My study builds upon the tradition of biological naturalism, a 
late twentieth-century branch of the philosophy of mind that expressly rejects 
the prior traditions of dualism, behaviorism, materialism, and cognitivism, 
among others.16 Biological naturalism subscribes to a scientifically-oriented 
approach to the traditional mind-body problem. It makes three mutually 
dependent claims regarding the nature of mental states: 1. mental states are 
higher-level features of specific lower-level neurobiological processes; 2. 
mental states, despite their biological basis, are ontologically subjective—that 
is to say, they have a strictly subjective (first-person) ontology yet, critically, 
can be approached objectively; and 3. most, but not all, mental states are 
intentionalistic in that they are about or refer to objects and states of affairs. 
The biological naturalist framework makes two further sets of 
ontological distinctions that are central to my study: 1. the distinction between 
intrinsic and derived agency, and 2. the distinction between observer-
independent and observer-dependent phenomena. The distinction between 
intrinsic and derived agency has not always been maintained or made explicit 
in musicological writings on agency and is frequently blurred in Critical 
Organological writings.17 In the philosophical framework of biological 
naturalism, intrinsic agency is understood to be a higher-level feature 
																																																								16	Searle	presents	his	definition	and	framework	for	biological	naturalism	in	several	publications,	most	notably	in:	Intentionality	(1983),	The	Rediscovery	of	the	Mind	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	MIT	Press,	1994),	and	Mind:	A	Brief	Introduction	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004).	For	a	well	reasoned	critique	of	biological	naturalism,	see	Kevin	J.	Corcoran,	“The	Trouble	with	Searle’s	Biological	Naturalism,”	Erkenntnis	55/3	(2001):	307-24.	17	For	a	close	discussion	and	analysis	of	how	the	notion	of	agency	has	been	deployed	in	musicological	writings,	see	Seth	Monahan,	“Action	and	Agency	Revisited,"	Journal	of	Music	Theory	57/2	(2013):	321-71.	The	blurring	of	these	distinctions	is	exhibited	in	the	Critical	Organological	writings	cited	above	in	footnote	No.	2.	
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exclusive to biological organisms (both human and animal) that possess the 
necessary neurobiology for producing genuine mental states and 
intentionalistic representations. Intrinsic agency is therefore not reducible to 
other forms of materiality and hence not a feature of material “things” or man-
made technologies, since the latter do not possess the necessary neurobiology 
to create such mental states.18  
On the other hand, derived agency or “as-if” agency is a (second level) 
representation of intrinsic agency. Derived agency gains its representational 
capacities from the more fundamental biological resources of intrinsic agency. 
For instance, the capacity for a map to represent meanings beyond its 
immediate materiality derives from intentionalities that have been attributed 
to it by human agents who do possess intrinsic intentionality. It follows from 
this distinction that any perceived sense of agency in materiality is derivative 
of genuine biological agency, a notion that contrasts with the claims and 
practices of Critical Organology. The importance of this ontological distinction 
for understanding how musical materiality represents meaning is twofold. On 
the one hand, the distinction isolates biologically based agency as the 
fundamental resource for the ability of musical (as well as other) materialities 
to represent meaning, and hence establishes mental phenomena rather than 
materiality alone as the necessary site of investigation. And on the other hand, 
this ontological distinction helps focus the investigation on the genuine 																																																								18	In	Chapter	One	I	will	provide	a	more	detailed	working	definition	of	consciousness.	In	summary,	I	subscribe	to	the	view	that	consciousness	is	a	biological	phenomenon	of	the	natural	world	and	that	its	functions	are	predicated	on	a	specific	set	of	neurobiological	features.	Though	neurobiological	entities	are	the	only	known	entities	that	possess	features	of	consciousness,	it	remains	open	that	we	might	one	day	be	able	to	produce	or	even	find	alternative	processes	that	engender	consciousness.	
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complexities, so far insufficiently studied, of how intrinsic agency enables 
derived agency in musical practices. A possible reason that these complexities 
have so far been inadequately studied in musicological scholarship is that the 
notion of agency has often been applied loosely to both biological agents and 
non-biological materiality. The blurring of this important distinction obscures 
the complex ways with which intrinsic agencies enable and structure derived 
agencies in materiality. To be sure, it is often useful to think metaphorically 
about agency.19 Yet problems and confusions arise when epistemologically 
based discussions of (metaphorical) agency blur into ontological claims, 
obscuring genuine complexities at work.20  
The second set of distinctions that follow from the biological naturalist 
framework concerns the distinction between observer-independent and 
observer-dependent phenomena. This distinction is relevant to the relation 
between musical materiality and meaning because it points toward a 
methodological framework grounded on logical, as opposed to 
phenomenological, analysis (whose differences will be explored in Chapter 
One). Broadly speaking, observer-independent phenomena are those that 
exist and function regardless of human attitudes. These are typically physical 																																																								19	In	recent	years	there	has	been	a	wealth	of	interest	regarding	metaphors	in	musical	discourses.	Among	this	literature	that	relate	to	the	central	themes	of	this	dissertation	are	writings	that	focus	on	metaphors	that	have	their	sources	in	the	body	and/or	the	physical	environment.	For	a	small	selection	of	these	writings,	see:	Marion	Guck,	“Analytical	Fictions,”	Music	Theory	Spectrum	16/2	(1994):	217-30;	Mark	Johnson,	“Embodied	Musical	Meaning,”	Theory	and	Practice	22/23	(1997/98):	95-102;	Janna	Saslaw,	“Forces,	Containers,	and	Paths:	The	Role	of	Body-Derived	Image	Schemas	in	the	Conceptualization	of	Music,”	Journal	of	Music	Theory	40/2	(1996):	217-43;	Judy	Lochhead,	“The	Metaphor	of	Musical	Motion:	Is	there	an	Alternative,”	Theory	and	Practice	14/15	(1989/90):	83-103;	George	Fisher	and	Judy	Lochhead,	“Analyzing	from	the	Body,”	Theory	
and	Practice	27	(2002):	37-67;	Arnie	Cox,	“Embodying	Music:	Principles	of	the	Mimetic	Hypothesis,”	Music	Theory	Online	17/2	(2011);	Lawrence	Zbikowski,	Conceptualizing	Music:	
Cognitive	Structure,	Theory,	and	Analysis	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002).	20	See	footnote	No.	6.	
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and biological phenomena of the natural world (some familiar examples are 
mass, gravity, metabolism, etc.). Mental states, as biological features of 
organisms found in the natural world, therefore belong to this class of 
observer-independent phenomena. Observer-dependent phenomena, on the 
other hand, are humanly constructed notions (which can themselves become 
genuine realities) that exist only insofar as human beings believe them to exist. 
Some everyday examples of observer-dependent phenomena include: the 
meanings of spoken sentences, the concept of money, socio-cultural 
institutions, and of course musical meanings. As such, observer-dependent 
phenomena typically exhibit derived agency imposed on some form of 
materiality.  
The relevant implications of this second set of distinctions are: 1. mental 
states, as a part of the natural world, are conditioned by the same physical 
laws that govern all of the natural world’s other features; 2. as such, there are 
logical structures that underlie the ways our mental, intentionalistic capacities 
represent objects and states of affairs; and 3. by extension, such logical 
structures underlie the ways in which mental capacities mediate materiality 
and meaning. The implications are that mental states, despite their intrinsic 
first-person subjectivity, have logical features that can and should be 
approached objectively through logical, as opposed to phenomenological, 
analysis.21 
My approach therefore contrasts with those of Critical Organology in 
two important respects. In terms of a basic ontology: I identify the functions of 																																																								21	I	will	discuss	the	merits	and	problems	of	phenomenological	analysis	(as	contrasted	with	logical	analysis)	in	Chapter	One,	section	1.5.	
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human agency, as opposed to materiality, as the focal point of mediation. I 
therefore set out to explore the complexities with which human intentionality, 
as a feature of consciousness and agency, mediates how materiality relates to 
meaning in musical practice. And in terms of how historical contingencies 
figure in the basic ontology of this relation: rather than claiming that the 
ontologies governing how materiality and meaning are instantiated change 
across historical periods and cultural spaces, I show (in the case studies of Part 
II) how varied historical manifestations of the relation between materiality 
and meaning exist coherently, and are in fact derivative of, the stable 
structures of human intentionality. My approach aims to reconcile historical 
contingency with certain universal realities of the natural world (such as 
human intentionality) on which those contingencies depend. I return to this 
point later. 
On the basis of this framework, I develop in Chapter One a 
philosophical theory of musical intentionality that extends Searle’s general 
theory of intentionality to the domain of musicking. It aims to describe the 
mental intentionalistic structures that animate relations between materiality 
and meaning specific to musical practice.22 I stop short of calling it a general 
theory because it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to study the 
intentionalistic structures of all the principal musical activities (performance, 
listening, composing, imagining, analyzing, etc.) even within a single musical 
tradition. Instead, mine is a theory of intentionality based on musical 																																																								22	The	words	“intentional”	or	“intentionalistic”	are	used	here	(and	henceforth)	as	adjectives	of	the	noun	“intentionality.”	“Intentionality”	is	used	with	reference	to	its	traditional	philosophical	meaning.	The	words	“intention”	and	“to	intend”	in	their	ordinary	senses	constitute	but	one	manifestation	of	the	broader	concept	of	intentionality.	
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performance. Despite leaving many other musical activities unexplored, I 
believe that the approach presented here can help lay the groundwork for the 
study of intentionalistic structures across a broad range of musical practices. 
For heuristic purposes, I define my unit of analysis as a “meaningful 
musical utterance” and situate it within the norms of Western art music. This 
unit of analysis is defined as: an intentional human action on which the 
performing agent attaches musical meaning(s) beyond the action itself. In 
order to develop its more distinctive features, I begin by first establishing 
basic structural parallels between meaningful musical utterances and 
everyday examples of speech acts. In both cases, bodily gestures are 
syntactical objects of materiality to which conceptual meanings are attached—
meanings that are beyond the immediate material features of the actions 
themselves. I argue in Chapter One that the basic intentionalitic structure of a 
meaningful musical utterance, like that of most familiar speech acts, involves 
two levels of intentionality: one that causes the musical action and another 
that represents the conceptual meaning attached onto that action. 
On the basis of this two-part structure, Chapter One culminates in a 
formal theory of musical intentionality that theorizes a marked feature of how 
materiality relates to meaning in musical performance. The theory formalizes 
the intentionalistic structures that underlie moments when the physical 
“feeling” of what it is like to execute a musical utterance becomes intimately 
connected to the utterance’s associated network of meanings. It is argued that 
during such moments the intentional content of the (first-level) intentionality 
that causes the physical action becomes an integral part of the intentional 
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content of the (second-level) musical meaning(s) that are attached to that 
action. This characteristic feature in large part distinguishes musical 
performance from common species of speech acts (though it possibly 
characterizes other performing arts); it is noteworthy that the feature has not 
received systematic accounts despite its recognition by most performers. 
Having outlined in Chapter One a philosophical framework for how 
musical materiality relates to meaning in the context of musical performance, 
my primary aim in Chapter Two is to derive an analytic methodology in order 
to explore that relation in actual musical contexts. What is required is a 
methodology capable of modeling multiple musical intentionalities and their 
interactions. Although all existing music-analytical methodologies model 
aspects of intentionality with varying degrees of explicitness (even 
Schenkerian theory, a tradition that has been charged with stating what are 
claimed to be “facts” about the “music itself,” but frequently reveals the 
intentionality of its claims with statements such as “I hear x as y”),23 the 
transformational theories associated with David Lewin are among the most 
self-consciously and self-reflexively intentionalistic. Three features of 
transformational theory lend themselves to the exploration of musical 
intentionality: 1. the theory makes explicit references to musical activities such 
as listening, performing, ear-training, etc., and expressly aims to model the 
kinds of human processes and their interactions that occur during these 
activities—what Lewin calls musical experiences, perceptions, intuitions, 																																																								23		Leo	Treitler,	for	instance,	adheres	to	the	traditional	view	of	Schenkerian	analysis	when	he	states:	“When	Schenker	speaks	about	how	the	listener	hears	things,	he	really	means	to	be	saying	how	they	are.	His	analyses	concern	the	musical	object.”	See	Treitler,	“’To	Worship	that	Celestial	Sound’:	Motives	for	Analysis,”	The	Journal	of	Musicology	1	(1980):	153-70.	
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enactments, etc.; 2. these processes are called upon for their rich 
intentionalistic implications; and 3. the generalizing powers of mathematical 
group theory provide the necessary “translation,” frequently in the form of 
isomorphisms, for modeling the simultaneous interaction between different 
levels of intentionalities. 
Despite these relevant features of transformational theory, I argue that 
Lewin’s framing of intentionality, at times implicit, contains problematic 
features that prevent it from being a ready-made framework for analyzing 
musical intentionality in the terms that I develop in this dissertation. First, 
Lewin’s loosely post-Husserlian phenomenological framing of the 
intentionalistic implications of his various theories contains logical 
inconsistencies from the perspective of a biological naturalist account of 
intentionality.24 Second, these inconsistencies lead Lewin to posit questionable 
associations between certain musical intentionalities (“intuitions”) and the 
group-theoretic and other formalisms that are intended to model those 
intentionalities.25 
My approach to developing an analytic framework is first to critically 
re-examine the principal intentionalistic assumptions that underlie the formal 
concepts of Lewinian transformational theory. With his celebrated figure from 																																																								24	Several	recent	published	writings	(each	from	a	different	intellectual	tradition)	have	reflected	on	what	I	am	describing	as	the	intentionalistic	underpinnings	of	Lewin’s	theories.	See	in	particular:	Daniel	Harrison,	“Three	Short	Essays	on	Neo-Riemannian	Theory,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	
Neo-Riemannian	Theories,	eds.	Edward	Gollin	and	Alexander	Rehding	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011):	548-77;	Steven	Rings,	Tonality	and	Transformation	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011):	16-21,	24-29;	Brian	Kane,	“Excavating	Lewin's	‘Phenomenology’,"	Music	
Theory	Spectrum	33/1	(2011):	27-36;	Maryam	Moshaver,	“Telos	and	Temporality:	Phenomenology	and	the	Experience	of	Time	in	Lewin's	Study	of	Perception,”	Journal	of	the	
American	Musicological	Society	65/1	(2012):	179-214.	25	Lewin’s	group-theoretic	apparatuses	can	be	understood	in	one	sense	to	exemplify	Lawrence	Zbikowski’s	notion	of	cross-domain	mapping.		
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Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations of 1987 (replicated here as 
Example 0.2), Lewin presents two contrasting classes of intentionalities that 
could be modeled by the abstract formal components of the figure. These are 
what he calls the Cartesian-intervallic attitude and the transformational 
attitude. Under the transformational attitude, the formerly static intervallic 
measurement of “i” is re-conceptualized with human “doings” that actively 
enact the “distance” between the musical objects. However, I argue that the 
transformational attitude models not so much the intrinsic intentionalities that 
animate real-world actions, as senses of actions; this is to say that Lewin’s 
transformational “actions” and “doings” are not genuine embodied actions in 
any real-world sense, but rather represent conceptual notions and values.26 
Conversely, the supposedly static intervallic attitude entails a greater degree 
of active intentionality on the part of the agent than Lewin acknowledges. 
Interval classes, to cite but one example of the intervallic attitude, are almost 
never purely representations of fixed observer-independent facts, but are 
representations of distinct conceptual notions imbued with cultural values.27  
The purpose of pursuing these (and other) reformulations in Chapter 
Two is to relativize Lewin’s original distinctions between the intervallic and 
																																																								26	My	view	corroborates	with	Rings’s	assessment	of	the	ontology	of	Lewin’s	transformational	attitude.	Rings	writes:	“Yet,	there	are	clearly	many	instances	in	the	transformational	theory	literature	(the	majority,	in	fact)	where	such	a	literal,	“real-world”	interpretation	of	the	transformational	attitude	does	not	work.	The	transformations	in	many	analyses	do	not	correspond	in	any	obvious	way	to	physical	things	some	musical	actant	does	out	in	the	world	to	execute	a	passage.”	See	Rings,	“Tonality	and	Transformation”	(Ph.D.	diss.,	Yale	University,	2006):	49-50.	27	For	a	fine	illustration	of	this	point	regarding	the	intentionalistic	contents	of	familiar	(tonal)	Generalized	Interval	Systems,	see	Rings’s	analysis	of	the	opening	gesture	of	the	Prelude	from	Bach’s	Cello	Suite	in	G	major.	See	Rings,	Tonality	and	Transformation	(2011):	21-24.	
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the transformational attitudes.28 But more significantly for the purposes of 
deriving a methodology for analyzing the structures of musical intentionality 
(to serve the analytic case studies of Part II), the re-formulations make 
available as-yet unexplored potentials for Lewin’s theory to model real-world 
performative actions and the relations between those actions and their 
associated conceptual values.29 The resulting analytic framework, illustrated 
by Example 0.3, is one that readapts Lewin’s mathematical formalisms to 
model as-yet unexplored intentionalistic contexts and structures. 
Part II consists of three analytic essays that illustrate the interpretive 
potentials afforded by the theoretical and methodological framework outlined 
in Part I. The essays aim to illuminate the creative ways in which composers 
draw on the intersecting relation between musical materiality and meaning as 
a creative resource. Although many of the musical details I discuss can be 
explored independently of the philosophical framework, I argue that the 
philosophical and methodological construction of Part I is important for 
interpretive application in two principal ways: 1. it spotlights a class of 
musical phenomena whose interactions by and large have not been 																																																								28	It	has	been	argued	by	Julian	Hook,	for	instance,	that	the	distinction	Lewin	draws	between	Generalized	Interval	Systems	(GIS)	and	transformational	systems	is	not	clear-cut,	that	GIS	and	its	transformational	counterpart	participate	throughout	Lewin’s	writings	as	essentially	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	See	Julian	Hook,	“David	Lewin	and	the	Complexity	of	the	Beautiful,”	Intégral	21	(2007):	173-75.	My	views	concur	with	Hook’s	assessment	and	argue	that	this	is	especially	so	when	one	strips	away	the	descriptive	language	for	each	system.	29	In	a	recent	publication,	James	Bungert	has	set	out	on	a	similar	project.	Citing	from	Bungert’s	abstract:	“This	article	represents	a	unique	interpretation	of	Lewin’s	transformational	attitude:	rather	than	elaborating	mathematically	grounded	transformational	analyses,	this	article	pursues	the	performer’s	physical	actions	in	order	to	heuristically	reconstruct	the	compositional	logic	of	the	Corrente	from	J.	S.	Bach’s	Keyboard	Partita	in	E	minor…this	article	conceives	Bach’s	compositional	decisions	in	terms	of	a	subtle	physical	performance	challenge	posed	at	the	Corrente’s	outset.”	See	James	Bungert,	“Bach	and	the	Patterns	of	Transformation,”	Music	Theory	
Spectrum	37/1	(2015):	98-119.	Bungert’s	notions	and	analytic	practice	relate	closely	with	my	analysis	of	a	Haydn	string	quartet	movement	in	Chapter	Three.		
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emphasized in the standard literature; 2. it forces a conscious awareness on 
the part of the analyst of the kinds of ontological assumptions that underlie 
his/her interpretative claims. One’s assumptions about the nature of the mind 
or the philosophy of science, for instance, can directly shape one’s interpretive 
claims and how one formulates analytic questions. The philosophical 
framework folds the critical reflection of those issues and assumptions into the 
analytic process itself. 
In Chapter Three I explore a shared (isographic) “gestural” pattern that 
characterizes both the successions of up-bow/down-bow motions of the 
principal motive and the successions of large-scale structural upbeats and 
downbeats in the first movement of Haydn’s String Quartet Op. 64, No. 3. I 
argue that the familiar claims of structural upbeat and downbeat status in tonal 
phenomena are not intrinsic to tonality, but are metaphoric, conceptual values 
derived from the intentional representations of physical motions. In the case of 
Op. 64, No. 3, I argue that the physical senses involved when performing the 
principal motive’s bowing pattern, that is to say the phenomenal character of 
their intentionalistic representations, impart a set of locally defined meanings 
to the otherwise stock notions of structural rhythm. The progression of large-
scale rhythmic and formal articulation therefore gains a distinctive set of 
senses derived from the specificity of the string players’ physical gestures. 
Chapter Four explores the conceptual notion of processual form30 
through the performance consideration of tempo in the first movement of 																																																								30	I	borrow	this	notion	from	the	work	of	Janet	Schmalfeldt	on	formal	processuality.	See	Schmalfeldt,	In	the	Process	of	Becoming:	Analytic	and	Philosophical	Perspectives	on	Form	in	Early	
Nineteenth-Century	Music	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).	
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Schubert’s Piano Sonata, Op. 42 (D. 845). Although the notion of processuality 
in musical form holds visceral connotations of continuous action and its 
unfolding, I argue that such senses remain dormant in performances that 
maintain an unchanging tempo for the movement’s two principal thematic 
materials. I suggest that the distinctive processuality of the movement’s form 
derives in large part from the contrasting metric character of its thematic 
materials; when interpreted within the context of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century conventions of tempo and meter, the two principal 
thematic materials point to contrasting tempi in performance. The chapter 
closes with my own recorded performance that aims to capture the 
processuality of the movement’s musical form through careful attention to the 
changing topography of its meter and tempo.  
In Chapter Five I begin by reflecting on a famously puzzling gesture 
near the end of Chopin’s Prelude in E-minor from Op. 28: a pause preceded by 
a dissonant chord with an implied but unrealized resolution. I define this 
moment as a “negative” gesture, one characterized by what the performer 
intentionally does not act out. In order to pursue how this singular but marked 
gesture (viewed as an instance of musical materiality) might relate to a larger 
network of conceptual meanings, I explore a complex web of associations—
both embodied and conceptual—between the E-minor and A-minor preludes, 
associations I infer from a surviving sketch leaf containing the working-out of 
both preludes. In the process, I offer alternative ways for thinking about the 
question of cyclic integration with regards to Chopin’s Op. 28 cycle. 
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On one level, this dissertation is about furthering an understanding of 
the connection between materiality and meaning, between performance and 
analysis. However, my approach also aims to make a deeper philosophical 
argument: music, as a product of human thoughts and historical 
contingencies, coexists coherently with, and is in fact dependent upon, 
universal and objective realities, realities represented by such foundational 
scientific theories as evolutionary biology, atomic physics and others. The vast 
body of objective scientific knowledge we now possess has made it possible to 
begin to ask as-yet unexplored questions about how the freedom and diversity 
of a human activity such as music can not only exist coherently with universal 
features of physical reality, but also be dependent upon such basic fixed 
realities. How do we reconcile seeing music as the product of unbound human 
thoughts and feelings with the astounding fact that music exists consistently 
within exactly one world, one that is bound by a set of hard, objective, and 
universal facts? How do the contingencies of music (across historical eras, 
cultures, geographies, etc.) fit within the constancy of such a reality, as part of 
a coherent worldview? 
I believe these are pressing questions if we wish to achieve a better 
understanding of the deeper “rationalities” behind music’s many fluid 
phenomena—such as taste, judgment, and representations—across its many 
historical and cultural manifestations.31 Since these have not yet become 
																																																								31	At	present,	I	tentatively	envision	such	a	project	as	being	in	some	ways	analogous	to	what	John	Rawls,	for	instance,	has	argued	in	the	twentieth-century	for	the	notion	of	justice.	See:	John	Rawls,	
A	Theory	of	Justice	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1971).	Such	a	project	might	begin	by	comparing	the	“fluid”	phenomena	of	musical	discourse	with	the	rational	structures	of	likewise	fluid	non-musical	discourses	such	as	justice	and	moral	judgment.	
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mainstream questions of musical scholarship today, which either studies 
music’s contingent characteristics in isolation from their naturalistic ties or 
argues against the universality of those ties, my approach to questions of 
materiality and meaning can be seen as an attempt to contribute to this larger 
puzzle.32 The formulation of these broader questions has been made possible 
by fields such as Critical Organology that have begun to explore how music 
has historically interacted with its physical realities (instruments, 
technologies, human bodies, etc.). However, I wish to argue that the 
historically- and epistemologically- oriented frameworks of Critical 
Organology—much of it inspired by the work of postmodernist thinkers such 
as Foucault, Latour, Kittler, and post-Husserlian phenomenologists such as 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—have so far blocked access to the broader 
ontological questions of how music fits coherently into a material world that 
operates within a finite set of governing laws, even if these laws continue to be 
subjected to revision by scientific research. One reason, I suggest, is that 
postmodernist frameworks, with their emphases on historical and cultural 
contingency, are well-suited to examine human realities on their own terms, 
but ill-suited to accommodate them within universal and objective realities of 
which all human constructed domains are a coherent part. As I have already 
suggested, logical difficulties emerge in Critical Organological writings when 																																																								32	One	possible	reason	for	the	separation	between	the	humanities	and	the	natural	sciences	might	stem	from	the	fact	that	the	birth	of	musicology	as	a	formal	discipline	came	after	what	Rens	Bod	in	
A	New	History	of	the	Humanities	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014)	has	recently	argued	was	the	historical	bifurcation	at	the	beginning	of	the	eighteenth-century	between	what	we	now	recognize	as	the	humanities	and	the	natural	sciences.	As	a	result,	in	our	modern	conception	products	of	human	thoughts,	feelings,	and	actions	such	as	music,	art,	and	literature,	are	categorically	separate	from	natural	and	universal	phenomena,	the	domain	of	the	so-called	“hard”	sciences.	
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postmodernist frameworks are taken beyond their traditional historical 
purviews, to making ontological claims about how humans interact with 
materiality in a real-world context. My broader aim in this dissertation is to 
bring the material and technological turn in current musicology to the next 
logical stage by offering an alternative philosophical framework that 
assimilates the contingency of human realities with the universality of 
physical realities. My aim is not to undermine music’s historical and other 
contingencies and replace them with deterministic explanations. Rather, it is 
to understand how freedom and diversity within a single domain of human 
reality such as music can be created out of universal facts of reality, and to 
explore the extraordinary complexities of that coherent existence. 
Towards that aim, I suggest that the biological feature of intentionality 
found in humans and animals (as expressed by a biological-naturalist notion 
of the mind) constitutes the quintessential enabling mechanism and the focal 
point for exploring that coherence. As a real and irreducible phenomenon 
caused by (neuro)biological activity found throughout the natural world, 
intentionality is the indispensible junction by way of which human 
constructed domains (such as music and culture) exist and relate coherently 
with the physical world. By theorizing the intentionalistic structures of a 
localized aspect of music, I aim to contribute a small piece to a large puzzle. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
A THEORY OF MUSICAL INTENTIONALITY  
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Two Levels of Musical Experience 
 
Consider the dollar bill: experienced purely as a material object, it is a 
piece of paper made with a special cotton blend rendered with green ink 
patterns. Most readers will have had first-hand experiences with its distinctive 
texture, smell, size, thickness, weight, and strength. Owing to these material 
properties, the dollar bill as a “material tool” can in fact be used to fulfill a 
diverse array of practical functions. The fortepianist Malcolm Bilson once 
demonstrated that the U.S. dollar bill is ideally suited to fill the inside of a 
loose tuning pin on the pinblock of a Viennese fortepiano! Of course, paper 
money is not ordinarily experienced or used in terms of any of its material 
affordances, of which there could be many. Rather it is most commonly used 
as legal tender which stands for concepts and values that exceed its “ready-at-
hand” material capabilities. 
The above describes two modes with which we encounter the dollar 
bill: on the one hand we have embodied sensory experiences with the paper in 
the “here-and-now” as a concrete piece of material, and at the same time we 
use the paper to stand for conceptual values, promises, and legal obligations 
that extend beyond its immediate physical characteristics. This brief 
illustration aims to capture a foundational feature that underlies musical 
practice, a feature that I intend to formalize with the theory of musical 
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intentionality. I argue that we likewise engage with musical utterances on two 
levels. On one level, we have immediate sensory experiences with the purely 
material aspects of a musical utterance. As a listener, for instance, we 
encounter the materiality of musical utterances most commonly in the forms 
of aural and visual experiences. In the case of the performer, these perceptual 
experiences combine with experiences of one’s own physical actions acting 
upon instruments, spaces, and so on. Yet on another level, we listen to and 
perform musical utterances beyond our immediate experiences of their sheer 
sonic and physical manifestations. When we listen to and perform musical 
actions, we attach conceptual meanings and expressive associations over and 
above how we experience their physical attributes. 
Conceptualizing the distinction between these two levels of experience 
is more difficult in the case of musical utterances than in the case of language 
(and the case of the dollar bill), owing to a more intimate relation between 
how we experience music’s materiality and its expressive associations. 
Differences in this regard between music and language are analogous to the 
kinds of distinctions Christopher Small describes between what he calls verbal 
and gestural language. Small writes: 
 
This brings us to another difference between verbal and gestural language: the fact 
that while in the former the relation between the sound of a word and its meaning is 
arbitrary (apart from occasional onomatopoeia), in the latter it is not—or at any rate, 
not completely. There is no special reason, for example, other than that of historical 
development from a common origin, why the words eau, agua, aigua, and aqua on the 
one hand and water and Wasser on the other should all be used to denote the liquid 
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element; any other combinations of vocal sounds would have served as well and do 
so in other languages that are not historically related to Latin or German models. 
 
But the relation between the shape or pattern of a gesture and its meaning is not 
arbitrary. Many gestures are fully iconic and carry within themselves the picture of 
their meaning: the baring of teeth, for example, to signify aggression has an obvious 
basis in the attack and defense ways of animals…and the holding out of the empty 
right hand to show we are not carrying a weapon. This means not only that when we 
use this kind of communication we are using one set of relationships, one pattern, to 
signify another…but also that gesture and meaning are, at leas to some degree, 
analogues one of the other. 
 
To some degree only, however. There is an element of arbitrariness, or at least of 
choice between alternative representations, in gestural language also. If there were 
not, if all gestures were exact analogues of the relationship they articulate, those 
gestures would all be identical for all members of the same species; every gesture 
would have its significance, and that would be that. Nor would any change or 
development be possible.33 
 
This is to say that, unlike the dollar bill (and analogously for the 
linguistic examples cited by Small), where there is no obvious relation 
between how we experience it as a physical materiality (as pieces of paper or 
sounds produced) and the conceptual values we impose on it,34 I argue that it 
																																																								33	Christopher	Small,	Musicking:	The	Meanings	of	Performance	and	Listening	(Middletown,	CT.:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1998),	59-60.	34	On	the	flexible	relation	between	symbols	and	their	intended	meanings,	the	anthropologist	Leslie	White	(writing	during	an	earlier	era)	argues:	“The	meaning,	or	value,	of	a	symbol	is	in	no	instance	derived	from	or	determined	by	properties	intrinsic	in	its	physical	form:	the	color	appropriate	to	mourning	maybe	yellow,	green,	or	any	other	color;	purple	need	not	be	the	color	of	royalty;	among	the	Manchu	rulers	of	China	it	was	yellow.	The	meaning	of	the	word	‘see’	is	not	
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is a marked feature of musicking across disparate histories and genres that 
there often exists a palpable relation between how we experience the 
materialities of music and the kinds of expressive meanings we impose on 
those materialities. Yet, similarly to what Small argues with regard to 
“gestural language,” such relations in music are not fixed “one-to-one” 
mappings. I likewise argue that there is an elasticity across a wide continuum 
in how musical materiality, by way of our experiences of it, relates to musical 
meaning. There is a continuum that ranges from a close correlation between 
“what it is like” to perform an utterance and its associated meanings, to a non-
congruence on the other extreme. 
The purpose of this chapter is to formalize a philosophical framework 
that defines what makes these relations possible and how they are made 
possible. The chapter aims to define the logical structures that underlie the 
flexibility of these relations. Growing out of such a framework, a 
methodological space can then be delineated, one that will facilitate the 
creative exploration of this elasticity between musical materiality and 
meaning. In what follows, I will argue that mental representation-based 
theories of meaning derived from the philosophy of language and mind—
theories that distinguish speaker meaning from sentence meaning, theories 
that argue that speaker meaning is to be analyzed in terms of speaker 
																																																																																																																																																															intrinsic	in	its	phonetic	(or	pictorial)	properties…	The	meanings	of	symbols	are	derived	from	and	determined	by	the	organisms	who	use	them;	meaning	is	bestowed	by	human	organisms	upon	physical	forms	which	thereupon	become	symbols.”	See:	Leslie	White,	“The	Symbol,	the	Origins	of	Human	Behavior,”	Philosophy	of	Science	7/4	(1940):	453.		
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intentions35—constitute a logical starting point for pursuing such a 
philosophical framework. I will argue that these theories and their analytic 
apparatus can help define ontological categories in musical discourse—
categories such as meaning, non-meaning, action, perception, conscious, non-
conscious, materiality, agency—whose distinctions are necessary for 
subsequently understanding how musical materiality relates to meaning. 
 
1.2 Musical Utterances, Speech Acts, and the Enabling Functions of 
Intentionality 
 
When laying out his wishes for his theory of embodied meaning, Mark 
Johnson writes:  
 
I seek to recover most of the resources for meaning-making that are ignored in the 
writings of influential philosophers such as Quine, Searle, Davidson, Fodor, Rorty, 
and many others. In addition to the standard notion that meaning involves the 
conscious entertaining of concepts and propositions, I am focusing on mostly 
nonconscious aspects of a person’s ability to meaningfully engage their past, present, 
and future environments. I am proposing what I call the embodied theory of 
meaning.36 (my emphasis) 
 
According to Johnson, the cited philosophers partake in what he calls 
the “conceptual-propositional theory of meaning,” which explores meaning 
																																																								35	See	Introduction,	footnote	No.	13.	36	Mark	Johnson,	The	Meaning	of	the	Body:	Aesthetics	of	Human	Understanding	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2007),	9-10.	
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only in terms of conscious propositional thought in the form of subject-
predicate structures. Without rejecting the presence of propositional thinking, 
Johnson argues that “propositions are not the basic units of human meaning 
and thought.” Rather, “meaning traffics in patterns, images, qualities, feelings, 
and eventually concepts and propositions.”37 As Johnson makes clear, he 
believes that these embodied sources for meaning impart no conscious 
imprint, which is to say no mental representational content. This manner of 
construing meaning’s relation with the human body echoes the post-
Husserlian phenomenological projects of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty that 
frame human ontologies as so-called “always-already-involved-in-the-
world.”38 
Such related notions raise the questions: if indeed those bodily 
experiences that are pertinent to constructions of meaning harbor no mental 
representational content, what are the pathways through which they are able 
to “link up with,” and in turn influence, conceptual meanings which are 
acknowledged to be primarily of a mental nature? If indeed physical 
phenomena (including bodily actions) are nonconscious and non-
representational, how might they in turn shape conscious representational 
content?39 In response to Johnson, I argue that evidence suggests that the kinds 																																																								37	Ibid.,	9.	38	Ibid.,	264.	For	an	explicit	connection	of	these	views	with	post-Husserlian	phenomenological	projects,	see	Hubert	Dreyfus,	“Phenomenological	Description	Versus	Rational	Reconstruction,”	
Revue	Internationale	de	Philosophie	217	(2001):	181.	39	Though	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter	to	survey	more	comprehensively	the	different	theoretical	discourses	that	share	a	non-representational	view	of	meaning,	I	would	like	to	mention	ecological	approaches	to	action,	perception,	and	meaning	expounded	most	notably	by	James	J.	Gibson	in	his	theory	of	affordances.	As	a	standard	text,	see	James	J.	Gibson,	The	Ecological	
Approach	To	Visual	Perception,	(New	York:	Psychology	Press,	1986)).	Eric	Clarke	has	more	recently	adapted	Gibsonian	ecological	approaches	to	the	domain	of	musical	meaning.	See:	Eric	
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of embodied resources that contribute to meaning in musicking are in fact 
supported by mental representations. Moreover, I argue that it is the active 
capacities of the mental that generate (and house) the resources that enable 
musical materiality and meaning to intersect. Rather than directing the 
enquiry onto bodily or material/technological sites, I propose to (re)direct the 
focus onto the active features of consciousness that are responsible for 
engendering and shaping such relations.  
In order to identify the precise mental capacities that engender such 
relations, I draw first from existing (and more extensive) understandings of 
similar processes in a comparable human activity to that of music: language. 
On the overlapping relation between music and language in human evolution, 
Gary Tomlinson has written recently that: 
 
The set of capacities that enables musicking is a principal marker of modern 
humanity…Most of these capacities overlap with nonmusical ones…In the area of 
overlap, linguistic capacities seem to be particularly important, and humans are (in 
principle) language-makers in addition to music-makers – speaking creatures as well 
as musicking ones.40  
 
																																																																																																																																																															Clarke,	Ways	of	Listening:	An	Ecological	Approach	to	the	Perception	of	Musical	Meaning	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	and	Clarke,	“Music	Perception	and	Musical	Consciousness,”	in	
Music	and	Consciousness:	Philosophical,	Psychological,	and	Cultural	Perspectives,	eds.	David	Clarke	and	Eric	Clarke	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).	Clarke	(and	Clarke)	notably	reject	the	presence	and	active	functions	of	mental	representations.	Notwithstanding	differences	in	their	goals	and	formulations,	my	comments	regarding	Johnson’s	views	apply	equally	to	Clarke	(and	Clarke)’s	principal	assertions.	40	Gary	Tomlinson,	A	Million	Years	of	Music:	The	Emergence	of	Human	Modernity	(New	York:	Zone	Books,	2015),	23-24.	
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Following upon the work of Frege and Russell, John Searle has argued 
that the capacity for language to refer and denote beyond its immediate 
physical manifestations (whether as sounds, gestures, or marks) derives from 
the more fundamental mental capacity to refer or be about objects and states 
of affairs in the world. Searle argues that this capacity, recognized in 
philosophical contexts as the capacity for intentionality, functions according to 
a complex set of logical structures owing to its basis in biology and, more 
specifically, to its basis in consciousness as a feature of neurobiology. Such 
logical structures govern the ways in which we relate to the physical world 
around us, as well as in the case of humans how physical objects (including 
bodily actions) take on meanings, status functions, institutional values etc. that 
are beyond the physical manifestations themselves—the latter arguably a 
unique human characteristic.41 If indeed, as Tomlinson suggests, human 
linguistic capacities overlap in important ways with those of music, the 
structural components of a meaningful musical utterance (the proposed basic 
unit of our analysis) can be understood to parallel in important ways those of 
a speech act in ordinary language. 
Notwithstanding differences (of the kind Small describes between 
verbal and gestural language) that reside at later levels, at the most basic level 
the actions of musical utterances, like the actions of speech acts (whether 
manifested as sounds or gestures), likewise carry conceptual meanings, 
																																																								41	For	a	short	survey	of	arguments	that	exist	both	for	and	against	the	Neanderthals’	alleged	capacity	for	symbolism	and	representation,	see:	Steven	Mithen,	“Creations	of	Pre-Modern	Human	Minds:	Stone	Tool	Manufacture	and	Use	by	Homo	Habilis,	Heidelbergensis	and	Neanderthalensis,”	in	Creations	of	the	Mind:	Theories	of	Artifacts	and	Their	Representation,	eds.	Eric	Margolis	and	Stephen	Laurence	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	289-311.	
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though of a far less specific kind. No matter how closely a bodily action might 
seem intrinsically related to its projected meanings, the essential feature 
shared by both speech acts and musical utterances, I argue, is that conceptual 
meanings are imposed upon bodily actions, where such actions are considered 
in one way as objects of materiality in the world like any other objects. 
John Searle’s general theory of intentionality, which follows upon his 
earlier research in the philosophy of language, serves to lay out the 
philosophical foundations for his earlier theory of speech acts.42 Searle’s 
general theory of intentionality makes explicit that human speech act behavior 
parallels and derives from the more fundamental structures of human 
intentionality.43 In light of the parallelisms between musical utterances and 
speech acts, my theory of musical intentionality therefore builds upon the 
general theory of intentionality outlined by Searle. It aims to make explicit 
how the shared faculties of intentionality enable in similar yet different ways 
the structural features of musical utterances. The sections that follow will 
formalize the core components of the theory, namely: 
 
1.  How the logical properties of human intentionality structure 
musical actions and perceptions, and 
2.  How such actions and perceptions in turn, via the logical 
properties of human intentionality, shape conceptual meanings 
that are attached onto those musical actions and perceptions. 
 																																																								42	Searle,	Intentionality	(1983);	Speech	Acts	(1969).	43	See	also	Introduction	footnote	No.	14.	
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1.3 The Basic Structural Components of Intentionality 
 
To begin, I rehearse some of the basic structures of intentionality 
presented in Searle’s general theory in Intentionality (1983).44 We recall that 
intentionality denotes those aspects of conscious mental states that are 
directed at, are about, or represent states of affairs beyond themselves. In this 
definition, any conscious mental state that has directedness—or 
“aboutness”—to something beyond itself might be called an intentionalistic 
state. Commonly cited examples of intentionalistic states are beliefs, desires, 
intentions, hopes. As Searle points out, these mental states have a two-part 
structure: a propositional content (that such-and-such) represented under a 
psychological mode (such as belief, desire, or in the case of actions, an 
intention to carry out something). In the analytic philosophical tradition, this 
structure is represented more simply as: S(p), where S denotes psychological 
mode and p the propositional content. To illustrate, below are two examples of 
intentionality, each with its psychological mode and propositional content: 
 
Believe (that Obama is president). 
Hope (that Obama is president). 
 
The above examples illustrate that the same propositional content can 
occur under different psychological modes, while conversely the same 																																																								44	The	English	term	“intentionality”	is	derived	from	the	German	term	Intentionalität,	and	its	use	here	has	no	specific	association	with	the	conventional	meaning	of	“intending,”	as	in	the	separate	German	term	Absicht.	To	intend	to	do	something	is	merely	one	of	many	possible	types	of	intentionality.	
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psychological mode can accommodate a potentially infinite number of 
propositions. It is important to note here that the proposition constitutes the 
content of the intentionalistic state and not the intentionalistic object of either 
the belief or hope. The object here is Obama, but the proposition is “that he is 
president.”45 
A core component of Searle’s theory of intentionality is that 
intentionalistic states and propositional contents further operate under two 
additional principles: 1. conditions of satisfaction and 2. direction of fit. In 
terms of conditions of satisfaction, a defining characteristic of propositional 
contents is that, when represented by a given intentionalistic state, they can be 
either true or false, fulfilled or unfulfilled: framed more generally, they can be 
said to be either satisfied or unsatisfied. Propositional contents determine a set 
of conditions under which an intentionalistic state can be satisfied (or not). 
The psychological mode of the intentional state, on the other hand, specifies 
the “direction” of how those conditions are satisfied in terms of the agent’s 
relation to the world. According to Searle, all intentionalistic states with a 
direction of fit thus internally represent some condition(s) under which that 
state will be satisfied or not satisfied in a given direction of fit between the 
agent the external world. For instance, if one has an intentionalistic state of 
belief (S) that such and such (p), the state of believing is satisfied (ordinarily in 
the case of beliefs one would say simply that it is true) if and only if some 
external reality in the world comes to match the conditions of satisfaction 																																																								45	Lest	there	were	confusions	about	this	point,	it	is	important	to	note	also	that	propositional	contents	(though	presented	here	in	verbal	terms)	do	not	have	to	be	either	verbal	or	linguistic.	In	fact,	most	intentionalistic	states	that	occur	in	everyday	activities	could	have	non-verbal/linguistic	propositional	contents.	
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determined by the propositional content under mental representation. In this 
sense, “belief” is said to have a “mind-to-world” (m-w) direction of fit. 
Conversely, a desire or an intention to do something has a “world-to-mind” 
(w-m) direction of fit: the satisfactory fulfillment of these intentionalistic states 
is in these cases dependent on whether states of affairs external to the agent 
come to match the conditions set out by the desire or intention. Critically, in 
both sets of cases, human intentionality sets its own conditions that determine 
senses of success or failure. This last point makes clear the principal problem 
that comes with shifting the sites of interpretation beyond human intentions 
onto material media: material media cannot determine conditions for success 
or failure since they lack the necessary (neuro)biological capacities to do so. 
 Table 1.1 juxtaposes and summarizes the two broad categories of 
intentionality—cognitive and volitional—with each defined by their 
contrasting directions of fit.46 The table additionally distinguishes between 
whether an intentionalistic state is causally self-referential or not and if so, its 
direction of causation.47 This distinction, as we shall see later on, is a critical 
criterion by which musical utterances derive meaning from embodied and 
material domains. 
 
 
 
																																																								46	This	table	is	a	simplified	version	adapted	from	Searle,	Mind:	A	Brief	Introduction,	120.	47	Causal	self-referentiality	characterizes	the	indexical	intentionalistic	representations	of	real-world	actions	and	perceptions	(i.e.	in	the	“here-and-now”).	These	contrast	with	beliefs	and	desires	which	are	non-causally	self-referential	and	are	conceptual	in	nature.	
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1.4 The First Level: How Intentionality Structures Musical Actions and 
Perceptions 
 
Earlier I suggested (in 1.1) that the actions and perceptions involved in 
musicking (chiefly performance and listening) impart various kinds of bodily 
experiences to both performers and listeners, and that in certain musical 
contexts these experiences relate to a network of conceptual meanings. In this 
section I aim to offer a framework that defines how the faculty of 
intentionality structures musical actions and perceptions at the first, 
immediate level of experience. To begin, I offer a framework that helps to 
distinguish between those actions and perceptions which are fully intentional, 
that is to say those which have mental representational content, from those 
which may not be fully intentional. 
What does it mean for an agent to act and perceive intentionally in the 
context of music? In the senses with which I am using the terms here, actions 
and perceptions do not function independently of their conscious agents. On 
the nature of what can be properly be called actions, the philosopher of action 
Rowland Stout writes:  
 
An action is an agent doing something, and as such essentially involves the agent. 
Understanding action is understanding what it is for an agent to act. The question of 
what it is to be a full-blown agent needs to be answered in tandem with the question 
of what is it for someone to act in a full-blown way. And this is usually taken to be the 
same as asking what it is for someone to act intentionally. Characterizing intentional 
	 38	
action and distinguishing it from lesser sorts of action or activity are the central goals 
of the philosophy of action.48 [emphasis original] 
 
For Rowland, the notion of action (and I suggest that the same holds 
true for the notion of perception) is intimately connected with notions of 
intentionality and agency. In terms of action, there are of course events 
occurring within our bodies which are not part of our acting intentionally: 
stomachs digesting, pupils dilating, or hair growing. These types of bodily 
phenomena, though active, are not normally considered actions because we 
can no more intend to secrete more acid to digest a meal than intend to grow 
more or less hair. These phenomena occur naturally as part of our natural 
biology, and because we cannot intend for them to happen one way or 
another, there is no intentionality that supports them—which is to say such 
“actions” hold no determinants for conditions of success or failure. To be sure, 
we might legitimately believe that if one’s hair were to stop growing, or if 
one’s digestive system malfunctions, that these events represent failures of a 
sort. But such failures are not intrinsic to the said biological phenomena; 
rather, in such “failed” cases our intentionality attributes them with notions of 
failure relative to what we believe conceptually counts as failures (or 
successes). In this way, the notion of “growth,” for instance, implies the 
presence of an intentionalistic state replete with conditions of satisfaction that 
render instances of hair growth either successful or unsuccessful. Yet insofar 
as hair itself is concerned, since it is not intrinsically intentionalistic (that is, 
hair is not considered to harbor mental representational content), the notion of 																																																								48	Rowland	Stout,	Action	(Montreal:	McGill	University	Press,	2005),	3.	
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“growth” as applied to the biology of hair growth is purely “as-if” and 
metaphoric.  
The above examples evoke clear-cut cases. Yet the distinction between 
intentional and non-intentional actions is not always so clear-cut either in 
everyday life or in more specialized cases of “skill-coping,” of which musical 
performance is a paradigmatic example. To understand how action and 
perception might relate to conceptual meaning in musical contexts, we need 
critical tools that sharpen our sensitivity in distinguishing between those that 
are intentional and those that are non-intentional, that is to say between those 
that harbor intentionalistic content and those that do not.  
 
1.5 Phenomenological versus Logical Analysis 
 
If, as I have argued, intentionality is the principal enabling pathway 
through which embodiment and materiality relate to conceptual meaning, 
locating the analytic tools for distinguishing between those actions that are 
intentional and those that are non-intentional constitutes a critical step in 
formulating a theory of musical intentionality and in approaching the central 
theme of this dissertation. In contemporary philosophy, there have been two 
dominant and contrasting approaches to these issues. The first might be 
broadly termed the phenomenological tradition (more precisely post-
Husserlian or existential phenomenology); the second, the logical-analytic. In 
a series of well-known essays, Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle, each 
representing the two traditions respectively, offer contrasting accounts of 
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human actions and perceptions particularly in the areas of skill-coping, habits, 
and “know-how.” From the phenomenological perspective, Dreyfus argues 
that much of what we call skill-coping operates on the level of the 
background: a non-propositional, non-representational, and non-intentional 
field of forces that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty call the “phenomenon of 
world.”49 Subscribing to their views, Dreyfus writes:  
 
Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent 
behavior, learning and skillful action, can be described and explained without 
recourse to mind or brain representations.50  
 
While Searle also speaks of the background as a set of non-
representational mental capacities necessary for intentionalities such as action 
and perception (among others) to properly function,51 he argues that the kinds 
of skillful actions that Dreyfus relegates to the non-representational 
background are in fact fully intentionalistic and analyzable in terms of their 
conditions of satisfaction.52 The differences in views between these two 																																																								49	Hubert	Dreyfus,	“Introductory	Essay:	The	Mystery	of	the	Background	qua	Background,”	in	
Knowing	Without	Thinking:	Mind,	Action,	Cognition,	and	the	Phenomenon	of	the	Background	ed.	Zdravko	Radman	(London:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2012),	9.		50	Dreyfus,	“A	Phenomenology	of	Skill	Acquisition	as	the	Basis	for	a	Merleau-Pontian	Non-Representationalist	Cognitive	Science,”	from	http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/MerleauPontySkillCogSci.pdf	(2004):	1.	51	Searle,	Intentionality,	141-159	and	141	in	particular.	See	also:	Michael	Schmitz,	“The	Background	as	Intentional,	Conscious,	and	Nonconceptual”	in	Knowing	Without	Thinking,	57.	Schmitz	takes	Searle’s	arguments	further	than	Searle’s	own	original	formulation.	52	For	an	extensive	debate	on	this	issue,	see	the	following:	Searle,	“The	Phenomenological	Illusion,”	in	Searle,	Philosophy	in	a	New	Century	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	107-136;	Searle,	“The	Limits	of	Phenomenology,”	in	Heidegger,	Coping,	and	Cognitive	Science:	
Essays	in	Honor	of	Hubert	L.	Dreyfus	Volume	2,	eds.	Mark	A.	Wrathall	and	J.	E.	Malpas	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	MIT	Press,	2000);	Dreyfus,	“Heidegger’s	Critique	of	the	Husserl/Searle	Account	of	Intentionality”	Social	Research	60/1	(1993):	17-38;	Dreyfus,	“Phenomenological	Description	Versus	Rational	Reconstruction”	Revue	Internationale	de	Philosophie	55/216	(2001):	181-196;	
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dominant traditions derive in part from differences in their methods of 
analysis: phenomenological introspection of the phenomenologically available 
(and unavailable) on the one hand; and on the other, logical analysis of 
conditions, in our case the conditions of satisfaction for a given musical action 
or perception. In Searle’s logical account, a crucial problem of the 
phenomenological methodology is that many if not most conditions of 
satisfaction under representation are not always phenomenologically available 
to the immediate conscious foreground. As Searle argues: “some of the most 
important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality.”53 
I now turn to discussing a musical example in order to illuminate how 
the methods of logical analysis—which entails the analysis of conditions and 
the intentional state(s) in question—might provide insights in distinguishing 
between those actions that harbor mental content and those that might not 
legitimately qualify as intentional actions. To cite but one recent example that 
argues for the non-representational status of musical actions, Roger Moseley 
writes: 
 
The pedagogical materials and traditions of partimenti, which for so long eluded the 
attention of Anglophone scholars on account of their lack of a literary rubric, also 
operated according to serial and parallel logic: rather than a text to be read, a 
partimento is both a puzzle and an algorithm, a concise script that must be 
																																																																																																																																																															Dreyfus	“The	Primacy	of	Phenomenology	Over	Logical	Analysis,”	Philosophical	Topics	27/2	(1999):	3-24.	For	a	third-party	perspective	on	these	debates,	see	Sean	Kelly,	“Closing	the	Gap:	Phenomenology	and	Logical	Analysis,”	Harvard	Review	of	Philosophy	13/2	(2005):	4-24.	53	Searle,	“The	Phenomenological	Illusion,”	114-15.	
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uncompressed and processed via the hardware of a harpsichord, the interface of its 
keyboard, and the “wetware” of its player’s experience, skill, memory, and 
associations in order to become music. Such computation need not be carried out 
consciously; as Leibniz put it, “music is a hidden arithmetic exercise of the soul, which 
does not know it is counting.” This helps explain the phenomenon noted by John 
Locke, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, and Denis Diderot in which the cognitive burden 
of playing—or, in the latter’s case, improvising—at the keyboard is delegated from the 
brain to the digits, thus affording the Gadamerian sensation of being played even while 
playing.54 [my emphases] 
 
Describing the practice of realizing partimenti (and figured bass more 
broadly), Moseley begins by acknowledging the presence and function of 
mental processes that are innate to the activity. Yet during the course of his 
description, Moseley adopts terms that evoke (even if they do not fully 
commit to) functionalist and computational theories of the mind. Although he 
cites the resources of memory, skills, and experience—all of which are 
traditionally acknowledged to be highly intentionalistic—as the bedrock that 
enable the necessary mental processing, Moseley conjures a computational, 
mechanistic view of the mind that leads him to conclude that such “mental” 
processes in fact need not be conscious. Since these processes harbor no 
mental representational content, the “cognitive burden” responsible for 
animating the musical activity can thus be understood as being “delegated 
from the brain to the digits.” In support of his views, Moseley evokes the 
plausible phenomenological sensation of seemingly “being played” by the 
material object of the keyboard “even while playing.” 																																																								54	Moseley,	“Digital	Analogies,”	181.	
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Moseley’s analysis echoes those of post-Husserlian phenomenology 
whereby high-level skill coping are explained in non-representational terms.55 
Yet he fails to recognize the multitude of conditions of satisfaction that are 
built into an activity as layered and acculturated as partimento realization that 
render it fully intentionalistic. Not least, the pedagogical origin of the 
partimento tradition, which aims to incrementally develop musical skills and 
judgment in its subjects, is precisely predicated on the conscious learning of 
these skills at the initial stages leading to the sedimentation of their conditions 
of satisfaction at deeper levels of intentionality in the later stages of mastery. 
The myriad conditions of satisfaction underlying partimento realization—as 
norms of voice leading, schemata, and other more nuanced features of style 
that do not amount to easy textual codification—do not typically manifest 
themselves at the phenomenological surface at later stages of learning to be 
sure, especially when considered from a real-time context. However, for 
partimento realization to function at all as a two-way communicative art form, 
one that lends itself to critical evaluation (in a master-student context), shared 
conditions of satisfaction figure as the basis for enabling such processes of 
evaluation. It is not that phenomenological introspections contradict the 
findings of logical analysis, but that they can only serve as the beginning 
rather than the end point for any such analysis: logical analysis of conditions 
takes over where phenomenological introspection ends.  
The methods of logical analysis seek to establish whether there are 
conditions of success and failure that determine and regulate a given human 																																																								55	Moseley	cites	the	writings	and	ideas	of	Heidegger	elsewhere	in	“Digital	Analogies.”	
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activity, and if so, seek to explore and identify those conditions. By doing so, 
the analytic method brings to the conscious foreground conditions of 
satisfaction that otherwise remain beyond the reach of phenomenological 
reflection. When approached this way, logical methodologies have the effect 
of “slowing down” real-time processes, revealing the multitude of conditions 
of satisfaction at work throughout the cognitive structure, many of which 
might indeed not be phenomenologically available but can be in principle 
made explicit (one could argue that this is precisely the function of texts and 
manuals that codify such kinds of historical practices). Analysis of conditions 
lifts the more embedded mental representations into foreground conscious 
awareness in the same way that when glitches occur during an activity of 
skill-coping, that such moments likewise bring those conditions (if only 
momentarily) to the fore of the agent’s consciousness. Moseley’s account 
neutralizes the active intentionalistic processes that underlie an activity that 
can be evaluated through constructed values in the guise of conditions of 
satisfaction, while gesturing toward non-representational materiality as at 
least in part “actively” responsible for engendering such conditions, 
conditions that have their basis in neurobiology. 
Although the merits and practices of these contrasting methodologies 
remain debated, my purpose here is to introduce the methods and questions 
posed by logical analysis as a supplement to phenomenological introspection, 
the latter more frequently practiced in musicological studies of musical 
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action.56 The aim is to introduce tools that sharpen our sensitivity to the often 
difficult distinction between musical actions that are intentional versus those 
that are non-intentional. In this section, I hope to have made the case that the 
essential property which distinguishes the intentional from the non-
intentional is that we can delineate conditions of success/failure for the 
former and not for the latter. Moreover in the case of intentional musical 
actions, these conditions can in principle be brought to consciousness even in 
those cases when they do not have obvious phenomenological presence.57 
 
1.6 The Second Level: Intentionalistic Structures of Meaningful Musical 
Utterances 
 
Having introduced the principal components of intentionality—such as 
psychological/intentional state, propositional content, condition of 
satisfaction, and direction of fit—and shown how this set of concepts animates 
and structures intentional musical actions and perceptions at the first level of 
experience, I explore in this section how conceptual meanings (at the second 
level of experience) are imposed onto first level actions and perceptions to 																																																								56	To	cite	but	one	recent	musicological	study	that	explicitly	draws	upon	the	ideas	of	post-Husserlian	phenomenologists,	see:	Jonathan	De	Souza,	Musical	Instruments,	Bodies,	and	Cognition	(Ph.D.	diss.,	University	of	Chicago,	2013).	57	On	the	question	of	whether	there	might	be	“non-intentional	musical	actions,”	the	question	prompts	two	further	distinctions.	One	can	easily	conceive	of	non-musical	intentional	actions:	for	instance	the	act	of	sitting	on	a	piano	bench	would	be	an	example	of	an	intentional	action	that,	though	requisite	for	the	musical	purpose	of	playing	the	piano,	is	not	typically	understood	to	be	strictly	musical.	One	can	also	conceive	of	non-intentional	actions	that	occur	during	otherwise	intentional	musical	actions:	the	complex	and	intricate	movements	of	the	larynx	during	the	intentional	act	of	singing,	for	instance,	typically	do	not	harbor	representational	content	for	vocalists,	who	are	traditionally	trained	through	the	aid	of	metaphors	that	represent	their	vocal	technique	in	ways	that	are	made	mentally	accessible.	
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give rise to a meaningful musical utterance. The chapter will then culminate 
with the formulation of a theory of musical intentionality that formalizes the 
intentionalistic structures underlying such an utterance. 
To begin exploring how conceptual meanings are imposed onto 
experiences of musical materiality, I draw on a set of structural overlaps with 
the intentionalistic structures of speech acts in ordinary language. The central 
question concerning how language as acts of speech refers to objects and 
states of affairs is: How do the physical properties of speech acts (as spoken 
sounds, gestures, or marks on paper) refer to or represent semantic meaning 
that lies beyond the physical manifestations themselves? How do bodily 
gestures and material objects, which are not intrinsically intentionalistic, 
derive their meaning? As the example of the dollar bill illustrates, there is a 
double level of intentionality in both the performance and perception of 
meaningful representations across disparate domains. There is first the 
intentionality with which the utterance (or materiality) is physically created 
(or perceived). There is then a second-level intentionality that confers the 
conditions of satisfaction of its intentional state (for instance beliefs or desires) 
onto the conditions of satisfaction of the first level of intentionality. The 
workings of this double level of intentionality explain why, as Searle points 
out: 
meaning exists only where there is a distinction between Intentional content and the 
form of its externalization, and to ask for meaning is to ask for an Intentional content 
that goes with the form of externalization.58 (my emphases)  
 																																																								58	Searle,	Intentionality,	28.	
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In the context of speech acts, this is to say that the physical action is the 
material vehicle by way of which one means something. Once a second level 
of intentionality has been confered onto the physical action, the action as a 
materiality represents meanings, conceptual notions, institutional values etc. 
over and above its manifest physical features. It can then be said that the 
entire speech act package, now carrying its own set of conditions of 
satisfaction (that such and such), will be satisfied if and only if the expressed 
psychological state of the second level of intentionality is satisfied under its 
prescribed conditions of satisfaction and direction of fit. 
I argue that a similar, though not identical, structure pertains to 
meaningful musical utterances. It is likewise the case that products of musical 
materiality are not in-and-of-themselves intrinsically meaningful—they 
become meaningful only after conscious agents have attached a second level 
of intentionality onto the material product. It is crucial—for the purposes of 
exploring the elasticity inherent in the broad range of ways that musical 
materiality relates to meaning—to maintain the distinction between the two 
levels of intentionality, especially in cases where there might seem to be an 
intimate affinity between the musical materiality (and our first level 
experiences of it) and its projected set of meanings.59  
The intentionalistic structures of a meaningful musical utterance 
likewise involve the intentional conferring of a (second level) set of conditions 
of satisfaction onto (first level) experiences of actions and perceptions. Musical 
sounds and actions when performed with meaningful intention gain a set of 																																																								59	As	an	analogy,	recall	Small’s	example	of	baring	of	teeth	as	an	instance	of	gestural	language	(footnote	No.	1).	
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derived representational qualities60 that are themselves derivative of the 
biological functions of intentionality. These views regard meaningful musical 
production as a close cousin of other human capacities such as linguistic, 
gestural, and visual representation. Yet while the direction of fit determined 
by the psychological mode of the (second-level) intentionality in ordinary 
language, for instance, can flow equally in either direction (for instance, one 
makes statements about beliefs or desires with equal ease), the default 
direction of fit of the second-level intentionality of musical utterances, I argue, 
occurs under the mind-to-world direction of fit.61 
We are now in a position to make formal the key components of a 
theory of musical intentionality. Example 0.3 summarizes the “flow” of 
intentionality that gives rise to a meaningful musical utterance. The set of 
intentionalities shown on the left-hand side of the example engenders what I 
have been calling the first level of experience (or representation) of physical 
materiality, including embodied actions. The right-hand set of intentionalities 
engenders representations of conceptual meaning attached onto the physical 
manifestations of the musical utterance. The upper dashed arrow shows the 
process of imposing the second layer of intentionality onto the first, while the 
lower (two-way) dashed arrow illustrates the continuum of possible relations 
between materiality and meaning that might exist, and more importantly the 
																																																								60	The	notion	of	“representation”	here	and	throughout	the	dissertation	is	used	not	in	the	(more	narrow)	sense	of	programmatic	representation,	but	in	the	broader	sense	of	mental	representation.	61	By	contrast,	an	example	of	a	world-to-mind	musical	utterance	is	the	case	of	bugle	calls	in	military	contexts.	Such	utterances	constitute	an	example	whereby	music	gestures	can	be	used	as	“directives”	whose	conditions	of	satisfaction	are	satisfied	if	and	only	if	when	a	change	in	some	state	of	affairs	in	the	world	takes	place.		
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ontological basis of those relations. The theoretical framework serves to 
ground the analytic goals for the remainder of the dissertation: to explore 
moments when the physical sense of “what it is like” to execute a musical 
gesture comes into dialogue with the musical utterance’s associated network 
of meanings. Framed more formally, such moments occur when the 
intentional content (i.e. conditions of satisfaction) of the (first level) 
intentionality that causes the physical action becomes part of the intentional 
content (conditions of satisfaction) of the (second level) musical meaning(s) 
that are conferred onto that action. 
 
1.7 Aspectual Shapes as Enabling Translator 
 
The final component that needs to be appended to a theory of musical 
intentionality is the notion of aspects, what Frege called “modes of 
presentation.”62 Intentional states represent their contents/conditions of 
satisfaction under certain aspects and not others. A common cited example of 
an aspectual shape is water and H2O. A desire for water does not equate to a 
desire for H2O: a person might not be aware that water is H2O, or alternatively 
might believe that water is in fact H2O. Moreover, owing to the intrinsic 
subjectivity of mental representations, intentional contents and their objects 
are represented under unique aspects. I argue that the relation between 
musical materiality and meaning depends in great part on this feature of 																																																								62	Gottlob	Frege,	“On	Sinn	and	Bedeutung,”	in	The	Frege	Reader,	trans.	Max	Black	ed.	Michael	Beaney	(Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishers,	1997),	151-71.	Frege’s	paper	was	first	published	in	the	
Zeitschrift	für	Philosophie	und	philosophische	Kritik	100	(1892):	25-50.		
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intentionality. The capacity for intentionality to represent the same object 
under different aspects enables a kind of “translation” across different 
domains of experience. In terms of musical intentionality, it is the 
phenomenon of aspectual representation that enables relations to hold 
between the two different levels of intentionality: the embodied/material 
domain and the conceptual domain. The aspect(s) under which physical 
senses of doing or perceiving a musical gesture are intentionalistically 
represented become related to the aspect(s) represented in the intentional 
content of the meaning. 
In musical discourse, the theoretical systems of music theory and 
analysis are rife with implications of aspectual shape. For instance, the 
commonly voiced claim that something is heard “as such and such” implicitly 
points to the aspectual shapes (or modes of representation) attendant to a 
given theoretical paradigm or some specific way of listening. The possibilities 
range from basic notions such as pivot chords, to Schenkerian voice leading 
structures, to Gjerdigenian schemata, to units of pitch class sets, or to complex 
Lewinian modes of perception, and so on. Depending upon context, different 
aspects can often be attached onto a singular encounter with a given physical 
utterance in a manner that echoes Weber’s Mehrdeutigkeit, Carl Schachter’s 
“Either/Or,” and much of Lewin’s analytic ideal of multiple enactments, 
among others.63 A sonority consisting of a major triad plus a minor third, for 
																																																								63	See	Janna	Saslaw,	“Gottfried	Weber	and	Multiple	Meaning,”	Theoria	5	(1990):	74-103;	Carl	Schachter,	“Either/Or,”	in	Schenker	Studies,	ed.	Hedi	Siegel	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990),	165-79;	Steven	Rings,	“Review	of	David	Lewin,	Generalized	Musical	Intervals	and	
Transformations,	Musical	Form	and	Musical	Transformation:	Four	Analytic	Essays,	Studies	in	Music	
with	Text,”	Journal	of	Music	Theory	50/1	(2006):	111-27.	
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instance, can be simultaneously represented as (or “heard as,” to append it an 
intentional state) a V7, an augmented sixth, set class 4-27, or [0258]. Though 
the above examples are all conceptual aspects, there are certain classes of 
aspects that allow for translation to occur between conceptual and embodied 
representational contents. The senses of “up”-beats and “down”-beats, for 
instance, though now widely established as conceptual notions, owe their 
origins to highly embodied aspectual shapes. For such kinds of rhythmic 
notions, the first-level action- and perception-based representations often 
work in close conjunction with the more abstract notions such as harmony, 
form, and meter (see Chapter Three). 
The theory of musical intentionality presented in this chapter aims to 
establish a framework that enables the exploration of relations between 
conceptual meaning and aspects of musical materiality more generally. The 
purpose of the next chapter is to fashion a music-analytic methodology, 
building on the work of David Lewin, that will facilitate that exploration in 
actual musical contexts. 								
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Intentionality and Lewinian Transformational Theory 
 
In Chapter One, I developed a philosophical theory of musical 
intentionality. The theory—which extends from John Searle’s general theory of 
intentionality and the theory of speech acts—seeks to make formal the 
intentionalistic structures that animate relations between materiality and 
meaning specific to musical practices. The theory has shown how material 
features of musical utterances relate to their conceptual meanings on the basis 
of human intentionality and its logical structures. More specifically, the theory 
demonstrates that the basic structure of a meaningful musical utterance 
involves two levels of intentionality: one that carries out the physical aspects 
of the musical action (in the here and now) and another that represents 
conceptual meaning(s) imposed onto the action. 
In order to explore how these levels of intentionality relate in actual 
musical contexts in Part II, I develop in this chapter a music-analytic 
framework that models multiple levels of musical intentionality and their 
interactions. To be sure, most existing music-analytic methodologies model 
aspects of human intentionality with varying degrees of explicitness.64 
Nevertheless, among existing analytic methodologies Lewinian 
transformational theory is one of the most self-consciously and self-reflexively 																																																								64	Even	Schenkerian	analysis,	a	tradition	that	has	come	under	scrutiny	for	ostensibly	stating	“facts”	about	the	“music	itself,”	frequently	points	to	the	intentionality	of	its	claims	with	statements	such	as	“I	hear	x	as	y.”	See	footnote	no.	24	in	Introduction.	
	 53	
intentionalistic.65 Three features of this theory lend themselves to the 
exploration of musical intentionality: 1. the theory explicitly sets out to model 
interactions between multiple levels of what Lewin calls musical 
“experiences”66—including but not limited to “perceptions,” “intuitions,” and 
“enactments”—during the musical activities of composition, listening, 
performing, ear-training, etc.; 2. such kinds of “experiences” inherently 
involve rich intentionalistic implications; and 3. the generalizing powers of 
mathematical group theory provide a means of “translation” (often in the 
form of isographies) for relating different domains of musical experiences. 
Lewin’s notion of a musical space, one that is integral to his transformational 
theories, describes not only a set of musical objects and their relationships, but 
more importantly the accompanying human perspective(s) that engender such 
relationships: in other words, intentionalistic state(s). 
Yet Lewinian transformational theory as it stands remains a 
problematic framework for analyzing musical actions (and intentionality more 
generally) in the terms I develop in this dissertation. To begin, we need to 
examine the kinds of relations that Lewin draws between the formal 
components of his theories and their intentionalistic implications. Throughout 
his writings, Lewin’s predominantly post-Husserlian outlook underpins how 
he frames the intentionalistic implications of his transformational and other 																																																								65	In	addition	to	footnote	no.	25	in	Introduction,	see:	Ramon	Satyendra,	“An	Informal	Introduction	to	Some	Formal	Concepts	From	Lewin’s	Transformational	Theory,”	Journal	of	Music	
Theory	48	(2004):	135	where	he	writes:	“A	music	theory	for	communicating	perceptions	and	intuitions	locates	music	in	experience	and	not	in	nature.”	66	Ibid.	“In	applying	GMIT’s	[Generalized	Musical	Intervals	and	Transformations	(1987)]	theory	in	analysis,	one	judiciously	selects	both	a	musical	space	and	set	of	transformations	to	capture	a	musical	intuition.	A	passage	that	stimulates	more	than	one	intuition	may	inspire	multiple	descriptions,	perhaps	each	with	a	different	choice	of	space	and	transformations.”	
	 54	
theories and that when viewed from the perspective of this dissertation these 
can be seen to harbor several logical difficulties.67 
In order to formulate an analytic methodology, I first aim to clarify the 
philosophical bases of Lewin’s transformational theories and from there to 
offer ways to bridge what I argue are their inherent philosophical 
inconsistencies. The chapter therefore serves a twofold purpose: 1. to re-orient 
Lewin’s existing analytic technologies so that they may account for musical 
action and its interaction with perception and meaning, and 2. in the process, 
to formulate an analytic methodology for the exploration of musical 
intentionality more generally. 
 
2.2 Lewin’s Husserlian vs. Post-Husserlian Phenomenology 
 
The philosophical basis of Lewin’s transformational and other theories 
can be gleaned from the final section (section V) of “Music Theory, 
Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” (1986). In it Lewin recognizes the 
need for a philosophical and analytic framework that could venture beyond 
modeling musical perceptions (which remains the more familiar mode of 
engagement for music analysts) toward modeling musical actions.  
 
																																																								67	For	discussions	on	Lewin’s	relation	to	Husserlian	and	post-Husserlian	phenomenology,	see:	Steven	Rings,	“Tonality	and	Transformation”	(Ph.D.	diss.,	Yale	University,	2006);	Brian	Kane,	“Excavating	Lewin’s	‘Phenomenology,’”	Music	Theory	Spectrum	33/1	(2011);	Maryam	A.	Moshaver,	“Telos	and	Temporality:	Phenomenology	and	the	Experience	of	Time	in	Lewin’s	Study	of	Perception,”	Journal	of	the	American	Musicological	Society	65/1	(2012).	
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In laying out these ideas and the consequent dissatisfaction with his 
own P(perceptual)-model in this regard, Lewin writes: 
 
…since “music” is something you do, and not just something you perceive (or 
understand), a theory of music can not be developed fully from a theory of musical 
perception (with or without an ancillary dialectic). At least so I maintain. 
 
Making fresh music as a mode of musical perception—this link in the chain of 
perception-and-creation is missing in the perceptual theories we have so far 
considered, including my own p-model so far as it has been worked out as yet…After 
all, Husserl calls perception a mental act, and describes it as something extraordinarily 
creative. I do not see as yet, though, how he might distinguish and relate what we call 
acts of listening, acts of performing, and acts of composing, as varieties of perceptual 
response in various musical contexts.68 
 
The P-model’s principal “failing,” according to Lewin himself, is that it does 
not account for aspects of musical action and its relation to both perception 
and meaning. As Brian Kane has recently argued, Lewin’s seeming dead-end 
with regard to the P-model stems in part from a tension between his earlier 
(explicit) Husserlian framework for his P-model and his later (implicit) 
philosophical turn toward a post-Husserlian phenomenology.69 This 
incompatibility, which is responsible for Lewin’s avowed dissatisfaction, 
stems in part from two contrasting views regarding the functions of the 
(observing) subject and the (observed) object: in the most general terms, 																																																								68	David	Lewin,	“Music	Theory,	Phenomenology,	and	Modes	of	Perception,”	Music	Perception	3/4	(1986):	377,	381.	69	Brian	Kane,	27-36.	
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Husserlian phenomenology embraces this distinction while post-Husserlian 
phenomenologies seek to break it down. The impression one gains from Part 
V of “Music Theory, Phenomenology” is that the Husserlian 
phenomenological apparatus, which had helped Lewin erect the P-model, fell 
short of leading the model to accomplish what he had hoped it would, namely 
to more broadly account for musical actions beyond perceptions. This 
realization leads Lewin to dramatically reject the Husserlian framework in 
favor of a post-Husserlian phenomenology, though stopping short of 
pursuing the latter formally in the context of the article. 
Contrasting with Lewin’s own assessment, I propose in this chapter 
ways to extend Lewin’s Husserlian framework via Searlean notions that I 
argue will enable Lewinian’s existing analytic technologies to fill that gap.70 
 
2.3 The Intentionalistic Implications of Lewin’s “GIS/Intervallic” and  
“Transformational” Attitudes 
 
To pursue that end, I first examine Lewin’s transformational theories 
and their suggested intentionalistic implications as outlined in his 1987 
Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations (henceforth GMIT). In GMIT 
Lewin presents his transformational theories as analytic tools broadly 
conceived to model both “perceptions” and “doings.” The transformational 
apparatus purports to relate meaning with the broader contexts of bodily 																																																								70	My	view	contrasts	not	only	with	those	of	Lewin	himself,	but	additionally	with	those	of	Kane,	who	speculates	with	reference	to	the	P-model	that:	“possibility	remains	open	for	one	to	pursue	the	themes	introduced	in	Part	V	of	the	[“Phenomenology”]	essay	through	an	application	of	post-Husserlian	phenomenology,	in	particular,	through	a	close	study	of	Merleau-Ponty.”	Ibid.,	35.	
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intentionality. With his celebrated figure from GMIT— replicated earlier as 
Example 0.2—Lewin presents two contrasting but complementary modes of 
musical engagement, what he terms the Cartesian-intervallic attitude and the 
transformational attitude. To explore each mode, Lewin formulates two sets of 
analytic tools: the so-called Generalized Interval System (GIS) for the former 
and more wide-ranging group theoretic systems for the latter. These modes of 
musical engagement amount to what are essentially two contrasting classes of 
intentionalities that enact the abstract components of Example 0.2. Lewin’s 
presentation places significant emphasis on the active verbs with which 
analysts and musicians construe musical relations.71 In ways comparable to 
the guiding premise of speech act theory, which seeks to understand linguistic 
meaning from the perspective of speaker intention, Lewin’s conceptions of 
music theory and analysis are similarly grounded in the intentionalities of 
conscious agents. 
The principal innovation of Lewin’s transformational attitude involves 
re-conceiving familiar notions of intervallic distance as various kinds of 
human “doings” that enact the imagined “distance” between musical objects. 
Yet Lewin’s “doings” do not for the most part model intrinsic intentionalities 
that animate real-world actions, but rather model senses of actions: that is to 
say Lewin’s transformational “actions” and “doings” are less embodied 
actions in any real-world sense than they are conceptual values.72 Conversely, 
																																																								71	For	such	examples,	see	David	Lewin,	Generalized	Musical	Intervals	and	Transformations	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1987),	xxix,	xxxi,	158-159.	72	This	view	corroborated	by	Ring’s	observations:	“…it	is	clear	that	Lewin	does	not	intend	all	transformations	to	be	understood	so	literally.	As	his	writings	make	clear,	he	primarily	intends	the	concept	metaphorically,	or	as	a	simile:	the	mindset	of	the	transformational	analyst	is	like	the	
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Lewin frames the Cartesian intervallic attitude as principally a passive mode 
of engagement on the part of the agent, a mode in which one passively 
perceives or measures a distance out there in some musical space. The GIS 
formula int(s, t) = i serves as the essential analytic formalism of the intervallic 
attitude. The int function, in intentionalistic terms, characterizes the 
intentional state of the agent’s “stance” in relation to the music; in Lewin’s 
presentation, int is a perceptual act in which the agent observes “a 
measurement of extension between points s and t… passively ‘out there’ in a 
Cartesian res extensa.”73 Yet that perception (especially when viewed in light of 
the biological naturalist notions of mind) involves a greater degree of active 
intentionality than Lewin is willing to acknowledge. Despite Lewin’s 
characterization (“passively out there”), the int function nonetheless 
represents “action(s)” carried out by a conscious agent.74 Such perceptual acts 
are in fact supported by the full family of intentionalistic notions outlined in 
Chapter One—including psychological state, representations of propositional 
content, conditions of satisfaction, aspectual shape, and direction of fit. 
Without needing to invoke the transformational attitude, the intervallic 
attitude itself fully engages the active verbs of perception to signify active 
processes of intentionality and its associated concepts. The question therefore 																																																																																																																																																															mindset	of	the	performer.	See	Rings,	“Tonality	and	Transformations,”	50.	One	notable	instance	of	Lewin	speaking	of	concrete	performative	actions	occurs	in	his	analysis	of	Debussy’s	“Feux	D’Artifice.”	See	Lewin,	Musical	Form	and	Transformation:	Four	Analytic	Essays	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1993),	157.	73	Lewin,	Generalized	Musical	Intervals	and	Transformations,	xxxi.	74	For	instance,	the	familiar	classes	of	intervals	for	the	pitch	domain	are	almost	never	purely	representations	of	observer-independent	facts	but	rather	represent	distinct	conceptual	notions	imbued	with	music-theoretical,	cultural,	and	other	values.	Rings’	analysis	of	Bach’s	Cello	Suite	in	G	in	Tonality	and	Transformations	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	21-24	illustrates	this	point.	
	 59	
is not whether functions of intentionality are present or absent in one attitude 
or another—they are present in both. The question, rather, is whether there are 
indeed meaningful differences in the intentionalistic structures that underlie 
the two contrasting attitudes and how these “intuitions” can be analyzed in 
musical contexts. 
 
2.4 Lewinian Analytic Technologies and Their Intentionalistic Structures 
 
In GMIT Lewin further draws correlations between his analytic 
technologies and their underlying musical intuitions. The formal technology 
of GIS groups is conceived to model the intuition of an agent in the posture of 
an observer “measuring” a Cartesian point-space external to himself. 
Alternatively, the STRANS (simply transitive) and other technologies of the 
transformational attitude can be tailored to accommodate intuition(s) 
comparable to those of a composer or performer who carries out musical 
processes from within the performing body.75 In short, Lewin intends that 
transformational technologies model intentionalities of musical actions while 
GIS technologies model intentionalities of musical perceptions. The former are 
constituted by the transformational formula Ti(s) = t, which re-conceptualizes 
the intervallically-inspired GIS formula. For Lewin, the contrasting group-
theoretic characteristics of the two formalisms capture a distinction in the 
																																																								75	Lewin,	GMIT,	158-59.	
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conscious agent’s intentionalistic stance, namely the difference between a 
perceptual and an active relation to the world.76 
I argue, however, that the distinction between Lewin’s transformational 
and intervallic attitudes stems from intrinsic differences in the intentionalistic 
structures of perception and action—and specifically from their contrasting 
directions of fit—rather than from differences between their group-theoretic 
structures. Table 2.1 outlines Lewin’s analytical technologies and relates them 
to the intentionalistic implications that Lewin ascribes to the analytic 
formalisms. The table presents GIS groups and their associated “passive” 
mode of enactment, on the one hand, and the broader group-theoretic 
possibilities of transformational groups and their associated “active” mode of 
enactment on the other. The table then delineates the implicit intentionalistic 
structures of Lewin’s two contrasting attitudes. Perception belongs to the 
“cognitive” class of intentionality while action belongs to the “volitional” (see 
Table 1.1). Lewin’s passive metaphor for the GIS/intervallic attitude is hereby 
defined concretely by the m-w (mind-to-world) direction of fit characteristic of 
cognitive states, while his active metaphor for the transformational attitude is 
defined concretely by the w-m (world-to-mind) direction of fit characteristic of 
volitional states. 
Inferring from Table 2.1, we might posit an additional (non-trivial) 
correlation between the two group-theoretic structures on the one hand, and 
the two intentionalistic structures on the other. In terms of the intentionalistic 
structures, perception takes logical priority over action in human and animal 																																																								76	See	Lewin’s	oft-cited	statement	from	GMIT,	xxxi:	“If	I	am	at	s	and	wish	to	get	to	t,	what	characteristic	gesture	should	I	perform	in	order	to	arrive	there?”	
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intentionalistic behavior: a conscious agent can have perception without 
action but there can be no intentional action without some kind of perceptual 
ability. It is in this sense that the intentionalistic structures of action can be 
said to logically subsume those of perception. Analogously, in terms of the 
group-theoretic structures of GIS and transformational systems, the broader 
scope of transformational groups subsumes the more narrowly-defined GIS 
groups. As Lewin points out, all GIS groups can be conceived 
transformationally as simply transitive (STRANS) groups, yet crucially not all 
transformational groups are simply transitive. The possible groups of the 
transformational perspective are thereby conceptually broader and offer a 
wider range of application than the GIS perspective.77 Yet notwithstanding 
this observable correlation between intentionalistic structures and group-
theoretic structures, I argue in the following section that group-theoretic 
distinctions do not determine the kinds of intentionalistic distinctions Lewin 
wishes to draw between the two analytic attitudes and systems. 
 
2.5 Lewin’s Conceptual Gap: I 
 
An impression one might glean from Lewin’s distinction between the 
intervallic and transformational attitudes is that there is a direct correlation 
between the two group-theoretic structures and their application in real-world 
musical contexts. Framed in the philosophical terms presented here, Lewin’s 																																																								77	It	is	worth	noting	that	Lewin	introduces	semigroups	in	Chapter	1	of	GMIT.	Certain	transformations—for	instance	those	that	are	not	one-to-one	and	onto—inhabit	semigroups,	not	groups.	This	is	another	feature	in	which	the	transformational	attitude	is	broader	in	scope	and	application	than	the	GIS	attitude.	
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position might be described as: GIS groups model “passive” cognitive 
intentional states with m-w fit; STRANS/transformational groups model 
“active” volitional intentional states with w-m fit. Yet difficulties with this 
division arise when we reflect on both Lewin’s descriptions of the intervallic 
and transformational attitudes and their group-theoretic apparatuses. The 
problem is that it is equally conceivable that one can mentally represent 
propositional contents that have as their conditions of satisfaction 
transformational functions under so-called “passive” cognitive states (under 
the m-w direction of fit). Like GIS intervals, most of Lewin’s transformational 
functions are in fact representations of conceptual notions rather than 
embodied actions. Conversely, it is difficult to conceive how one might 
observe a measurement of a distance “out there” in the world without the 
“active” workings of cognitive and perceptual intentionalities. Just as one can 
believe (under m-w fit) that the distance between s and t is i, one can equally 
believe (under the same m-w fit) that Ti is the functional operator that relates 
the input s to the output t, as exemplified by the transformational formula 
Ti(s) = t.  
To frame this in a different way, I argue that the formal properties of 
transformational groups are not confined to modeling the volitional class of 
intentionalities in musical contexts, nor are the formal properties of GISes 
confined to modeling cognitive intentionalities. All of the analytic examples in 
GMIT that aim to illustrate the transformational apparatus can equally be 
interpreted as depicting different classes of mental beliefs.78 To be sure, Lewin 																																																								78	See	footnote	No.	72	above.	
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intuitively grasps that the intentionalities of perception and action are 
fundamental to a multitude of musical practices. However, once we base our 
understanding on how human agents relate to the world through the 
biological capacities of intentionality, it becomes clear that the attendant 
intentionalities of Lewin’s transformational functions more often represent 
“as-if” intentions-in-action than any real-world intentional actions. The 
essential distinction between GIS/intervallic and transformational spaces is 
not so much that the two spaces inherently determine different classes of 
intentional states (with different directions of fit). Rather, I argue that the 
distinction lies in the internal character of their implied intentional contents, 
that is to say, the aspectual shapes that make up their respective contents.79 
The musical “doings” evoked in GMIT are indeed aspectual shapes 
underlying the cognitive content at the second level of intentionality (CS2); 
and when such contents represent the group-theoretic properties of either GIS 
or transformational space, the contents take on conditions of satisfaction 
defined by those group properties. 
The foregoing discussion of GIS/intervallic and transformational 
models and their intentionalistic implications claims that both models can 
partake of the same (m-w) class of intentionality. This view is more nearly 
consistent with Lewin’s own emphasis on the complementary rather than 
dialectical relationship between the two formalisms; though not made explicit, 
the view for the most part conforms to Lewin’s own analytic practices. On this 																																																								79	Recalling	Chapter	One,	intentional	states	represent	their	conditions	of	satisfaction	under	aspects,	or	in	Fregean	terms,	“modes	of	representation.”	Familiar	examples	of	aspectual	shape	cited	in	the	philosophical	literature	are	Wittgenstein’s	duck	vs.	rabbit	image,	Frege’s	morning	star	vs.	evening	star.	
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point, Julian Hook has pointed out that Lewin moves to integrate the two 
notions almost as soon as he introduces the STRANS transformational 
apparatus and its attendant agential attitude.80 Citing the relevant passage 
from Lewin: 
 
More significant than this dichotomy, I believe, is the generalizing power of the 
transformational attitude: It enables us to subsume the theory of GIS structure, along 
with the theory of simply transitive groups, into a broader theory of transformations. 
This enables us to consider intervals-between-things and transpositional-relations-
between-Gestalts not as alternatives, but as the same phenomenon manifested in 
different ways.81 [emphases original] 
 
Framed in the intentionalistic terms offered here, it can be said that different 
ways of manifesting the same phenomenon can be understood as multiple 
aspectual shapes under representation. Such intentionalistic notions are very 
much inherent in Lewin’s conceptions of musical space and musical 
“intuitions.” Given the same set of musical objects, the groups of GIS intervals 
or transformational functions typically define the principal aspectual shapes 
under representation (p) and their accompanying intentional states (S). When 
Lewin juggles between GIS intervals and STRANS transformations, he is in 
essence construing the same object or phenomenon under different aspects of 
representation. Similarly with reference to Lewin’s P-model (which I discuss 
in the following section), Brian Kane has suggested that the “STatement” list 
likewise describes the various ways of construing a given musical object, 																																																								80	Julian	Hook,	“David	Lewin	and	the	Complexity	of	the	Beautiful,”	Intégral	21	(2007):	173-174.	81	Lewin,	GMIT,	159.	
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amounting to Frege’s “modes of representation”—a closely related concept to 
that of aspectual representation.82 
The notion that the same musical phenomenon can be manifested—
more precisely, intentionalistically represented—in different ways by the 
agent is pervasive throughout Lewin’s analytic thinking and practice. It is 
likewise a central concern of this dissertation to explore how different 
intentionalistic representations (specifically for musical materiality and 
meaning) relate in musical practice. It is on this shared concern that I argue 
Lewin’s analytic and theoretic framework can be re-framed and brought to 
bear on relations between different levels of musical intentionality. My aim in 
this and the previous sections has been to clarify the intentionalistic 
implications of Lewin’s theoretical constructs, and to show how the circle of 
intentionalistic concepts (such as intentional state or psychological mode, 
intentional content, conditions of satisfaction, aspectual shape, direction of fit) 
outlined in Chapter One bears on the various technical components of 
Lewin’s formalisms (such as the notions of musical space, the set of musical 
elements, groups of intervals and functions). My point is not to negate the 
conceptual framework behind Lewin’s GIS and transformational models but 
rather to articulate precisely the kinds of intentionalistic intuitions they serve 
to model. 
 
 																																																								82	Kane,	“Excavating	Lewin’s	‘Phenomenology,”	29-31.	Depending	upon	musical	context,	certain	aspectual	shapes	might	avail	themselves	as	either	more	or	less	appropriate	than	others.	The	decision	on	the	part	of	the	analyst	can	often	pose	fundamental	questions	about	the	essential	“premise”	of	the	composition	at	hand.	See	Lewin,	GMIT,	246.	
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2.6 Lewin’s Gap: II 
 
In “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception” 
(henceforth MTPP) Lewin shows signs that he was conscious of the kinds of 
conceptual gaps in GMIT I have pointed out, that he was alert to the 
metaphorical status of transformational “doings.” As mentioned in 2.2, Lewin 
in the final section of MTPP makes a stronger argument than he does in GMIT 
against what he considers to be the overwhelming stance in musical analytic 
engagement, namely that of “passive” perception as the primary mode of 
analytic contact. Returning to “Section V” of MTPP, Lewin, as he does in 
GMIT, expounds on the division between subject and object that underlies all 
purely perceptual acts: a modus operandi which he calls “X/Y” perception.83 
The act of listening, for instance, is for Lewin one manifestation of such an 
“X/Y” mode of perception, which, as he argues, contrasts with those of 
composing or performing. Evoking once more the passive/active axis, he 
echoes arguments made in GMIT by framing listening as a passive activity 
that projects externally and away from the agent, as contrasted with 
composition and performance which are actively embodied within the agent.84 
In connection with his own P-model, these views lead Lewin to argue that the 																																																								83	As	is	the	case	with	GMIT,	MTPP	places	the	perceptual	consciousness	of	the	agent	at	the	foreground	of	musical	analytic	practice.	I	believe	both	works	can	(and	should)	be	read	as	a	synoptic	pair	representing	a	consistent	vision.	As	with	GMIT,	MTPP	insists	on	the	plurality	of	musical	experience	and	locates	that	plurality	in	variations	of	temporality	and	the	available	discursive	contexts	and	spaces.	Such	concepts	resonate	with	Searle’s	notions	of	the	“network”	and	“background.”	For	these	latter	concepts,	see	Searle,	Intentionality,	65-71.	84		We	might	wish	to	read	this	in	conjunction	with	Lewin’s	desire	to	expand	upon—though	not	reject—the	GIS/intervallic	model	and	its	underlying	philosophical	premise.	Lewin,	at	the	very	least	in	GMIT,	never	gave	up	the	intervallic	language	and	its	attendant	mode	of	listening.	On	this	point,	see	Hook,	“Review,”	172-74.	
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P-model and its accompanying philosophies fit poorly with the “present-tense 
activities of composers and performers.”85 Pure perception in analysis fails to 
capture a mode of musical enactment that is paradigmatic of composition and 
performance.  
These views pry open another conceptual gap in Lewin’s thought that 
might be articulated by posing the following questions: 1. If perception also 
plays a role in the modalities of composition and performance, which it 
necessarily does, what is that role precisely? 2. What are then the causal 
relations between perception and creative action in musical production—and 
specifically in relation to musical utterances for the purposes of this 
dissertation? Though surely aware of these pressing questions, Lewin does not 
set out to provide answers. Rather his purpose, as he asserts, is to alert us to 
the inadequacy of a purely perceptually-driven music theory. 
Drawing upon the philosophical terms developed in Chapter One, I 
aim in what follows to bridge the two conceptual “gaps” in Lewin’s theories. 
By way of re-orienting the intentionalistic implications of both GIS and 
transformational systems and Lewin’s so-called “X/Y” perceptions, I suggest 
that we can begin to conceive of alternative ways in which Lewin’s various 
technical apparatuses—GIS intervals, transformational functions, and the P-
model—might model embodied features of musical intentionality. Through 
this I aim to achieve two goals: 1. to contribute to the critical evaluation of 
Lewin’s theories, specifically the relation between their technical formalisms 
and philosophical implications; and 2. to derive a music-analytic framework 																																																								85	Lewin,	“MTPP,”	375.	
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that explores the interaction between musical materiality and meaning in 
actual musical contexts. 
 
2.7 Towards an Intentionalistic Re-orientation of Lewin’s Theories 
 
To begin, we need to first account for how “X/Y” perception might 
relate to creative actions. I have argued that, despite Lewin’s “passive” 
framing, such “X/Y” perceptions are in fact fully active intentionalistic 
phenomena. Moreover, the intentionality of perception partakes in a complex 
network of other intentionalities to engender many types of musical actions 
we practice as musicians, including not least the production of meaningful 
musical utterances (the unit of analysis for this dissertation). Perception, in 
this more inclusive sense, is therefore distinct from action. Yet the distinction 
is not based on an embodied vs. disembodied dichotomy, as Lewin presents it; 
rather, both are eminently “embodied” in the neurobiological systems as part 
of our intentionalistic capacities. Lewin’s argument that perception involves 
grafting a distance between subject and object, that the perceived object is an 
entity “out there” and “other than” the perceiving subject, loses its rhetorical 
force when we consider that any sentient human (and animal) perception 
entails some internal form of active mental representation. The status of music 
“as-it-is-being,”86 which Lewin accords only to action and not perception, is 
applicable for both modalities.  
																																																								86	Ibid.,	374.	
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One more feature intrinsic to perception that it shares with action is its 
self-reflexivity; this is, the intentionalities of both perception and action 
represent their conditions of satisfaction indexically (see Chapter One). This 
self-reflexive feature enables both the perceiving and acting subjects to have 
active and lived phenomenological experiences, which are constitutive of the 
agent’s conscious state. During both activities, the intentionalities impart a 
phenomenological immediacy to the agent in ways that are not necessarily 
true of other types of intentional states, such as imagination or hope, which do 
not share the quality of presentedness. 
In the context of musical practice, we can broaden the notion of 
perception still further beyond Lewin’s “X/Y” notion. Owing to its m-w 
direction of fit, perception can be understood more generally to encompass a 
set of intentionalities within the larger family of cognitive intentionalities. 
“Perception” can thus be generalized—in ways that remain consistent with 
Lewin’s analytic practice—to belong to the second level of intentionality (CS2) 
that represents conceptual meanings and values (this is the kind of structure 
that underlies common examples of analytical language such as “I perceive 
this chord as a German augmented 6th”). Within this second level there could 
be both “creative” intentionalities (such as beliefs, imaginations, and 
convictions) as well as the more nearly perceptual intentionalities. Unlike 
Lewin’s “X/Y” perception, however, these intentionalities need not represent 
only “static” or “after the fact” objects or be about something that exists “out 
there.” Perception as framed in this broader sense can actively represent any 
aspect of meaning beyond the purely physical manifestations of materiality.  
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Enlarging Lewin’s framing of perception enables a richer appreciation 
of the complexities inherent even in the more nearly “pure” perceptual acts, 
such as listening, which in Lewin’s “X/Y” account is framed passively and 
seemingly devoid of active imaginative input. His view, it seems, downplays 
the fact that musical listening typically involves two levels of perception. It 
would be difficult, for instance, for most people to listen to the opening of 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony purely in terms of the “X/Y” sense; second level 
meanings and values will invariably enter the listeners’ networks of 
intentionalities and these will be represented under a m-w direction of fit.87 
The contents of these m-w perceptions might equally well comprise GIS 
intervallic values, transformational functions, or other kinds of conceptual 
propositional contents. All such intentional contents are examples of human 
values that are not intrinsic to their associated musical materiality, much in 
the same way that the “perception” of monetary value is not intrinsic to the 
dollar bill as a material object. 
We recall from Chapter One that the intentionalistic structure of a 
meaningful musical utterance involves two levels of intentionality: one that 
enacts the musical action and another that represents the conceptual 
meaning(s) imposed onto that action. At the first level, such intentional actions 
require an accompanying set of m-w perceptual intentionalities, of the kind of 
“X/Y” perception to which Lewin alludes. Once the significance of the 
musical utterance extends beyond its physical features and begins to represent 																																																								87	Indeed,	readers	familiar	with	MTPP	will	be	able	to	recognize	that	midway	through	Lewin’s	argument,	the	notion	of	perception	itself	begins	to	exceed	the	purview	of	the	initial	“X/Y”	paradigm.	Lewin,	“MTPP,”	381-82.		
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meaning, the materiality of those actions then takes on conceptual meanings 
that are brought about by the second level of intentionality. 
Example 2.1 illustrates the “flow” of the intentionalistic structure of a 
meaningful musical utterance and attempts to show how Lewin’s formal 
apparatuses fit within this revised framework. The example re-orients the 
intentionalistic implications of Lewin’s terms and notions from GMIT and 
MTPP. Understood more literally, the “X/Y” perception, which Lewin deems 
to be purely passive in nature, is shown to be part of the network of 
intentionalities that contribute to the more nearly physical aspects of musical 
production rather than in opposition to musical action. On the other hand, GIS 
intervals, transformational functions, and the contents of P-models are shown 
to be part of the intentional content (as conditions of satisfaction) of m-w 
cognitive intentionalities that belong to the second level of intentionality. In 
this view, their purported contrasting identities as passive observations (GIS) 
on the one hand and active doings (transformations) on the other dissolve 
within this more expanded understanding of musical action and meaning.  
At a deeper level, the intentionalistic structure represented by Example 
2.1 aims to break down the prevalent dichotomies that can be traced back to 
Descartes’ dualist notions of res cogitans and res extensa, which tacitly structure 
several other current musicological discourses, such as Carolyn Abbate’s 
“gnostic” versus “drastic,” Jankélévitch’s the mentally conceptual versus the 
phenomenologically embodied, Christopher Small’s score-based conceptual 
analysis versus practice-based embodied performance, Emily Dolan’s 
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“ideality” versus “materiality.”88 Perhaps sensing the inadequacies of dualism, 
a consistent trend in current musicological discourse has been to reject the 
perceived hegemony of the mental and to favor a metaphysics of embodiment, 
phenomenology, and materiality. Lewin’s dualistic framings of embodied 
doings versus disembodied perception/observation likewise partake in this 
revisionist trend. Yet as I have argued in earlier parts of this dissertation, 
without a fundamental re-thinking of the ontology of the mental in biological 
terms, dualist thought can be seen to persist despite the so-called material 
turn. 
Having shown how Lewin’s theoretical constructs could potentially 
model alternative intentionalistic structures, the following sections will 
demonstrate how they might be re-fashioned into a methodology that can 
then model and explore the relation between musical materiality and 
meaning. 
 
2.8 Towards an Analytic Methodology for Musical Intentionality: 
Reconceiving s !  t 
 
Taking Lewin’s well-known s ! t opening gambit from GMIT, 
Example 2.2 shows how the concept can be re-adapted into a general 
methodological framework that serves to model the two levels of 																																																								88	Carolyn	Abbate,	“Music—Drastic	or	Gnostic?”	Critical	Inquiry	30/3	(2004):	505-36;	Vladimir		Jankélévitch,	Music	and	the	Ineffable,	trans.	Carolyn	Abbate	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2003);	Christopher	Small,	Musicking:	The	Meanings	of	Performing	and	Listening	(Middletown:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1998);	Emily	Dolan,	The	Orchestral	Revolution:	Haydn	
and	the	Technologies	of	Timbre	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013).	
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intentionality in musical utterances. Points “s” and “t” depict musical objects 
in some physical space. The symbol “i1” depicts the conditions of satisfaction 
(CS1) of embodied actions, which, as I argued, necessarily encompass a 
network of indexical perceptions. The “i1” arrow between “s” and “t” can 
represent a wide array of physical actions that traverse between musical 
objects: a vocal exertion, a fingering, a bowing pattern, and so on. “i2” on the 
other hand depicts the conditions of satisfaction in the domain of conceptual 
meaning (CS2). The “i2” arrow can represent any aspectual shape attending to 
conceptual values that we might also attribute as the “distance” between 
musical objects: a voice-leading connection, a transpositional or inversional 
value, a schema, a topos, and so on. The single-direction upper dashed line 
depicts the imposition of “i2” onto “i1” that takes place during the production 
of meaning, whereas the dual-direction lower dotted line captures the 
principal focus of this dissertation: the relation between the two classes of 
mental representations and their respective contents.  
The methodology represented by Example 2.2 provides a basis to 
creatively explore, in a manner of speaking, “what it feels like” to perform or 
perceive a given musical gesture and how that experience relates to, 
(re)shapes, or contradicts the meanings that that gesture conveys. Conversely, 
the methodology enables the exploration of how different categories of 
musical meaning—whether they be Schenkerian voice-leading structures, 
partimenti schemata, topoi, pitch-class sets, etc.—can likewise inflect on the 
mental representations of embodied doings. The methodology offers a two-
way exploration of these relations and offers a platform to explore not only the 
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dimensions of materiality and meaning separately, but more importantly, the 
mutually enriching relations they inhabit. 
 
2.9 Analytic Vignette: Chopin Étude Op. 25 No. 1 
 
I close this chapter with a short analytic demonstration. The aim of this 
analytic vignette is not to explore unfamiliar intuitions (that will be the 
purpose of Part II), but to call upon familiar ones to help demonstrate the 
methodological apparatus developed thus far. 
On the significance of the notation in Chopin’s Étude in A-flat major, 
Op. 25/1, Schenker writes: 
 
The small notation in such cases reveals the middleground elements, directing the 
reader or player more easily into the path which leads to the true sense of the music. 
Chopin very often made use of small notation in passage work, arpeggiations, and 
other figurations. Perhaps the most interesting example of its use is the notation of the 
bass in the Étude op. 25 no. 1, where at the first tonic Ab he indicates, by 
distinguishing between large and small notation, the correct performance even of the 
bass.89 
 
From this brief passage from Free Composition, we can see that Schenker 
understands Chopin’s notation as embodying both conceptual and embodied 
intentions. He “translates” what he takes to be Chopin’s conceptual intentions, 
as gleaned from the notation, into the terms of his own hierarchical theory. For 																																																								89	Heinrich	Schenker,	Free	Composition,	trans.	Ernst	Oster	(New	York:	Pendragon	Press,	1978),	98.	
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Schenker, Chopin’s notation reveals the (Schenkerian) middleground for the 
passage, which for him constitutes the “true sense of the music.” Schenker’s 
“sense” is in effect the aspectual shape with which he represents part of the 
meanings of the passage and which involves highly constructed notions of 
tonal hierarchy. Although such notions are not intrinsic to the representational 
content of the first level of intentionality—which is to say that in order to 
simply physically execute or perceive this excerpt at the bare physical level 
level, one need not know anything about the tonal language, much less 
Schenkerian theory—I argue that Schenker’s aspectual shapes have the 
potential to relate intimately with how the physical gestures at the piano are 
internally represented by the pianist.  
As Example 2.3 shows, the notation of the larger note heads in the 
outer voices contrasts with the smaller note heads in the middle of the texture. 
The contrast points to a complex network of embodied knowledge that bring 
about intersections between the performing body and the instrument. These 
embodied representational contents might include the performer’s perception 
of his/her hand shape and position, the active rotation of the wrist, the 
distribution of arm weight towards the outside of the hand away from the 
thumb, and the perception and manipulation of the instrument’s timbre to 
“hide” the smaller note values, consistent with the performance practices of 
early nineteenth-century pianism. These descriptions, which are by nature 
subjective and by no means complete or conclusive, point to the kinds of 
embodied intentional contents and their aspects that might underlie a pianist’s 
performance of the passage. What is at once intuitive and yet remarkable is 
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that the qualitative experiences of these embodied actions at the first level of 
intentionality echo key features of Schenker’s middleground elements that 
mark the aspectual shapes at the second level of intentionality. One way to 
underscore this kind of “cross-domain mapping” at work might be to say that 
the mental representations of (physical) “weight” distribution at the keyboard 
inflect on the structural “weight” distribution of the (conceptual) voice-
leading structure. One might go further and say that the stretch of the right 
hand to F (on 6^) in m. 2 likewise corroborates its structural status as a 
dissonant upper neighbor to 5^; the embodied representation of the subtle 
“tensions” involved in the right hand stretch relates intimately to the 
conceptual senses of musical tension inherent in the notion of the “dissonant” 
upper neighbor.90 The embodied/material domain thus lends a unique and 
subjective characterization to the more generic concept of a 5^-6^-5^ neighbor 
motion. 
Although I have intended this analytic demonstration to capture 
something that is more nearly intuitive, the philosophical and methodological 
framework I have developed serves to formalize these relationships. As I will 
show in Part II, the framework provides the basis to model as-yet unexplored 
relations between materiality and meaning in various musical contexts. The 
analytic essays of Part II aim to exercise the interpretive potentials afforded by 
the framework presented here in Part I. What follows aim to illuminate the 
																																																								90	This	feature	is	itself	part	of	a	broader	musical	context	that	includes	the	dynamic	and	agogic	stretches	implied	by	the	hairpin	marking.		
	 77	
creative ways with which composers draw on the distinctive intentionalistic 
features of musical discourse as an essential resource for expression. 																					
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
BOWING GESTURES AND STRUCTURAL RHYTHM IN  
 
HAYDN’S STRING QUARTET OP. 64 NO. 3 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The terms of large-scale structural downbeats were first introduced by 
Edward Cone in “Analysis Today” (1960) and subsequently elaborated in 
Musical Form and Musical Performance (1968).91 Cone explains his terms as 
follows: 
 
By structural downbeat, of course, I do not mean the arbitrary accentuation of the first 
beat of every measure; I mean rather phenomena like the articulation by which the 
cadential chord of a phrase is identified, the weight by which the second phrase of a 
period is felt as resolving the first, the release of tension with which the tonic of a 
recapitulation enters…It is just here [at the cadence] that the importance of rhythm to 
the establishment of tonality emerges, for the cadence is the point in the phrase at 
which rhythmic emphasis and harmonic function coincide.92 
 
																																																								91	Edward	T.	Cone,	“Analysis	Today,”	Musical	Quarterly	46/2	(1960):	172-88;	Musical	Form	and	
Musical	Performance	(New	York:	Norton,	1968).	92	Cone,	“Analysis	Today,”	182-83.	Carl	Schachter	has	pointed	out	that	Cone’s	notion	of	the	“structural	downbeat”	corresponds	closely	with	Roger	Sessions’	“accent	of	weight”	from	Sessions,	
Harmonic	Practice	(New	York:	Harcourt,	Brace,	and	World,	1951),	83-84.	Moreover	Schachter	points	out	areas	of	overlap	between	Cone’s	ideas	of	structural	rhythm	with	those	of	Grosvenor	Cooper	and	Leonard	Meyer	in	The	Rhythmic	Structure	of	Music	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1960).	Schachter	observes	however	that	Cooper	and	Meyer’s	large-scale	downbeat	accents	tend	of	remain	effect	continuously	for	extended	sections	of	music	in	ways	that	Cone’s	structural	accents	do	not.	See	Schachter,	“Rhythm	and	Linear	Analysis:	A	Preliminary	Study,”	Music	Forum	4	(1976):	281-334;	see	specifically	footnote	No.	26.	
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 In his 1969 dissertation “The Delayed Structural Downbeat and Its 
Effect on the Tonal and Rhythmic Structure of Sonata Form Recapitulation,” 
Robert Morgan further expands upon Cone’s notions and defines a structural 
downbeat as:93 
 
A structural downbeat, as the term clearly implies, is a rhythmic accent of such 
importance that it assumes structural significance. The word “accent,” of course, is 
used in musical terminology to describe various kinds of events, and it is important to 
distinguish the type of accent referred to here from other types…some accents 
emphasize point of stability while others emphasize points of instability, and some 
are compositional in nature whereas others are provided by the performer. Downbeat 
accents, then, are compositional accents (they can, of course be supported by the 
performer) which emphasize points of stability. They are primarily defined by the 
completion of various kinds of structural motion and thus depend largely upon more 
background aspects of the composition than the surface rhythm. 
 
While Cone famously locates musical form in rhythmic structure and makes 
the claim that one way to achieve effective performance is to make clear the 
rhythmic life of a composition,94 Morgan extends Cone’s notions of form to 
argue that musical form arises from the interaction between tonal and 
rhythmic events and that tonal unfolding generates much of what we might 
call structural rhythm.  
Morgan, moreover, makes explicit the distinction between 
“compositional” accents versus accents that have their sources in 																																																								93	Robert	Morgan,	“The	Delayed	Structural	Downbeat	and	Its	Effect	on	the	Tonal	and	Rhythmic	Structure	of	Sonata	Form	Recapitulation,”	(Ph.D.	diss.,	Princeton	University,	1969),	10-11.	94	Cone,	Musical	Form,	31.	
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performance. To encapsulate this intuition, I cite at length Cone’s discussion of 
the opening chords of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony, which touches on the 
principal concern of this chapter: 
 
In every respect, then, the beginning of the Eroica is conceived as a completely 
integrated introduction, not as a mere frame. How can this distinction be realized in 
musical performance? Only by respecting the basic rhythmic character of these two 
measures: by recognizing that they constitute an upbeat. No matter that they are forte 
and the ensuing theme piano, that they are tutti, and the theme, as it were, concertino—
their basic role is vitiated unless they are somehow conducted and played to be heard 
as a double upbeat. Although the strings would hardly use up-bow, keeping such a 
possibility in mind would suggest the requisite lightness and springiness; the heavy 
accents we so often get almost drown out the theme and prevent a convincing start. 
Furthermore, an upbeat performance of these measures stresses their kinship both 
with the parallel measures of dominant harmony immediately preceding the 
recapitulation, and with the two balancing measures of tonic afterbeat at the very end. 
These two measures thus offer us a clue to the basic importance of the introduction, 
an explanation of its frequency: an introduction is an expanded upbeat. Even when, as 
in Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony, it is long, begins with its own strong downbeat, 
and contains many subdivisions—a true introduction, as opposed to a frame, is an 
expanded upbeat.95 
 
Cone’s “upbeat” characterization of these opening measures attributes 
conceptually based meanings to the passage in context rather than describing 
something intrinsic in the chords themselves. In Cone’s reading, the first two 
chords of the Eroica Symphony, despite resting metrically on downbeats, form 																																																								95	Cone,	Musical	Form,	23-24.	
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an extended structural upbeat (or rather, a double upbeat) that leads into the 
downbeat at m. 3, when the main theme begins. Cone, however, observes a 
certain complexity: the double upbeat status of these first two measures 
coexists in tension with the downbeat status of these chords. And more 
significantly for present purposes, the chords’ structural upbeat senses 
inversely relate to the physical down-bow gestures which Cone acknowledges 
to be their normal musical execution.  
This seeming complexity, I argue, reflects the crucial distinction 
between the two levels of intentionality in musical utterances. In the first two 
chords of the Eroica, Beethoven exploits this distinction as a resource for 
expression: the downward aspects that underlie the action intentionality of the 
bowing (that is, the intentional content of the first level of intentionality, CS1) 
rubs against the conceptual meanings (CS2) imposed upon these actions which 
have upward notions as their representational content. In other words, 
Beethoven uses downward gestures as vehicles to carry meanings of upward 
thrust. 
Thus I wish to argue that the familiar notions of structural upbeats and 
downbeats are conceptual and metaphorical characterizations of energy, and 
that, through the faculty of intentionality, such conceptualizations intersect in 
complex ways with the actual physical components of music.96 The 
																																																								96	In	fact,	Cone,	in	his	effort	to	concretize	these	notions,	calls	upon	an	analogy	with	that	of	literally	throwing	a	ball.	He	writes:	“If	I	throw	a	ball	and	you	catch	it,	the	completed	action	must	consist	of	three	parts:	the	throw,	the	transit,	and	the	catch.	There	are,	so	to	speak,	two	fixed	points:	the	initiation	of	the	energy	and	the	goal	toward	which	it	is	directed;	the	time	and	distance	between	them	are	spanned	by	the	moving	ball.	In	the	same	way,	the	typical	musical	phrase	consists	of	an	initial	downbeat	(/),	a	period	of	motion	(U),	and	a	point	of	arrival	marked	by	a	cadential	downbeat	(\).”	Cone,	Musical	Form,	26-27.	
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philosophical framework offered in this dissertation formalizes the parameters 
for such relations, while the analytical methodology helps to bring into focus 
such interplays between structural rhythm and musical action. In what 
follows, I will explore possible isomorphic relations between the bowing 
gestures of the prevailing rhythmic motive in the first movement of Haydn’s 
string quartet Op. 64 No. 3 and the movement’s recurring patterns of 
structural rhythm at different levels of form. I will argue that the bowing 
gestures animate and concretize the otherwise abstract notions of structural 
rhythm, imparting large-scale upbeats and downbeats at deep levels of the 
form with the gestural senses derived from foreground bowing actions. 
 
3.2: The Gestural Properties of the Prevailing Rhythmic Gesture 
 
We begin first with a close analysis of the prevailing rhythmic motive 
of Haydn’s Op. 64 No. 3 quartet first movement and the dynamic shape of its 
gestural features. Example 3.1a shows the opening six-note figure and the 
bowing motions that activate the figure. This rhythmic motive, the single most 
important recurring motive of the movement, elicits from the performers a set 
of gestural articulations that convey the movement’s central topical character. 
The figure involves a pair of upbeat-to-downbeat motions, each directed 
toward the second notes of their respective pairs. The two-tiered inflection 
derives from the figure’s metrical alignment and its associated bowings. These 
features are shown in Example 3.1a by the two pairs of upward and 
downward arrows: upward arrows represent up-bow for upbeats, downward 
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arrows represent down-bow for downbeats.97 The first upbeat/up-bow on D 
enters midway through a 3/4 measure. It leads first to a tentative 
downbeat/down-bow on the Eb of beat three, which occurs on a relatively 
strong part of the measure. D then re-begins a second and more intense 
upbeat, this time leading to a much stronger and definitive downbeat across 
the barline. Crucially the two down-bows fall on dissonant pitches (Eb and D 
respectively) with the latter being more emphatic than the former in this 
regard. The resulting accentual succession: weak-strong-weak-stronger leaves 
a visceral imprint on the performer as he executes the gesture. The analytical 
notation at the bottom of Example 3.198 conveys the performer’s 
intentionalistic representation of the entire gesture; the varying sizes of the 
arrows further denote the varying strengths of articulation embodied in the 
bowing strokes. 
Inherent in the design of the figure is the sense that the first down-
bow/downbeat is retrospectively rendered insufficient for closure due to a 
subsequent re-initiation of a second up-bow/upbeat which then leads to a 
stronger arrival, the latter completing the gesture. Because the second 
downbeat is stronger than the first, more tentative downbeat, the two 
downbeats are themselves engaged in an “upbeat ! downbeat” relationship 
on the same structural level. As a result, one experiences the two upbeats 
merging together into a larger single upbeat component for the gesture as a 																																																								97	Of	central	importance	to	my	hearing	is	that	Haydn	did	not	notate	the	work	in	6/8	meter,	which	otherwise	would	efface	the	rhythmic	motive	of	its	characteristic	accentual	properties.	98	The	analytic	notation	is	adapted	from	Türk’s	Klavierschule	but	resonates	with	those	found	in	Fred	Lerdahl	and	Ray	Jackendorff,	A	Generative	Theory	of	Tonal	Music	(Cambridge,	MA.:	MIT	Press,	1983).	
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whole. In this way, the three notes preceding the barline constitute a single 
over-arching upbeat momentum that moves into the downbeat of m. 1. 
Example 3.1b attempts to show this higher-level representation of the figure.99 
The expressive character of this opening rhythmic gesture derives in part from 
the performers’ two-fold attempt at “grabbing onto a downbeat.” The effort 
required at the third note to turn the first downbeat back to an upbeat 
heightens the satisfaction when the second down-bow/downbeat is reached.  
The kinds of intentionalistic representations that underlie the execution 
of the six-note figure can be enacted to relate isomorphically to the 
movement’s large-scale rhythmic structure. I will show that it is precisely the 
turning of downbeats into upbeats, and the deferral of arrivals, that underpin 
the expressivity of much of the movement’s structural rhythm. 
 
3.3 Theoretical Preliminaries 
 
It will be useful here to clarify a few basic concepts regarding structural 
rhythm that will be relevant to my analysis. Although the discourse on tonal 
rhythm is vast and complex, I will focus only on those aspects of the 
theoretical framework that pertain to the structural rhythm of this movement. 
Elaborating upon Morgan’s definition cited above, I argue that the relative 
strength of a structural accent is determined by the shifting interaction 
between harmonic, contrapuntal, and rhythmic events. The strength of a 
																																																								99	This	higher-level	representation	is	additionally	supported	by	the	articulation	of	three	wedges	followed	by	a	slur.	
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structural accent is greatest when the contrapuntal impulse completes its 
linear motion at the most stable harmonic and rhythmic point of arrival.  
In terms of upbeat accents: the beginning accent of a Ursatz, for 
instance, opens with a relatively weaker structural accent in relation with the 
endpoint of the Ursatz since it is initiated from 3^, a point of relative tension in 
relation to its contrapuntal goal, 1^. Since a weaker structural accent relates to 
a stronger accent in an upbeat-to-downbeat rhythmic relationship, a Ursatz in 
abstraction could be said to take on this very structural rhythmic shape. It 
could be then said that structural upbeats are structural accents that call for 
continuation due to their intrinsic instability. A structural upbeat generates 
expectancy for the onset of a stronger point of arrival that will serve as its 
downbeat pair. It should be noted here (a point that will be relevant for the 
following analysis) that a structural downbeat accent can be succeeded later 
by a yet stronger accent at a higher level, retroactively converting the previous 
downbeat accent into an upbeat. As such, it is necessary for the analytic 
perspective to be sensitive to the temporal spans and contexts from which 
interpretive statements are rendered. 
Let us here consider two bass lines in abstraction that model rhythmic 
and temporal contexts related to Haydn’s movement. Example 3.2a shows a 
stepwise descending tetrachord from 4^ to 1^ with a standard “rule of the 
octave” harmonization. The example aligns its structural rhythmic 
implications (inherent in the harmonization) with a standard metrical 
accentuation. The weak beats (beats 2 and 4) align with the two dissonant 7th 
chords, while the strong beats (beats 1 and 3) pair up with the consonant 
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triads. Example 3.2b shows a first level reduction of this bass line (without 
additional musical context), in which an accentual pattern of “weak-strong-
weak-stronger” emerges. The second downbeat accent (denoted by +++) is the 
stronger of the two because it constitutes the most stable point of arrival 
marked by a 5/3 chord (as well as occurring on a metrical downbeat). 
Example 3.2a could be alternatively reduced into the accentual pattern shown 
in Example 3.2c, where the initial three elements of the bass line form an 
overarching upbeat that subsumes the 6/3 chord of beat 3 into a local passing 
tone, moving collectively towards the structural downbeat across the barline. 
Yet without further musical context, the abstract bass line of Example 3.2a 
poses an “either/or” situation moving from the foreground to the 
middleground level.100 Example 3.2d illustrates an alternative reading in 
which the higher level structural downbeat accent rests on the 6/3 chord 
while the 5/3 on the next downbeat is interpreted as a consonant skip (via a 
passing tone on 2^) that serves to extend the 6/3 in time. This reading might 
be possible when there are strong cues on the musical surface to suggest it. 
However, in this abstract environment it remains unconvincing. 
Example 3.3a presents a second abstract bass line situation. Here the 
bass alternates twice between 1^ and its stepwise upper neighbor, 2^, without 
differentiation in terms of their harmonization and metrical placement. 
Because of its intrinsically symmetrical structure (and again a lack of further 
musical context), this bass line segment poses an indeterminable either/or 
scenario when reaching for the middleground level: both Example 3.3c and 																																																								100	For	more	on	this	topic	of	tonal	analysis,	see	Carl	Schachter,	“Either/Or,”	in	Schenker	Studies,	ed.	Hedi	Siegel,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990),	165-79.	
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3.3d could be valid readings. The two contrasting bass line examples illustrate 
that it is the relation between the two downbeats that in great part determines 
the overall rhythmic trajectory of such abstract bass line fragments. When they 
are compositionally undifferentiated (as in Example 3.3), there is no necessary 
sense of forward motion toward a focal point, since both downbeats rest on an 
equal structural footing. In such instances, the music projects a sense of 
circularity, committing to no definite point or moment of closure. With a few 
notable exceptions,101 genuine large-scale formal and structural symmetries do 
not pervade late eighteenth-century tonal repertoire. As I shall demonstrate, 
Haydn crafts the first movement of Op. 64 No. 3 in such a way that it invites 
the listener and performer to engage with different temporal frames within 
the temporal continuum, and to continually (re)assess the ever-shifting 
dynamic between structural upbeats and downbeats. 
 
3.4 First Group 
 
I now explore the structural rhythms of the first movement of Op. 64 
No. 3. The first group, mm. 1-17, divides into two parts, with the division 
marked by a caesura in m. 7. Mm. 1-5 constitute the first complete phrase unit 
of the first group, followed by a kind of musical afterthought or a “musical 
suffix” (mm. 6-7) that begins as though to initiate a parallel phrase. The second 
part of the first group begins at m. 8 marked by a different texture and 
thematic profile. As I shall demonstrate, Haydn charts out a larger rhythmic 																																																								101	A	well-known	example	is	Chopin’s	A	minor	Mazurka,	Op.	41	where	the	tonalities	of	E	minor	and	A	minor	alternate	on	almost	equal	footing.	See	further	comments	in	Chapter	Four.	
	 88	
continuity in face of this clearly articulated bipartite design. The listener and 
performer are invited to reconsider the presentational function of the initial 
phrase (m. 1-5) at a later temporal perspective, retrospectively imparting hints 
of the expressive associations of developmental and transitional function. 
Example 3.4 illustrates the voice-leading structure of the first five measures, 
reading it as a complete undivided Ursatz at the level of the phrase: the 
contrapuntal motion begins with 3^ over I, moves through to 2^ over V, and 
finally arrives at 1^ over I, completing the linear and harmonic motion at the 
downbeat of m. 5.102 Without further musical context at the current temporal 
perspective, 3^ is heard for now as the Kopfton. Since 3^/I is a weaker 
structural articulation in relation with a closing structural accent ending with 
1^/I, the off-beat initiation of this opening accent (beginning metrically 
midway in the upbeat measure) further characterizes its upbeat relationship 
with the closing accent of m. 5. Example 3.4 shows the underlying rhythmic 
trajectory of the phrase. 
Once closure is achieved on the downbeat of m. 5, a new phrase 
seemingly reinitiates with the music of m. 1 (including the upbeat figure). The 
feigned gesture towards a consequent phrase re-beginning on 3^/I seems to 
overturn the harmonic and contrapuntal closure at m. 5. However, this fails 
almost as soon as it begins. The newly revived initiatory impulse fizzles out 
after just one bar, leaving 3^ dangling in midair without local bass support at 
																																																								102	I	thank	Frank	Samarotto	for	suggesting	to	me	that	one	way	to	read	the	inner	voice	descent	from	3^	to	2^	is	to	read	it	as	a	lower-level	interruption	analogous	to	Schenker’s	graphic	analysis	of	the	opening	phrase	of	Beethoven	Op.	26/i	in	Heinrich	Schenker,	Free	Composition	trans.	Ernst	Oster	(New	York:	Longman,	1979),	Fig.	85.	My	reading	preserves	the	uninterrupted	linear	descent	across	the	phrase	from	3^	to	1^	while	articulating	the	allusion	to	a	half-cadence	in	m.	2.	
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m. 7. What was ostensibly going to be a consequent restatement of the first 
phrase now becomes an open-ended musical suffix that hurls its tonal 
momentum into empty space. Example 3.5 represents the voice leading 
structure of the suffix in relation to mm. 1-5. The example shows the 
prolongation of 3^ from the Kopfton through octave coupling and left 
disconnected midway.103 
In terms of structural rhythm, the re-beginning on 3^ creates a second 
upbeat accent that searches for a second downbeat arrival that would become 
its downbeat pair. The suffix is so tightly welded to the end of the tonal 
completion at m. 5 that its open-endedness creates a foreground rhythmic 
pattern by m. 7 of weak-strong-weak. Example 3.6a illustrates the structural 
rhythm from mm. 1-7; it aims to capture the uncertainty, at this temporal 
perspective, of how the music might unfold after m. 7. Examples 3.6b and 3.6c 
offer two possible scenarios for “normal” continuation after m. 5. As Example 
3.6b shows, the music after the downbeat arrival of m. 5 could prolong 1^/I 
through a short codetta-like passage eliciting no additional structural 
downbeat. The second possibility for continuation, as shown in Example 3.6c, 
fulfills what the re-initiation at mm. 5-6 seems to suggest: complete a 
consequent phrase ending with an authentic cadence. In this alternative, a 
second, equally strong structural downbeat would emerge, parallel to the 
downbeat of m. 5. This hypothetical accent might then be symmetrically 
undifferentiated from the first structural downbeat at m. 5, making it difficult 
																																																								103	Note	the	echo	between	the	abrupt	skip	up	to	the	high	D	of	m.	3	and	of	m.	6.	
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to reach for a higher-level reading. (The scenario would be analogous to the 
abstract schema of Example 3.3, where there is an indeterminate forked path.) 
Haydn opts for neither option. Instead, he introduces a new thematic 
unit in m. 8 with a (similarly) comic, “galloping” topic. The surface elements 
of the music at m. 8 forestall obvious logical connections with the preceding 
music; it is not until m. 10 and following that the tonal and rhythmic structure 
for the first group as a whole begins to take shape. After 2 “empty” bars (mm. 
8-9) that initiate a local upbeat outlining the first two notes of a triadic ascent 
(Bb-D), the first violin from mm. 10-17 presents for the first time a complete, 
stable thematic statement from 5^. This thematic statement traverses a 
descending 5^-line through what will be the only regular eight-bar period of 
the entire movement. The phrase has all the trappings of a textbook period: a 
HC at m. 13 marking the antecedent and a PAC in m. 17 marking the 
consequent. Accordingly, the “galloping” theme is presentational in its formal 
function. Owing to its self-contained thematic and tonal regularity, it is devoid 
of developmental or transitional properties, and contrasts sharply with the 
unusual phrase-rhythmic design of mm. 1-7. The “galloping” theme’s firm 
beginning on 5^ establishes 5^ as the as the Kopfton for the first group, and as I 
shall argue, for the movement as a whole. 
Example 3.7 illustrates the tonal and rhythmic structure of the first 
group. The onset of the Kopfton at m. 10 retrospectively clarifies the structural 
(although not necessarily formal) role of mm. 1-7. In this broader temporal 
perspective, 3^ is now heard not as the Kopfton, but as the beginning of an 
ascending linear motion that moves toward 5^ at m. 10. Measure 10 
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simultaneously marks the coming together of three structural events: 1. the 
completion of the Anstieg, 2. the (delayed) appearance of the movement’s 
Kopfton and hence the beginning of the Urlinie, and 3. the beginning of the first 
Ursatz replica from the Kopfton itself. In this reading, the structural accent at 
m. 10 constitutes the first structural accent on the background level as an 
opening upbeat accent for the movement as a whole. As such, it overturns the 
first structural downbeat arrival at m. 5, despite being an upbeat of the 
middleground period (mm. 10-17).104 Example 3.7a illustrates the structural 
rhythm of mm. 1-10 as a succession of weak-strong-weak-stronger, while 
Example 3.7b further reduces the first three accents at a higher level as one 
larger structural upbeat that finds its downbeat pair at m. 10. 
The first group’s sequence of structural rhythmic motions (as shown in 
Example 3.7) shares important aspects with the bowing gestures of the 
principal motive. These shared aspects, I argue, are made possible by the 
common aspectual shapes of their respective intentionalistic representations: 
the “up-down-up-down” aspectual shape of the bowing action is in this case 
isomorphic with the “up-down-up-down” aspectual shape of the structural 
rhythm. This relation is enabled by the shared “weak-strong-weak-stronger” 
feature that underlies the representations of both domains. Through the 
faculty of intentionality, such cross-domain associations allow for the abstract 
notions of structural upbeats and downbeats to gain concrete meanings when 
																																																								104	It	is	important	to	note	here	again	that	my	analysis	concerns	Haydn’s	innovative	structural	rhythmic	designs	for	the	opening	articulations	of	the	primary	formal	sections	of	this	movement	(i.e.	first	group	exposition,	second	group	exposition,	and	recapitulation).	Therefore,	heard	from	vantage	point	of	the	first	group	alone	(mm.	1-17),	the	structural	accent	at	m.	10	would	become	an	upbeat	accent,	with	the	closing	downbeat	accent	at	m.	17	being	its	stronger,	downbeat	pair.		
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related to actual musical actions (in this case, the representations of up-bow 
and down-bow gestures). The intentionalistic representations of bowing 
gestures animate the otherwise metaphorical senses of structural rhythm, 
lending real-life context to the internal dynamics of the structural rhythmic 
succession. In what follows, I will argue that similar progressions of structural 
rhythm recur at two other formal junctions as well as operating at the 
background level across the entire movement.  
 
3.5 Transition and Second Group 
 
The formal design of the second group conforms to what James 
Hepokoski and Warren Darcy term the “Tri-Modular-Block” (TMB).105 By their 
definition, the TMB presents a double approach to the new tonic. This formal 
design poses a forked road in the analytical path, an either/or situation that 
requires resolution at a higher-level. In tonal terms, the fork involves hearing 
one of the two transitional dominants as part of the deep middleground. Of 
immediate note is Haydn’s unconventional construction of the dominant in 
the first transition. After a transitional passage that leads through a series of 
descending parallel 6/3 chords (mm. 23-27), the transitional dominant sneaks 
in on a 6/5 chord in m. 28 as the ending point of a stepwise-descending inner 
voice. The transitional dominant thus initiates with a bass tone that is 
problematically constructed. It is established rhetorically as falling on a half 																																																								105	See	James	Hepokoski	and	Warren	Darcy,	Elements	of	Sonata	Theory:	Norms,	Types,	and	
Deformations	in	the	Late-Eighteenth-Century	Sonata	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	170-79.	
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cadence, yet it is articulated with an unconventional “6/5-like” sonority with 
the viola articulating the bass tone. Moreover, after the “real” bass tone enters 
in the next measure on 5^, the dominant plateau surprisingly evaporates in 
terms of surface energy. It is significant here that the downbeat of m. 32 is not 
marked with fz—the expressive effect here relates to that of mm. 6-7 where 
there was similarly an evaporation of surface energy. The end of the 
transitional unit (mm. 29-32) reverses conventional dynamic and gestural 
expectations of a transition. And as I shall point out later, when the same 
music returns on the dominant of the home key in the recapitulation (mm. 
150-152), Haydn normalizes this rhetorical feature, allowing the dominant 
plateau in the recapitulation to fulfill its conventional rhetorical function—that 
that of heightening the articulation at the onset of the second group—with 
expected force and emphasis. By avoiding a conventional presentation of the 
transitional dominant in the exposition, Haydn heightens the intensity of the 
transitional dominant in the recapitulation relative to the exposition. The 
dominant that prepares for the onset of the second group in the recapitulation 
(m. 153), as I shall argue below, constitutes the most significant structural 
downbeat articulation of the movement at the background level. 
Returning to the exposition: the manner with which the second 
dominant plateau is achieved (m. 42) makes more apparent, in retrospect, the 
disruptive aspects of the first transitional dominant: an emphatic (and 
conventional) German augmented 6th chord. Moreover, the principal motive 
returns to accompany the second dominant. These features help establish the 
latter dominant as structurally more significant. By extension, this hearing 
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assigns the second tonic arrival at m. 48 as the stronger downbeat accent 
relative to the first tonic downbeat at m. 33; the two dominants on either side 
of the TMB as a result connect with one another at the middleground level. 
The lyrical theme at m. 33, which does not continue as a tonally self-enclosed 
harmonic and contrapuntal unit, bleeds seamlessly into the second dominant 
at the consequent branch of its projected form. Example 3.8 shows a bass line 
reduction of the “Tri-Modular-Block” and its structural rhythm in the 
temporal perspective of mm. 28-48. The example shows that the structural 
rhythmic shape of the TMB parallels that of the first group; both embody the 
rhythmic pattern that reflect the bowing actions of the opening motive.106 
 
3.6 Recapitulation and Overall Form 
 
Sonata forms with the so-called “double return” typically initiate a 
strong background downbeat at the onset of the recapitulation. As the central 
articulative event of the form, the recapitulatory moment resolves the tension 
of the retransitional dominant. As I shall argue, however, the rhythmic 
articulation at the recapitulatory junction of Op. 64 No. 3 complicates the 
standard narrative. The return of the first phrase of the movement (mm. 125-
130) in several ways compromises the sense of a full structural re-beginning 
since. For one, the upbeat character of the opening phrase’s structural rhythm 
																																																								106	I	should	note	that	my	reading	of	the	structural	rhythm	does	not	dismiss	the	notion	that	m.	33	initiates	the	second	group.	Measure	33	signals	hallmarks	of	a	contrasting	material.	Moreover,	the	music	that	resumes	after	the	second	dominant	plateau	(m.	48)	makes	for	a	logical	thematic	and	topical	continuation	to	the	lyrical	first	part.	Rhetorically,	m.	48	begins	a	concerto-style	derived	virtuosic	display	episode,	which	typically	follows	subordinate	themes	of	a	lyrical	nature.	
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(as I have discussed) heightens expectations for the return of 5^ as Kopfton. As 
I will demonstrate, Haydn re-imagines the approach to the headtone by 
withholding the headtone’s re-appearance until the onset of the second group. 
I will show that the structural rhythmic processes that had earlier 
underpinned the first and second groups of the exposition here stretch across 
from the beginning of the recapitulation to the second group. The design 
brings the two formal units into tighter relation with each other and makes the 
onset of the second group into a background structural downbeat. 
After a PAC in the submediant in m. 120, the music proceeds directly 
into the return of the opening phrase with no harmonic mediation. An 
unharmonized D-Eb dyad in the first violin serves as a foreground connective 
tissue highlighting the common tone D between the harmonies vi and I. 
Harmonically unmediated moves from a strong submediant cadence late in 
the development to a return of the tonic at the recapitulation had occurred 
with frequency in mid-century works, though the practice had waned by the 
1780s.107 Commenting on the musical results of this practice, Hepokoski and 
Darcy write:  
 
…when the development ends with the conventional vi:PAC (instead of the active 
dominant, V/vi) and proceeds with little or no significant mediation into the 
recapitulation…it can seem more elementary, cruder, than the normal practice, since 
																																																								107	For	discussion	of	this	and	related	practices	in	Haydn,	see	James	Webster,	Haydn’s	“Farewell”	
Symphony	and	the	Idea	of	Classical	Style	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991),	142-44.	
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it cuts out the need for bridging the submediant PAC to the tonic with an extended 
passage of retransition.108  
 
In the context of the 1780s, the procedure additionally harks back to 
outdated and more rigid tropes of Baroque Da Capo aria practice, which often 
close the middle section with a cadence in a related minor mode key and 
proceed back to the first section without an intermediary dominant. Whatever 
the procedure’s historical precedents, Haydn’s decision—both within the 
context of his personal compositional proclivities and the broader practices in 
the 1770s and 1780s—to move from a firm PAC in the submediant to the tonic 
without any hint of a dominant mediation at the recapitulatory junction is 
unusual in the context of late-eighteenth century sonata practice.109 The fact 
sheds a significant light on the interpretation of structural rhythm at this 
moment of the form, and specifically the rhythmic status of the tonic 
articulation. With this unusual retransitional strategy, Haydn weakens the 
structural status of the primary theme at its return: the two shared common 
tones between vi and I cushion the impact of the tonic’s return more than 
either a dominant or V/vi (another, more common, late eighteenth-century 
strategy; both share only one common tone with the tonic). The structural 
status of the recapitulation is further undercut by its subsequent continuation, 
which transforms the original musical “suffix” of m. 5-7 into a large-scale 
dominant prolongation that functions both as the “missing” retransitional 																																																								108	Hepokoski	and	Darcy,	Elements	of	Sonata	Theory,	203;	See	also	Charles	Rosen,	Sonata	Forms	(New	York:	W.	W.	Norton,	1988),	262-272.	109	Ibid.,	Hepokoski	and	Darcy	cite	examples	from	Mozart’s	earliest	violin	sonatas	as	following	the	same	procedure	and	no	others	from	the	late	century.	
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dominant and the transitional dominant to the second group. This dominant 
span, mm. 132-152, recaptures the background 5^/V from the second group of 
the exposition and participates in the background level of the structure.  
Example 3.9 provides an overview of the voice leading and rhythmic 
structure of the movement. In terms of voice leading, the sketch depicts the 
movement as an unorthodox one-part, undivided structure. Owing to the lack 
of a structural dominant at the end of the development, I read the first 
structural dominant as connecting the exposition’s second group with the 
(now retransitional) dominant in the recapitulation. This connection pushes 
the rhythmic articulation of the tonic at the recapitulation to the status of a 
foreground level downbeat in relation to the tonic downbeat at m. 153. The 
“large-scale dissonance,” which typically finds resolution at the beginning of 
the recapitulation, here finds resolution instead at the onset of the second 
group. The reading therefore marks the return of the second group at m. 153 
as the most significant structural downbeat of the movement, where the 
structural descent of the Urlinie begins.110 
Example 3.9 additionally illustrates the deep-middleground structural 
rhythm of the movement: as I argue, the movement expresses yet one more 																																																								110	Haydn	subtly	re-composes	the	melodic	structure	of	mm.	153-166	(in	relation	with	its	corresponding	passage	in	the	exposition,	mm.	52-65)	to	feature	a	clear	5^-line	descent	from	F.	As	
Example	3.9	shows,	I	read	the	upper	voice	structure	of	mm.	52-65	as	a	3^-line	and	mm.	153-166	as	a	5^-line.	I	wish	to	show	that	this	“inconsistency”	stems	from	Haydn’s	subtle	tweaking	of	the	same	thematic	material	upon	its	return	and	that	it	contributes	to	the	greater	structural	weight	projected	by	the	second	statement,	bearing	the	background	structural	descent	of	the	movement.	Of	note	too	are	the	four	upbeat	bars,	mm.	48-51	(which	Hepokoski	describes	as	“static	‘warm-up’”	bars)	which	resolve	the	transitional	dominant,	but	which	serve	as	an	upbeat	to	the	thematic	initiation	at	m.	52.	See	Hepokoski,	“Beyond	the	Sonata	Principle,”	Journal	of	the	American	
Musicological	Society	55/1	(2002):	124.	In	the	recapitulation,	these	upbeat	measures	are	omitted,	leading	directly	to	the	thematic	presentation	at	m.	153.	The	omission	of	these	“warm-up”	bars	heightens	the	articulative	strength	of	m.	153.	
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statement of the upbeat-downbeat-upbeat-downbeat rhythmic pattern. The 
attenuated articulation of the tonal and thematic return at m. 125 marks the 
first (weaker) downbeat while the onset of the second group marks the second 
and stronger downbeat arrival. In this way, the recapitulation can be seen to 
amplify the structural rhythmic tendencies of the exposition.111  
As I have argued earlier, one way to understand the energy flow of the 
conceptual structural rhythm is to understand it in relation to the aspectual 
shapes that underlie local musical actions such as the bowing actions that 
pervade the surface of the movement. This relation, enabled by the faculties of 
intentionality, concretizes the abstract domain of structural rhythm, lending 
real-life senses to its metaphorical notions of upbeat and downbeat. When 
mapped onto the principal formal articulations of the movement, the internal 
logic that underpin representations of the bowing gesture help to precisely 
define and attribute relationships among these formal articulations. 
 
3.7 Historical Implications 
 
Broadly speaking, the nineteenth century saw an aesthetic shift in favor 
of continuous development over symmetry. A frequent concern for composers 
of the Romantic generation was to revitalize the inherently repetitive structure 
of the sonata recapitulation while working within its classically derived 
framework. This attitude contrasts with eighteenth-century conceptions of the 																																																								111	In	this	sense	I	disagree	with	Hepokoski’s	view	(in	“Beyond	the	Sonata	Principle”)	that	the	recapitulation	normalizes	the	expansive	features	of	the	exposition.	Rather,	I	see	the	tightening	to	be	part	of	the	recapitulation’s	intensification	of	the	tonal	and	rhythmic	processes.	
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form as one primarily characterized by cadences and their articulations. Rosen 
points out that “discontinuities are, indeed, the principal preoccupation of the 
late eighteenth-century theorists – Quantz, Vogler, Koch, etc; what concerns 
them most is the character and the placing of cadence and half-cadence within 
any musical form.”112 From a nineteenth-century perspective, the 
recapitulation was regarded as the least tonally dynamic part of the form. Yet 
for the late eighteenth-century composer this feature was not always a cause 
for concern. The senses of symmetry and balance afforded by the repetitive 
structure of the recapitulation very often constitute positive aesthetic values 
for the classical composer. 
In structural rhythmic terms, the specific cause for unease for the 
Romantic generation might be said to be the overabundance of tonic 
downbeat articulations within the recapitulatory space, especially when 
contrasted with the other parts of the form. The cycling of all or nearly all of 
the important materials in the tonic results in a formal space that is largely 
tonally static. The current understanding of these issues is that beginning 
roughly with Beethoven and continuing through to the late nineteenth 
century, composers consistently aimed to invigorate the tonal dynamic of the 
recapitulation with ever more continuous tonal structures. One common 
strategy is to delay and/or reduce the number of expected tonic downbeat 
articulations. The result would often recast music that was originally 
presentational in function into music characterized by transitional and 
developmental features. 																																																								112	Rosen,	Sonata	Forms,	p.	25.	
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While it is often thought that the aesthetic preference for continuous 
development is mostly associated with nineteenth-century musical practices, 
the analysis here has tacitly argued that similar proclivities likewise appear in 
late eighteenth-century contexts even when they are motivated by different 
concerns resulting in different aesthetic outcomes. My analysis has explored 
how Haydn in Op. 64 No. 3 achieves a specific balance within the continuum 
of articulation and continuity, especially in the domain of structural rhythm. 
As I have shown, he crafts the rhythmic initiation of each of the three principal 
formal junctions (beginning, second group, and recapitulation) in ways that 
explore different versions of a very specific underlying rhythmic shape. By 
delaying two-fold the expected initiatory downbeat in each of the three formal 
junctions, their imminent arrivals are rendered all the more dynamic. 
In thinking about the relationship between musical action and musical 
meaning in this work, the analysis has aimed to animate the movement’s 
expressivity within the guiding physical gestures that saturate the musical 
surface and deeper levels of its rhythmic structure. I hope to have shown that 
the movement exhibits an extraordinary marriage between different domains 
of the music and their individual senses of rhythm. 						
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
TEMPO AND PROCESSUAL FORM IN 
  
SCHUBERT’S PIANO SONATA, OP. 42113 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In her recent monograph In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and 
Philosophical Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-Century Music, Janet 
Schmalfeldt writes:  
  
If indeed a “theory of early nineteenth-century form” can one day be produced, I only 
argue here that one of its principal tenets must be the idea of processual approaches to 
form…114 (my emphasis) 
 
To be sure, nineteenth-century instrumental works (whilst acknowledging 
their eighteenth-century precedents) frequently invoke a processual quality in 
their formal unfolding: Formung (form-as-process) as contrasted with Form 
(form-as-shape).115 Yet processuality—or the sense of becoming—remains, as 
Schmalfeldt acknowledges, a metaphor when applied to an analytic category 
																																																								113	An	earlier	version	of	this	chapter	appeared	as:	“A	Response	to	Schmalfeldt’s	‘Form	as	Process	of	Becoming’:	Once	More	on	the	Performance	and	Analysis	of	Schubert’s	Sonata	in	A	minor,	Op.	42,”	Music	Theory	Online	16/2	(2010).	114	Janet	Schmalfeldt,	In	the	Process	of	Becoming:	Analytic	and	Philosophical	Perspectives	on	Form	
in	Early	Nineteenth-Century	Music	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	15.	115	Kurt	Westphal,	Der	Begriff	der	musikalischen	Form	in	der	Wiener	Klassik:	Versuch	einer	
Grundlegung	der	Theorie	der	musikalischen	Formung	(Leipzig:	Breitkopf	&	Härtel,	1935).	For	recent	mentions	of	Westphal’s	notions,	see	James	Webster,	“Formenlehre	in	Theory	and	Practice,”	in	Musical	Form,	Forms	&	Formenlehre:	Three	Methodological	Reflections,	ed.	Pieter	Bergé	(Leuven:	Leuven	University	Press),	123-24.	
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as conceptually-based as musical form.116 Edward Cone, for instance, when 
formulating analogous distinctions to that between Form and Formung, evokes 
the more concrete intentionalistic activities of “synoptic comprehension” on 
the one hand and “immediate apprehension” on the other as the active ways 
with which the perceiving agent engages with formal concepts.117 Cone’s 
framing appends a psychological, intentionalistic context—namely that of 
perception—to the understanding of the formal concepts.118  
In this chapter, I will explore how the intentionalities of performative 
actions, specifically the performer’s deployment of contrasting tempi, 
articulate an alternative sense of formal processuality in the first movement of 
Schubert’s Piano Sonata in A minor, Op. 42, one that complements 
Schmalfeldt’s processual reading of the movement.119 
 
 
 																																																								116	Schmalfeldt	explicitly	acknowledges	the	metaphorical	ontology	of	notions	such	as	“process”	and	“becoming”	when	applied	to	musical	form.	She	writes:	“I	arrived	at	the	central	metaphor	of	this	study—the	concept	of	becoming—long	before	I	came	to	realize	its	role	within	German	Romanticist	and	idealist	thought.”	Examples	of	other,	less	direct	references	to	these	notions	as	metaphors	by	Schmalfeldt	are:	“The	metaphor	that	emerges	so	emphatically	here	[in	reference	to	Dahlhaus’s	discussions	of	Beethoven’s	“Tempest”	sonata]	is	the	image	of	form	coming	into	being,	the	notion	of	becoming…”;	“In	its	nontechnical	sense,	the	notion	of	becoming	has	itself	become	a	pervasive,	albeit	vague,	metaphor	for	the	effect	of	all	music	perceived	phenomenologically	as	a	temporal	art.”	See	Schmalfeldt,	In	the	Process	of	Becoming	(2011),	8-10.	117	Edward	T.	Cone,	Musical	Form	and	Musical	Performance	(New	York:	Norton,	1968),	89.	118	Ibid.,	88-98.	See	also	Webster,	“Formenlehre	in	Theory	and	Practice,”	124.	119	Schmalfeldt’s	most	detailed	discussions	of	this	movement	can	be	found	in:	“On	Performance	,	Analysis,	and	Schubert,”	Per	Musi:	Revista	Acadêmica	de	Música	5-6	(2002):	38-54	and	“On	Performance,	Analysis,	and	Schubert,”	in	In	the	Process	of	Becoming:	Analytic	and	Philosophical	
Perspectives	on	Form	in	Early	Nineteenth-Century	Music	(2011):	113-131.	Though	Schmalfeldt’s	writings	pay	important	attention	to	the	role	of	the	performer	and	performance,	much	like	the	remainder	of	her	book,	the	intentionalistic	focus	is	largely	grounded	in	perception.	Discussions	of	performance	frequently	are	evoked	in	terms	of	what	the	performer	does	to	lend	the	listener	one	set	of	impressions	over	another	rather	than	developing	musical	implications	from	the	performative	actions	themselves.	
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4.2 Tempo and Musical Form 
 
In terms of the all-important performance parameter of tempo choice, 
there has always been much debate amongst performers over whether a 
chosen tempo is to be strictly maintained throughout a movement or work. 
For the late twentieth- and twenty-first-century musician, the acceptance of 
unity and coherence as core aesthetic values for Western art music runs deep. 
The “one-tempo-only” rule of thumb is frequently taught owing to the 
prevalent belief that a constant tempo ensures the integrity of a composition’s 
formal and structural unity, and that the work would “fall apart” if disparate 
tempi were applied. This position has been held by many eminent musicians, 
not least Rudolf Serkin, who claims that: “For any music, the pulse should 
remain unified... In the Appassionata or the Waldstein Sonatas, I think a tempo 
that is not unified is a crime.”120 
Echoing the central theme of this dissertation, musicians such as Serkin 
intuitively sense that there is an important relation between tempo choice, as a 
domain of performative action, and a composition’s conceptual sense of form 
and structure. Yet for works that invite a processual hearing of form, such 
constraining of a performance parameter as central as tempo choice, I argue, 
blocks access to their processual nature. In other words, if we understand the 
metaphor of processuality as implying that something becomes or is 
transformed into something else at a later point in time, then tempo would be 
a concrete parameter through which such senses of processuality could be 																																																								120		Dean	Elder,	“Serkin,	As	Interviewed	by	Dean	Elder,”	Clavier:	A	Magazine	for	Pianists	and	
Organists,	(November,	1970):	15.	
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made manifest.  
In what follows, I will: 1. briefly recapitulate Schmalfeldt’s 
interpretation of the exposition’s “processes of becoming” as a foil from which 
to explore an alternative (but related) set of formal processes involving the 
unfolding of the movement’s two principal thematic materials, and 2. suggest 
how these alternative formal processes relate intimately with evidence of the 
movement’s shifting topography in terms of tempo, the latter deriving from 
late eighteenth-century notions of tempo and meter. I argue that differences in 
the metrical profiles of thematic materials point to differences in their tempo 
during performance. The intentional actions that give rise to those tempo 
changes constitute the representational content of the first level of 
intentionality (CS1 ); its conditions of satisfaction in turn “color” the 
movement’s large-scale formal processes, the contents of the second level 
intentionality (CS2). 
 
4.3 Formal Processes 
 
Example 4.1 attempts to capture in my own terms the type of “form as 
process” in Schmalfeldt’s analysis. She forges historical and conceptual ties 
between Schubert’s sonata and Beethoven’s “Tempest” Sonata, a work which 
she argues served as the principal compositional model for Schubert’s Op. 
42.121 The processual nature of these works requires that listeners, as 																																																								121	For	Schmalfeldt’s	interpretation	of	Beethoven’s	“Tempest,”	see:	Schmalfeldt,	“Form	as	the	Process	of	Becoming:	The	Beethoven-Hegelian	Tradition	and	the	‘Tempest’	Sonata,”	in	Beethoven	
Forum	4	ed.	Christopher	Reynolds	(1995):	37-71.	
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Schmalfeldt eloquently describes, listen “backwards as well as in the 
moment—by remembering what they have heard, while retrospectively 
reinterpreting formal functions in the light of an awareness of the interplay 
between conventions and transformations.”122 In Example 4.1 I aim to 
graphically capture both the idea of “form coming into being” as well as the 
particular mode of listening this type of formal process demands. As a 
complement to Schmalfeldt’s own graphic representation of these processes,123 
Example 4.1 additionally conveys how Structural Domains—such as tonal 
structure, thematic design, topical reference—combine (multivalently)124 in 
rhythmic dialogue to engender our perception of Formal Functions and their 
hierarchies. I will return later to the bottom of the example, which shows the 
domains of meter and tempo.  
The phrase structure of the opening paragraph leading up to m. 26 
inflects a highly unusual and dramatically reinterpreted Classical sentence. 
Most immediately discernible is the expansiveness of Schubert’s material. 
When the basic idea (mm. 1-4) is sequentially repeated (mm. 5-10), it 
undergoes a process of expansion that extends it from four measures to six 
measures, ending on the downbeat of m. 10. As a result, the highly expanded 
“fantasie-like” cadential buildup from mm. 10–21 seems not only logical but 
necessary to counterbalance the expanded and improvisatory nature of the 
opening presentation. To further render his main theme processual as 
opposed to expository, Schubert shapes the tonal underpinning of mm. 1-25 in 																																																								122	Schmalfeldt,	In	the	Process	of	Becoming,	116.	123	Ibid.,	119.	124	For	a	description	and	demonstration	of	analytic	“multivalence,”	see	Webster,	“Formenlehre	in	Theory	and	Practice,”	128ff.	
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ways that obscure a clear presentation of the background tonic. As the 
bassline reduction in Example 4.1 shows, the dominant takes deep 
middleground control from the very outset and continues to do so for the 
entire presentation phase between mm. 1-10.125 The opening theme’s 
expansiveness, developmental features, and almost C. P. E.  Bach-like hesitant 
expressive qualities combine to imbue it with a “loose-knit” formal expression 
frequently found in transitional(-like) regions of the form.  
In contrast with Schmalfeldt’s analysis, I argue that it is not until m. 26 
that the music initiates a background structural tonic downbeat.126 It is at this 
point that we retrospectively hear the opening theme as simultaneously taking 
on the formal and expressive qualities of a slow introduction while 
maintaining its original status as a main theme.127 The retrospective hearing of 
the opening theme uncovers a sense of multiplicity that seems to emanate 
from the musical materials themselves. The line is blurred between model and 
variant, statement and development. As a result, a tension exists between the 
built-in necessity of the musical materials to engage in processual 																																																								125	Here	I	depart	from	Schmalfeldt’s	interpretation:	Schmalfeldt	hears	the	opening	gesture	(mm.	1-2)	as	underpinned	by	the	tonic,	whereas	I	hear	it	as	suggestive	of	a	dominant	6/4	sonority	with	E	(5^)	as	the	controlling	bass	tone.	My	hearing	is	more	dependent	upon	relating,	both	aurally	as	well	as	physically	(contingent	on	retaining	the	same	fingering	for	both	m.	1	and	m.	5),	the	upper	voice	motion	between	E	(5^)	of	m.	1	with	F	(6^)	of	m.	5	on	the	same	structural	level.	This	connection	is	not	possible	when	reading	the	top	voice	E	of	m.	1	as	part	of	an	initiatory	(background)	tonic.	126	Schmalfeldt	interprets	the	opening	theme	as	beginning	with	a	tonic	background.	See	her	comments	on	this	feature	of	the	opening	theme	in	“Response	to	Lee,”	Music	Theory	Online	16/2	(2010).		127	Schmalfeldt	hears	the	opening	first	as	a	slow	introduction,	then	retrospectively	as	a	main	theme.	In	situations	involving	delayed	downbeats,	I	believe	it	is	more	logical	for	formal	units	prior	to	the	structural	downbeat	to	take	on	the	additional	functional	associations	of	units	that	typically	would	precede	them	under	a	normal	formal	syntax.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	hear	the	structural	downbeat	of	m.	26	as	providing	retrospective	confirmation	that	the	opening	material	takes	on	the	additional	dimension	of	a	slow	introduction	as	opposed	to	hearing	it	first	as	a	slow	introduction	that	then	becomes	a	main	theme.	
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development and the formal shell of the classical sentence that encages the 
material’s inner developmental urges. It is as if the music were trying to force 
itself out of its expository formal shell, resulting in a stretched and deformed 
sentence phrase.  
The disruptive aspects of the opening theme’s non-tonic opening 
combined with immediate motivic development together characterize its 
latent musical tendency. These tendencies for motivic development and tonal 
disruption, as I will show, continue to realize themselves across the opening 
theme’s various reappearances throughout the movement. I argue that with 
each subsequent reappearance at a different formal location, the opening 
thematic material consistently and progressively realizes its latent expressive 
and structural tendencies. The result is the formation of hitherto unnoted 
formal processes that cut across those identified by Schmalfeldt, who 
principally considers transformations of formal functions in terms of adjacent 
(as opposed to non-adjacent) formal units. As I shall argue, each of the 
movement’s two thematic materials engages in non-adjacent, long-range 
processes of becoming that cut across linear formal boundaries and voice 
leading spans. 
In terms of the contrasting thematic material and its formal processes: a 
militaristic march-like idea that contrasts vividly with the hesitant and 
floating character of the opening theme enters with the tonic structural 
downbeat at m. 26. I argue that the formal processes of the march theme, 
occurring across its own different (re)appearances through the movement, 
reverse those displayed by the opening theme. The structural tendencies of this 
	 108	
theme at m. 26 are marked by tonal stability and an almost mechanical 
regularity of harmonic rhythm, articulation, and dynamics. While these 
qualities are theoretically well-suited for expository functions, the march 
theme is instead made to become the transition. In contrast with the opening 
theme (whose developmental urges seem to come from within the materials 
themselves), the march theme between mm. 26-39 seems to be subjected to 
tonal and phrase-rhythmic developments from without, to accommodate the 
urgency of transitional function. Measure 26 therefore embodies at once the 
triple functional responsibilities of 1. a structural beginning, 2. a subordinate 
theme, and 3. a genuine transition. 
The subordinate theme “proper” can be heard to initiate at m. 40 in the 
mediant. The developmental impulse from the “transition” seems to seep 
across into the subordinate theme space (literally, as the musical surface leads 
seamlessly into m. 40). The subordinate theme consists of three distinct 
internal sets of variations based on the march material. Relative to the 
transition, the subordinate theme is, at least initially, “tightly-knit” in terms of 
its phrase structure. The variations are imposed on two clearly identifiable 
antecedent-like phrases (mm. 40-50 and mm. 51-61), each closing with a half 
cadence with the second phrase ending with a more expanded half cadence 
(mm. 61-62) than the first. The third variation appears as part of the closing 
space (mm. 77-89).  
In contrast to the opening theme, the overall trajectory of the march 
theme is one that incrementally heads toward regularization. The latent 
musical tendency of the march material is one marked by tonal solidity and 
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rhythmic regularity. As I have argued, Schubert fulfills its tendency by 
progressively casting each subsequent varied appearance of the march theme 
into more and more stable formal contexts. The bottom half of Example 4.2 
summarizes the formal trajectory of the march material in the exposition: 1. it 
first appears within an overall transitional formal context, 2. then as distinct 
variations in the more stable subordinate theme space, and finally 3. in the 
closing space as a means to anchor the new tonality.128 As the example shows, 
the formal trajectory of the march theme does not stand alone: it is 
counterpointed by that of the opening material. Example 4.2 shows the two 
thematic strands coexisting in interlocking and contrapuntal fashion, coming 
together to engender a set of complementary formal processes in addition to 
those described by Schmalfeldt.  
Returning again to the thread of the opening material: the opening 
theme makes its first reappearance in C minor in the heart of the subordinate 
group (m. 63). Its reappearance disrupts what could have been a logical 
harmonic (as well as phrasal) connection between the dominant at the end of 
the second antecedent phrase (m. 61) and the tonic at the onset of the closing 
section (m. 77). Owing to its tonal and formal features, the opening material 
upon its return at m. 63 functions as a kind of parenthetical interpolation. 
Despite the momentary cadence on a root position C minor triad in m. 71, I 
																																																								128	I	should	acknowledge	that	the	closing	space	(mm.	77-90)	is	not	devoid	of	destabilizing	features.	There	is	a	marked	return	of	the	opening	material	in	mm.	82-83	and	in	mm.	85-86	which	bring	back	implications	of	A	minor.	The	second	destabilizing	feature	involves	the	rhetorical	framing	of	the	half	cadence	on	which	the	closing	concludes.	These	features	return	and	culminate	in	the	coda	of	the	movement,	which	participates	in	the	kinds	of	formal	processes	discussed	in	this	chapter	but	which	will	be	discussed	in	a	separate	study	on	the	intersection	between	form	and	Schubert’s	compositional/performance	practice	with	regards	to	octaves	in	piano	writing.	
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argue that the pitch-structural status of C minor amounts to a kind of “horizon 
tonality,” one that does not receive deep-middleground affirmation.129 An 
appreciation of the expressive character of this C-minor passage, I argue, is in 
part contingent upon sensing that the initial promise for C minor to 
materialize as a middleground tonality is not kept. The bassline sketch in 
Example 4.1 depicts my hearing, in which the passage between mm. 63-66 is 
subsumed under a single dominant prolongation, framed as a large-scale 
cadential (dominant) expansion. 
The return of the opening material as a parenthetical interpolation in C 
minor constitutes the first in a series of stages through which, I argue, 
Schubert releases the structural (in this case, developmental) tendencies of his 
opening theme. In the subordinate theme space, Schubert accomplishes this in 
part by making overt the dominant tendencies of the theme with a literal bass 
pedal on 5^ in m. 66 and 70; its dissonant status is made more pronounced by 
being cast in the minor mode within a larger prolongation on (major) III. As 
the movement unfolds, the opening theme with its inherent disruptive 
tendencies gradually finds appropriate formal-functional contexts that more 
suitably accommodate its tendencies. The developmental proclivities of the 																																																								129	A	note	on	the	“apparent	tonic”	of	m.	71:	although	it	may	initially	seem	that	the	C-minor	tonality	(that	enters	with	the	reappearance	of	the	main	theme)	at	m.	64	“takes	care”	of	the	dominant	of	m.	61,	I	believe	a	stronger	case	could	be	made	that	its	initial	status	is	illusory.	The	bass	motion	for	mm.	65–70	remains	on	the	same	G	from	m.	61,	pointing	to	the	presence	and	continuation	of	dominant	function.	The	temporary	tonic	resolution	of	this	dominant	at	m.	71,	I	argue,	should	be	understood	retrospectively	as	an	“apparent	tonic”	based	on	the	relatively	“light”	articulation	of	C	in	the	bass	at	a	weak	(tenor)	range	of	the	piano	register.	The	continuation	(mm.	72–74)	then	immediately	brings	down	the	register	and	focuses	on	b6^	of	C	in	the	bass	to	strengthen	the	cadential	6/4	at	mm.	75–76.	The	strength	of	the	cadential	6/4	articulation,	as	a	consequent	of	both	its	low	register	and	the	manner	of	its	approach,	retroactively	overrides	the	temporary	root-position	relief	at	m.	71,	and	ultimately	connects	with	the	dominant	of	m.	61	on	the	same	structural	level.	
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opening theme culminate at the recapitulation, the central articulative event of 
sonata form. I invite the reader to imagine that opening theme’s penchant for 
tonal instability and formal disruption is let loose here in the recapitulatory 
junction, where it is set free in a contrapuntal tour-de-force. As Example 4.3 
shows, the bassline structure of the retransitional process (mm. 142-174) 
traverses a sequence of rising minor thirds, with each bassline station 
articulating a dominant and its implicit tonic horizon. The bassline sketch 
shows that the horizon tonality of C minor (mm. 156-169) proportionally 
exceeds the other bassline stations, and as such comes closest to materializing 
as a manifest key. This is a significant feature in terms of the overall formal 
trajectory of the opening theme: Schubert at this point in the form brings the 
two C-minor episodes (both based on the opening theme) into close relation 
with one another. The intensification of the C minor episode at the retransition 
retrospectively amplifies the latent tonal potentials of the former episode (in 
the subordinate theme space). The retransition is thus expressively so much 
more intense than the music of mm. 1-25 (the material from which it 
developed) that one is compelled to hear the arrival of the double return in m. 
186 more as a transformed statement than a thematic return. 
Example 4.2 summarizes my commentary on the movement’s formal 
processuality until the recapitulatory overlap. The example aims to capture a 
facet of the movement’s multiple formal processes, a facet that derives from 
the intersection of the two primary thematic materials. The top portion of 
Example 4.2 summarizes the narrative trajectory of the opening theme (Theme 
A): it shows how the material becomes progressively more “adventurous” in 
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tonal context and correspondingly migrates toward formal positions that are 
increasingly “loose-knit” in formal function. The bottom portion 
counterpoints a reverse processual arch for the march-theme (Theme B). As 
each of the two thematic materials develops across the movement, the 
dialectical tension between content and form likewise progressively dissipate. 
 
4.4 Aspects of Meter 
 
Supporting the formal processes of Example 4.2, I argue, are the 
inherently contrasting metrical properties embodied by the two principal 
thematic materials. While the movement’s home meter is set in cut-time 
(coupled with the Moderato tempo-character indication), Theme A embodies 
expressive gestures that lie outside of what Schubert typically associates with 
cut-time meter in his compositional practice. For Schubert, movements set in 
cut-time almost always embody a clear rhythmic and accentual regularity at 
the half-bar level.130 The highly “empfindsam” topic of Theme A, with its 
sharply disconnected gestures, seems to suggest an alternative metric profile 
in the context of Schubert’s notational practice. Theme A’s deviation from the 
“home” meter, I suggest, constitutes a kind of foreground metrical 
“dissonance” that creates expectations for resolution.  
That the opening material seems to call for an alternative metrical 
description is further corroborated by a survey of first movements from 
Schubert’s symphonies that contain explicitly notated slow introductions. 																																																								130	A	relevant	example	in	this	context	would	the	first	movement	of	Piano	Sonata	in	D	major,	Op.	53	(D.	850).		
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Example 4.4 lists tempo and meter headings for the initial movements of all of 
Schubert’s symphonies except for Nos. 5 and 7, the only symphonies that do 
not have explicitly notated slow introductions. Apart from Symphony No. 1 
(composed when he was sixteen years old), all five subsequent symphonies 
feature the quarter-note as the principal beat unit for their slow introductions. 
Furthermore, in Symphonies Nos. 2, 6, and 8, the meter switches to cut-time at 
the onset of the Allegro. Thus not only did Schubert (at least in his symphonic 
output) prefer non-duple meters for slow introductions, it was a normal (if not 
invariable) compositional and notational practice to shift the metrical 
emphasis as the music moves out of the slow introduction into the ensuing 
Allegro.  
Hearing Theme A alternatively in 4/4 meter, as informed by Schubert’s 
symphonic music, sharpens the existing distinction between the respective 
expressive weights of the quarter-note value across the two themes. Moreover, 
the implicitly “dissonant” status of the 4/4 meter appropriately “colors” the 
dissonant tonal status of the non-tonic opening, generating expectations for 
resolution in both tonal and metric domains (accomplished by the structural 
downbeat at m. 26). In similar fashion, the return of the opening theme in C 
minor (at mm. 63-76) recalls the “dissonant” profile of 4/4 meter, adding to 
the sense of “otherness” that in part defines the expression of the parenthetical 
interpolation. 
The march topic underlying Theme B, on the other hand, calls upon a 
clearly expressed accentuation pattern in performance. Aspects of the march 
theme—such as harmonic rhythm and texture—coalesce to suggest that its 
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quarter-note pulses are couched within a higher level half-bar tactus. 
Crucially, the (delayed) onset of the “home” meter at m. 26 coincides with the 
(likewise delayed) arrival of the structural tonic. In terms of how the 4/4 
meter transitions to the home meter, I suggest that the arrival on the dominant 
at m. 10 marks the beginning of a move away from the 4/4 meter.131 Helped 
by the accompanying crescendo markings (in m. 11, 14, and 18), the “structural 
return” to cut-time solidifies in incremental fashion during these measures 
and can in fact be felt as in effect already prior to m. 26, though the march 
materials renders it firm and unambiguous. Example 4.1 aims to capture the 
transition from 4/4 meter to cut-time between mm. 10-26 by showing cut-time 
symbols growing larger in the row titled “Projected Meter”. In the final stage 
of the metric transition (mm. 23–25), quarter-note rests and fzs markings at the 
half-note level establish the onset of the “home” meter at the structural 
downbeat through elision. 
 
4.5 Tempo and Large-Scale Formal Processes 
 
The movement’s unique network of formal processes and the kinds of 
metaphors (of processuality) that we attribute to them feature as the 
intentional contents of the second level intentionality (CS2). Before I explore 
																																																								131	Of	special	interest	here	are	the	“fermata-like”	gestures	(either	over	rests,	held	chords,	or	improvisatory	material)	that	consistently	appear	throughout	the	movement	at	formal	junctions	marking	metric	shifts.	I	suggest	that	they	serve	as	a	kind	of	“clearing	of	the	palate”	before	the	onset	of	a	new	meter,	in	order	to	facilitate	changes	in	the	underlying	beat	units.	These	fermata	gestures	(represented	in	Example	4.1	as	fermata	symbols	within	quotations)	momentarily	suspend	metrical	underpinning,	lending	both	listener	and	performer	the	needed	(empty)	space	to	make	the	transition	from	one	meter	to	another.	
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how they relate to the first level of intentionality, the performative actions of 
tempo fluctuation, I wish to clarify first certain late eighteenth-century 
conventions regarding the relationship between meter and tempo. As Neal 
Zaslaw argues with regard to Mozart’s tempo conventions: “for Mozart a 
piece in 3/8 with sixteenth-note motion predominating would have been 
faster than a piece in 3/4 with eighth-note motion, if both had the same tempo 
indication.”132 This is a point for which Zaslaw finds further support when he 
cites instances when Mozart, together with his pupil Hummel, renotate their 
compositions in an attempt to alter meter and tempo indications whilst 
keeping the actual performance tempo constant. I reproduce Zaslaw’s 
Examples I and II133 that illustrate this point here as Example 4.5. 
I argue that Schubert, in principle, attends to Mozart’s notational 
conventions when conveying tempo and meter relations. A case in point is the 
Symphony in C major, “The Great,” which opens with Andante in 4/4 time 
which then leads into Allegro, ma non troppo in cut-time. We can infer from 
Schumann’s well-known commentary on Schubert’s symphony that the 
transition is intended to sound seamless in performance. It is this precise 
feature that so impressed Schumann, who in 1840 wrote: “Brilliantly novel, 
too, is the transition to the Allegro; we are aware of no change of tempo, but 
suddenly without knowing how, we have arrived.”134 In more precise terms, 
Schumann understood that Schubert had intended for the half-note pulses of 																																																								132	Neal	Zaslaw,	“Mozart’s	Tempo	Conventions,”	in	International	Musicological	Society:	Report	of	
the	Eleventh	Congress	of	Copenhagen	ed.	Henrik	Glahn,	Søren	Sørensen,	and	Peter	Ryom	(Copenhagen,	1972):	721	(emphasis	original).	133	Ibid.,	728.	134	Robert	Schumann,	“Schubert’s	Symphony	in	C.”	in	The	Musical	World	of	Robert	Schumann:	A	
Selection	from	His	Own	Writings,	ed.	and	trans.	Henry	Pleasants	(London:	Macmillan,	1965):	166.	
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the Allegro 2/2 to sound at the same tempo as the quarter-note pulses of the 
Andante 4/4. If we draw on another (related) late eighteenth-century 
performance convention, namely that larger note values are executed more 
heavily and somewhat more slowly, then it becomes clear that the difference 
in tempo implied by the terms Andante and Allegro, ma non troppo serves to 
mitigate the difference between light and heavy execution implicit in the 
quarter- and half-note values of the symphony. 
Returning to the Piano Sonata in A minor: once we imagine that the 
two thematic materials can oscillate between 2/2 and 4/4 meters, we can 
begin to envision how the metric oscillation might affect tempo choices for 
different formal units of the movement. Since the indication Moderato remains 
in effect throughout, in light of Schubert’s tempo conventions that I have 
described, quarter-notes from 4/4 passages will move faster than the half-notes 
from passages in 2/2 time. Thus, if roughly 120 per quarter-note is 
appropriate for the opening theme, and if the transition to a heavier beat unit 
of half-notes slows down the tempo by roughly a margin of 20%, the tempo for 
passages in 2/2 time would fall roughly between 96–102 per half-note beat. 
The resulting tempo relations, I argue, suggest a shifting topography of tempi 
across the movement. 
 
4.6 Intentionality of Action and Meaning 
 
To return to the central theme of this dissertation: the shifting 
topography in the domain of performative action can be seen to relate to and 
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concretize the particular kinds of (conceptual) formal processes that I have 
been describing. This musical relation is enabled by the specific structures of 
intentionality that condition how we relate to the world more generally. The 
senses of formal processuality illustrated by Example 4.2 remain metaphorical 
and otherwise dormant in performances that adhere to an unchanging tempo. 
Schubert’s vision for the movement’s formal processes, it seems to me, is 
conceived holistically; that is to say, the formal processes do not function 
independently of intentionalistic contexts such as action and perception. I 
argue that in the case of the A minor sonata, the performer’s enactment of the 
tempo’s shifting topography (as part of CS1) contributes integrally to the 
meanings associated with the formal processes (as part of CS2) that I have 
tried to articulate in the foregoing analysis.  
I would like to now direct the reader to my recorded performance of 
the movement, accessible at: 
http://www.mikechengyulee.com/artist.php?view=media  
The performance is informed in part by the ideas presented in this 
chapter. However its inclusion here is not intended to be a didactic 
demonstration of the written analysis. I invite the reader to evaluate the 
artistic merits of the performance on its own terms as well as in light of the 
ideas presented here.135 
 
 																																																								135	The	recording	is	of	a	live	performance	given	at	Cornell	University	in	2009	on	a	copy	of	a	six-and-a-half-octave	Viennese	fortepiano	by	Rodney	J.	Regier	(Freeport,	Maine)	modeled	on	a	Conrad	Graf	piano	from	the	late	1820s.	For	information	about	the	piano,	see:	http://www.rjregierfortepianos.com/6-octave-f.htm		
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4.7 Performance and Analysis 
 
In recent years a growing number of music theorists (and 
musicologists) have felt an urgent connection between their work and that of 
performers; both groups have been open to the mutual enrichments that these 
activities can offer. For the purposes of the performer, however, the perennial 
question has always remained: “How does knowing this help one perform 
any better?” Indeed, scholars do not always know how or whether one should 
“perform” analytical results, while performers, on the other hand, are often 
able to produce artistically valuable results that clearly do not seem to depend 
on articulate knowledge of the many structural features that are the music 
scholar’s bread and butter. Historically informed performers, additionally, are 
often well informed in terms of historical style and execution, yet have not 
always been attentive to a composition’s structural and formal underpinnings. 
Beyond exploring the central themes of the dissertation, my broader 
goal in this chapter has been to participate in the performance-and-analysis 
dialogue by joining the dimension of performing style (informed by notions 
derived from historical performance practice) with a close reading of form and 
structure. In short, I have attempted to propose a mode of listening and 
performance that combines an awareness of both “style and idea,” forging a 
connection between the concerns of both analysts and performers with those 
of the composer. 
In the first movement of Schubert’s A minor Sonata, the “sphinx-like” 
interlocking relationship of the two primary materials moves beyond existing 
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(classical) formal categories. Coupled with dynamic processes of their own, 
the large-scale formal processes of the movement, I have argued, involve a 
staggered and non-linear kind of form-as-process whereby the processuality 
manifests in the incremental crystallization of a given thematic material’s 
latent expressive potentials. Adapted with subtlety and artistic discretion, the 
proposed tempo relations can potentially enact a narrative that otherwise 
remains dormant, as I hope to have rendered in my performance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
THE MEANINGS OF CHOPIN’S SILENT CHORD 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Just before the end of Chopin’s Prelude in E-minor there is a famously 
striking musical action, or rather, non-action: the music comes to a halt on 
what seems to be a dominant 4/2 chord pointing toward a Neapolitan 
resolution (or alternatively an enharmonically-spelled inverted German 
augmented 6th chord). The notation requires the pianist to pull the hands away 
from a resolution to an implied Neapolitan harmony. After this pause, the 
musical action resumes with a cadential gesture, with the bass in a lower 
register. This moment is the only silence accompanied by a fermata (before the 
double bar) throughout all twenty-four preludes of the opus. In this chapter I 
will reflect on the meanings of this “negative” action—that is, a gesture 
defined by an intention to not carry out a pre-meditated action—and how this 
musical non-action might relate to a possible network of meanings within this 
and between other preludes of Op. 28.  
 
5.2 The Autograph Sketch 
 
I begin by reflecting on the autograph sketch which contains the E-
minor Prelude as a context from which to discern once palpable acts of 
composition, improvisation, and performance. Example 5.1 shows the two 
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sides of a single autograph sketch-leaf.136 The year, though omitted, was 1838, 
when Chopin spent the winter in Majorca with George Sand. On one side, 
Chopin sketched the A-minor prelude in its entirety and a fragment in C#-
minor which did not later become a completed work. On the other side, he 
sketched out the Mazurka in E-minor, Op. 47, and beneath it the E-minor 
Prelude. The E-minor Prelude at this seminal stage already closely resembles 
the fair copy (the fair copy for the preludes in A minor and E minor are given 
as Examples 5.2a and 5.2b).137 Given the close temporal and spatial proximity 
of these works on the sketch leaf, I wish to reimagine, in what follows, a 
possible constellation of connected sounds, touches, and structures that might 
have animated Chopin’s creative processes.  
 
5.3 The Enharmonic Spelling 
 
With respect to the right hand melody of m. 4 in the autograph sketch, 
Carl Schachter observes that:  
 
[in m. 4] there is no flat before the B, but the natural sign in the next bar proves that 
the flat was certainly intended. In place of the flat there is a blotch before the note, 
whose position on the stave suggests that Chopin must first have written an A#, or at 
																																																								136	The	example	reproduces	Figures	1a	and	1b	from	Jean-Jacques	Eigeldinger,	“Twenty-Four	Preludes,	Op.	28:	Genre,	Structure,	Significance,”	in	Chopin	Studies	ed.	Jim	Samson	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988),	169.	The	autograph	is	in	the	private	possession	of	Daniel	Drachman	(Stevenson,	Maryland,	U.S.A.).	137	Preludia	op.	28	:	wydanie	faksymilowe	rękopisu	ze	zbiorów	Biblioteki	Narodowej	w	Warszawie	
Preludes,	op.	28	:	facsimile	edition	of	the	manuscript	held	in	the	National	Library	in	Warsaw	Commentary	by	Zofia	Chechlińska	and	Irena	Poniatowska	(Warszawa:	Narodowy	Instytut	Fryderika	Chopina,	2009).	
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least the sharp sign; no other possibility seems in the least plausible… it follows that 
Chopin’s choice was a considered, not an impulsive one.138 
  
Schachter then points out that the enharmonic spelling runs against Chopin’s 
usual preference for #4^ over b5^. The spelling, instead, forges a connection 
between Bb and A. The Bb of m. 4 prefigures the Bb in the bass of m. 23 
immediately preceding the fermata. Yet in m. 23 the Bb does not yield to A as 
it did in m. 4; rather, it “resolves” improperly to a B-natural across the bar line. 
The fermata pause rhetorically severs the closing gesture of mm. 24-25 from 
the rest of the Prelude, drawing attention both to itself and to the harmonic 
connection—or rather, disconnect—between its flanking harmonies. 
Chopin’s enharmonic spelling in m. 23 puzzled the editors of the 
Paderewski edition to the extent that they opted to normalize the notation by 
changing the Bb into an A#. The editors justify the decision by pointing out, 
correctly, that A# is “the fundamental, altered note of the subdominant in E 
minor (A-C-E) with the seventh G added.”139 Examples 5.3a and 5.3b 
juxtapose the different harmonic functions implied by the two spellings. As an 
A#, the chord functions as an inverted German augmented 6th.140 As Example 
5.3a shows, the chord with the A# spelling (as the Paderewski edition has it) 
anticipates an upward resolution to 5^ in the bass, cutting across the pause 
with a strong directedness toward the dominant. Chopin’s spelling with Bb 																																																								138	Carl	Schachter,	“The	Prelude	in	E	minor	Op.	28	No.	4:	Autograph	Sources	and	Interpretation,”	in	Chopin	Studies	2	ed.	John	Rink	and	Jim	Samson	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994),	179.		139	Frédéric	Chopin,	Preludes	for	Piano	ed.	Ludwik	Bronarski	and	Józef	Turczynski	(Warsaw:	Fryderyk	Chopin	Institute,	Polish	Music	Publications,	1949).	140	Alternatively	one	might	wish	to	imagine	the	chord	as	a	vii7/V	with	a	lowered	third.	
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lends both the chord and the pause significantly different meanings. Example 
5.3b shows that the chord, now as a dominant 4/2 of the Neapolitan, renders 
the linear and harmonic connection to B-natural a kind of syntactical non 
sequitur. Conventional voice-leading and harmonic practice would imply a 
resolution from Bb down to A-natural. Resolving the chord with the Bb 
spelling would thus imply a projection of a Neapolitan 6/3 harmony (bII6) 
into the pause with F-natural in the melody. Knowledge of Chopin’s Bb 
spelling tempts the hands and ears of those privileged to have access to the 
notation to contemplate the Neapolitan sonority and its part-writing in 
private. It is possible that sensitive and imaginative listeners not privy to the 
score might also hear the Neapolitan during the silence. Without a visual 
confirmation, however, the subsequent dominant will more likely “clarify” the 
harmony in retrospect as an augmented 6th chord. Yet in light of Chopin’s 
apparent insistence on the notation, I would like to imagine that he did hear—
and in fact intended the pianist to hear and feel—a “phantom” Neapolitan in 
m. 23. 
What then is the structural and expressive significance of the Phrygian 
as an unrealized harmonic “horizon”? Why imply it only to subvert it? What 
does this suggest to the performer who is given the time and space to 
contemplate, and perhaps even to embody in the hands, a resolution that he is 
asked not to realize? To explore these questions, I begin with the Prelude in A-
minor drafted on the opposite side of the sketch-leaf. 
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5.4 The A-minor Prelude 
 
Example 5.4 illustrates the three phases that the right hand melody 
undergoes: 1. the establishment of a process, 2. a critical disturbance, and 3. a 
variation of the original process.141 The example reveals an unusually modular 
conception of the melody, making use of the [025] trichord. While I do not 
imply set-theoretic sensibilities on Chopin’s part, the association with set-
theoretic operations does capture how he develops the motive. During the 
first phase, four successive statements of the trichord are linked via a common 
pitch-class, each alternating with an inverted form.142 The trichords are 
grouped into two pairs, each pair related by a fifth transposition. Each pair 
then combines to form an [0257] tetrachord, an important configuration in 
both preludes. The accumulation from these tightly-knit processes heightens 
the dramatic impact when they break down. After the left hand derails from 
the expected D major cadence at m. 11, the right hand enters in m. 14 on A on 
a weak beat—tentative and uncertain. For the first time, the note establishes 
no common-tone link with the previous trichord. Being the longest sounding 
pitch of the right hand melody, the A seems to initiate a repeat of the previous 
[025] trichord. Yet its length creates an expectancy for a possible shift in the 
melodic discourse. The A, after nearly seven quarter-note beats, succumbs to 
its own sonic decay at the piano. It is unable to reclaim E and F# to form the 
original [025] trichord; instead it gives way to the melody’s first semitone 																																																								141	This	three-part	process	of	the	right	hand	melody	was	pointed	out	by	Leonard	Meyer	in	
Emotion	and	Meaning	in	Music	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1956),	93-97.	142	For	analogous	kinds	of	melodic	chaining	in	Mozart,	see	Lewin,	Generalized	Musical	Intervals	
and	Transformations,	220-225.	
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interval, forming an isolated [015] trichord. The F-natural of m. 16 displaces the 
F# of m. 11, embodying a dramatic turning point in the discourse of the right 
hand and for the Prelude as a whole. The third phase then picks up from the 
critical F-natural of m. 16 and re-establishes the linking of [025] trichords, 
triggering a series of descending 3rds between mm. 17-21 that seem to pull 
inexorably downwards. 
The left hand too begins by establishing a process that subsequently 
breaks down. However, in Leonard Meyer’s interpretation this change “is 
conclusive, in the sense that the old process is not re-established.”143 The 
harmony projected by the left hand first establishes a sequence. Yet for 
seemingly unmotivated reasons the sequence derails from the expected 
resolution to D major in m. 11. The harmony then hones in on the structural 
dominant of A minor, arriving on a dominant 6/4 at m. 15 notwithstanding 
the continued surface dissonance. 
Yet harmony constitutes but one aspect in the overall left hand process. 
Another is the left hand’s somatic aspects. The sketch reveals that Chopin 
experimented with different ways of notating the basic figure. Example 5.5a 
transcribes an early version evidenced on the sketch, which seemed to have 
been quickly replaced by the version cited in Example 5.5b, which survived 
into the fair copy.144 These versions, I argue, progressively clarify the 
independence of the inner voice from its outer frame. The working out of the 
																																																								143	Meyer,	Emotion	and	Meaning,	77.	144	Eigeldinger	points	out	this	part	of	the	drafting	process	and	makes	a	similar	transcription	in	“Twenty-Four	Preludes,	Op.	28,”	175.	See	also	Eigeldinger,	“Critical	Commentary:	24	Préludes	Op.	28,”	in	The	Complete	Chopin	A	New	Critical	Edition:	Préludes	Op.	28,	Op.	45	ed.	Jean-Jacques	Eigeldinger	(London:	Edition	Peters,	2003),	63.	
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notation shows Chopin’s concern not only for the figure’s musical outcome, 
but equally for the aspectual shapes with which the performer mentally 
represents the musical action. Framed in the terms of this dissertation, the 
representational content underlying the musical action can be seen to in turn 
contribute to the conceptual meaning of the left hand’s utterance.  
The final published version, with its long slur above the upper-beamed 
notes, seems to indicate a counterpoint of two distinct timbres: 1. a finger 
legato in the inner part projecting what has been dubbed the Dies Irae 
motive145 accompanied by 2. a detached “walking” ostinato. The oscillating 
tenths frame and tightly enclose the Dies Irae motive in the middle fingers, 
keeping the motive and its expressive associations tightly in check within the 
murky texture. The action further induces in the left forearm of most pianists a 
steady oscillating motion from side to side pivoted around the chromatic inner 
voice. Chopin, who did not have particularly large hands, would have been 
attentive to these physical characteristics. The expressive meanings associated 
with the side-to-side motions might be gleaned from the “Funeral March” 
movement of the Bb-minor sonata, Op. 35. In the sonata, the ostinato chords of 
the left hand induce a similar oscillating motion likewise spanning a 10th and 
pivoting around an inner voice. The side-to-side swaying holds common 
aspects with the actual “marching” aspects of a walking procession for the 
dead, imparting the arm and writs motions at the keyboard with expressive 
associations derived from the funeral march topic. Examples 5.6a and 5.6b 																																																								145	See	Eigeldinger,	“Twenty-Four	Preludes,”	176;	Anatole	Leikin,	The	Mystery	of	Chopin’s	Préludes	(Farnham,	Surrey:	Ashgate,	2015),	73-78,	in	which	he	argues	that	the	Dies	Irae	motive	ripples	throughout	the	entire	opus.	
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compare the musical actions of the A-minor prelude and the “Funeral March” 
movement; Example 5.6a re-imagines the notation of the A-minor prelude to 
highlight the representational affinities shared by the two passages. 
An intertextual association with the Funeral March movement lends 
hermeneutic support for hearing the four-note inner voice motive as mirroring 
the head motive of the Dies Irae chant. However, this mirroring at the outset is 
“fuzzy.” The inner part at the opening of the prelude replicates the contours 
but not the precise intervals of the chant. The profile of the Dies Irae motive is 
relieved only once throughout the prelude: at the G major cadence in mm. 6-7. 
Here the march-like oscillation induced by the outer voices reduces to an 
octave span on G allowing the left hand to remain calm in its movements. It is 
also during this brief respite in the major mode that the chromatic inner voice 
reverses its contour, thereby momentarily dispensing with the Dies Irae 
associations. However, at m. 15 the Dies Irae motive crystallizes in the correct 
scale-degree and contour. The crystallization of the motive as 3^-2^-3^-1^ in 
A minor occurs in immediate proximity with the critical turning point in the 
right hand process when F-natural displaces F#. Moreover, after appearing in 
its proper scale-degrees at m. 15 the motive “bottoms out” and progresses no 
further.  
To summarize my main points so far: two structural events that stem 
from a common narrative impulse converge at mm. 15-16. Example 5.7 depicts 
these events: 1. the displacing of F# by F-natural resulting in the break of the 
right hand’s chain of [025] trichords, 2. the crystallization of the Dies Irae 
motive at the arrival of the structural dominant of A minor. 
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After m. 16, the right hand returns to its former process of chained 
[025]s, though here without alternating with its inverted pairs. As the example 
shows, the right hand now traverses a descending-thirds sequence after the F-
natural of m. 16. The “chorale” music that follows (in mm. 21-22) contrasts 
sharply with the rest of the prelude. It represents an oasis of harmony, 
counterpoint, and rhythm at their purest—a momentary relief from the 
prelude’s overwhelming chromatic intensity. The passage seems to suggest, 
however tentatively, that E has returned as tonic accompanied by F# as a 
diatonic pitch class within an E horizon. Yet the “chorale” music ultimately 
proves unsuccessful as a kind of resistance to the continuation of the narrative 
discourse of the prelude cemented by the series of events coalescing at mm. 
15-16. While we might bask in the chorale music’s momentary purity, with F# 
buried in a lower octave (within a B dominant triad), we sense that the chorale 
is ultimately unable to resist the momentum of A minor and its expressive 
associations. 
The final cadence in A minor abruptly revokes any hopes of E 
becoming tonic. Yet tonality is only partially responsible for the ending’s sense 
of “tragic desolation,” as Robert Hatten calls it.146 Contributing equally to this 
sense is the way with which a variant of the Dies Irae motive emerges and 
manifests itself at the structural cadence, where it assumes a new presence in 
the pianist’s right hand, the speaking voice of the prelude. The expressive 
association of the motive’s (re)appearance is made more intense by the 
omission of the first of the four-note figure, which maintains the pitch-class 																																																								146	Robert	Hatten,	abstract	from	the	2010	meeting	of	the	Society	of	Music	Theory.	
	 129	
content but re-cast as an [013] trichord (B-C-A). The intentional content that 
underlies the physical transfer of the Dies Irae motive, as part of the first level 
of intentionality (CS1) and the manner in which it manifests itself somatically 
at the cadence relates intimately to the network of meanings embodied in the 
final cadence, as the representational content of the second level of 
intentionality (CS2). Until m. 19, the conceptual meanings of the Dies Irae 
motive owe in significant part to its physical representations. Throughout the 
prelude the motive is kept tightly in check within the middle fingers of the left 
hand encased by the wide-spanning ostinato and “murky” texture. At the final 
cadence, however, the earlier Dies Irae motive is released from its former 
registral confinement to take possession of the right hand and its “speaking 
fingers”—fingers 4 and 5—in its new, more forceful form. More significantly, 
the three-note motive now assumes the three-note rhythmic profile that had 
remained strictly within the domain of the right hand melody. The effect of 
this transference is that it displaces and takes over the right hand’s speaking 
voice.  
One final detail corroborates this interpretation. Example 5.8 shows 
Chopin’s notation of the final measures in the fair copy. Two notes of the 
three-note motive peer above the surface, as it were, following the sinking of 
the right hand’s [025] trichords into the chorale music.147 In Chopin’s notation, 
the right hand pitches B and C in m. 21 are placed in the upper staff, preceded 
and followed by notes aligned with the lower staff. (The Paderewski edition, 																																																								147	One	can	additionally	hear	a	“phantom”	continuation	of	the	[215]	chain	sinking	into	the	chorale	music,	further	developing	the	sense	of	defeat	of	the	right-hand	process.	The	imagined	[025s]	are	shown	in	square	brackets	in	Example	5.7.	
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also shown in Example 5.8, does away with this notational feature.) The final 
A is again placed in the lower staff, welding the last note of the motive with 
the final tonic chord; the chord, though resembling the chorale chords in 
notation, takes on a very different effect given that it completes the three-note 
motive reminiscent of the Dies Irae.   
Example 5.7 attempts to capture the process described above with 
arrows that lead from the Dies Irae motive in the left hand at m. 15ff to its 
(re)emergence in the right hand at the structural cadence. The structural 
events represented in Example 5.7 combine to portray a narrative trajectory 
that descends into the expressive realms associated the topoi of the funeral 
march and death. As I shall argue below, these expressive associations 
influence the structural unfolding of the E-minor Prelude. 
  
5.5 The E-minor Prelude 
 
The close proximity of the E-minor Prelude to the A-minor Prelude on 
the sketch leaf invites speculation that Chopin drafted one within the 
sounding backdrop of the other. Though these two Preludes are not adjacent 
in Op. 28 as disseminated, it is conceivable, I argue, that Chopin sensed an 
occasion in the sketch process to establish a narrative thread between the two 
works. A fruitful way to listen might proceed by imagining the E-minor 
Prelude as emerging out of the A-minor Prelude. In what follows I argue that 
the E-minor Prelude engenders a counter-narrative that reverses the structural 
and expressive markers of the A-minor Prelude. In the later prelude, “failed” 
	 131	
E-minor elements from the earlier prelude are reinstated, while their 
“successful” A minor counterparts are transplanted in ways that strip away 
their original expressive potency. The pause moment in m. 23 of the E-minor 
Prelude marks the culmination at the end of such a process of restoration, 
albeit with a very surprising twist. 
In terms of form, the prelude projects a large-scale period design. In 
terms of harmony, both the antecedent and the consequent traverse from 
relative chromatic obscurity towards focused diatonicism. While the left hand 
throughout maintains some degree of semitone voice leading, the right hand 
incrementally enlarges its melodic intervals during each part of the period. 
The characteristic upper neighbor of the lament melody grows wider at each 
of its stepwise descending stations. The result is that the emotional intensity of 
the right hand melody abates as its characteristic semitone “wailing” gesture 
progresses toward wider intervals over more consonant harmonic stations. 
The subdominant in m. 9, which lends functional harmonic support to 4^, 
produces the first consonance between the hands since the opening chord. 
Scale degree 4^, however, bypasses 3^ to arrive on 2^ over V. The missing 3^, 
by Schachter’s account, makes for a very distinctive “gapped Urlinie,”148 which 
is made more apparent when Chopin slurs 4^ and 2^ twice as a unit across the 
bar in mm. 9-11. The right hand side of Example 5.9a shows the resulting 
Ursatz of the E-minor prelude. When it is heard in relation with the melodic 
discourse of the A-minor prelude, the tones of the E-minor Prelude’s Ursatz 
render structural those elements from the earlier work that “failed” to obtain 																																																								148	Schachter,	“The	Prelude	in	E	minor	Op.	28	No.	4,”	166-69.	
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structural status. Example 5.9a shows that the pitches of the gapped Urlinie 
reinstate the [0257] tetrachord that was denied its expected D major cadence 
and subsequently displaced by the critical [015] trichord. The example shows 
that the E-minor prelude absorbs this very same tetrachord, in pitch, as its 
peculiarly gapped fundamental line. The resonances shared between the same 
keys on the piano impart a consistency of range and timbre to the right hand 
melodies of both preludes, and further reinforce their narrative and structural 
relation. 
As a corollary to the above processes, the E-minor Prelude reverses the 
three principal events that had successfully altered and eventually cemented 
the narrative discourse of the A-minor prelude (to recapitulate, these events 
are: 1. the onset of the [015] trichord introducing F-natural into the melody, 2. 
the crystallization of the Dies Irae motive at the dominant 6/4 of A-minor, and 
3. the surfacing of the Dies Irae motive at the structural cadence). Example 
5.9b attempts to show how the E-minor Prelude re-appropriates each one of 
these structural events, in each case eroding away its original expressive 
associations. 
First, the top-most arrow shows the transformation of the [015] trichord 
back to the [025] trichord that it had then displaced. The very F# that was 
displaced here regains its footing in the new context as a consonant chord tone 
of the dominant of E minor. The figure shows that all members of the 
displaced [025] trichord—A, E, and F#—return as structural pitches and are 
given consonant support over the subdominant and dominant harmonies in 
mm. 9-10 (and correspondingly in mm. 18-19).  
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The second re-appropriation involves the earlier prelude’s left hand 
configuration at the dominant 6/4 of m. 15ff. The bottom of Example 5.9b 
shows how the A-minor triad progressively frees itself from its association 
with F-natural across both phrases of the E-minor prelude. The bottom arrows 
show that the process culminates at the consequent phrase when F# is welded 
to the A-minor triad. This occurs during the subdominant expansion and 
climax in mm. 16-18, effectively re-integrating the pitch-class F# tightly back 
within the diatonic orbit of E minor. By managing how the pitch-classes F-
natural and F# create stronger and weaker associations with an A-minor triad, 
Chopin can calibrate the balance between the tonalities E and A across both 
works. The subtle injection of F# in m. 16 and 18 help to (re)define A-minor as 
subdominant within the new tonal context of E.  
And third, I argue that the most palpable sense of re-appropriation 
concerns the dissolution of the Dies Irae motive at the outset of the right hand 
melody. Schachter makes the observation that the octave upbeat on B was 
most likely an afterthought: he observes that the upbeat occupies a rather 
cramped spacing in the handwriting (see bottom of Example 5.1).149 When 
played alongside the A-minor prelude, this detail reawakens in the right hand 
and ears the Dies Irae motive from the final cadence of the A-minor Prelude. 
The upbeat figure transfers its B and similar dotted rhythm up an octave to the 
principal register of the E-minor prelude. As a result, we sense the head of the 
Dies Irae motive lurking beneath the right hand’s initial melodic statement in 
rhythmic augmentation (see Example 5.9b). Yet the identity of the motive 																																																								149	Schachter,	“The	Prelude	in	E	minor	Op.	28	No.	4,”	162.	
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begins to fade almost immediately. The pitches of the motive fail to realize 
themselves fully in the new register and tonal environment: the melody 
crucially does not forge a connection from C to A. Instead, the melody 
separates C from A with a passing Bb, resulting in the neighbor figure, B-C-B, 
that saturates multiple levels of the prelude.150  
Furthermore, I argue that Chopin imports and subsequently transforms 
the somatic aspects of the Dies Irae motive’s “return” at the beginning of the 
E-minor Prelude. When the motive in its three-note form took hold of the 
structural cadence at the end of the A-minor prelude, the Dies Irae motive 
spoke through the “singing” fingers of the right hand, as common pianistic 
sense would determine: the 4th and 5th fingers of the performer’s right hand 
articulate B and C respectively. From Jane Stirling’s score of the E-minor 
Prelude, which contains Chopin’s suggested fingerings, we infer that he 
intended the same fingers to likewise articulate B and C in mm. 1-4 of the E-
minor Prelude, given that he intended the third finger to articulate Bb and A 
in mm. 4-5.151 The parallelism in fingering across the end of the A-minor 
Prelude and the beginning of the E-minor Prelude echoes Chopin’s well-
known dictum that each finger possesses its own distinctive voice. The shared 
fingering for the pitch-classes B and C, together with their shared rhythmic 
profile, brings the earlier intentionalistic representations of the Dies Irae 
motive to bear on the new context. 
																																																								150	The	voice	leading	avoids	a	direct	connection	from	C	to	A	which	would	otherwise	have	brought	back	the	pitches	and	contour	of	the	Dies	Irae	motive.	Such	a	connection,	at	this	stage	of	the	prelude,	would	have	worked	against	the	E-minor	prelude’s	structural	processes	of	re-appropriation.	151	See	the	editorial	remarks	in	Eigeldinger,	“Critical	Commentary:	24	Préludes	Op.	28,”	64.		
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Yet the physical sense of the Dies Irae motive begins to erode in mm. 4-
5 when we recall that Chopin instructs Jane Stirling to execute the motion 
from Bb to A with the 3rd finger. This typically Chopinesque “slide” locks the 
lower fingers, fingers 3 and 4, to the whole-step interval between A and B in 
mm. 5-8. The new fingering on A and B in mm. 5-8 compels a different 
intentionalistic representation of the neighbor note figure. Together with the 
pitch structure discussed earlier, the fingering contributes to the gradual 
dissolution of the Dies Irae motive’s core musical and somatic aspects. 
Phenomenologically, it is as if the hand were purging the Dies Irae association 
from within. 
After such processes of re-appropriation, the chromatic voice leading 
reminiscent of the opening of the prelude returns from m. 21 onward and 
extends into cadential space. The return of the chromaticism (which was 
earlier associated with traces of the A-minor Prelude’s structural and 
expressive associations) threatens to undo the recuperative processes achieved 
thus far. Though aware that the spelling harbors expressive significance, 
Schachter nonetheless normalizes the Bb of m. 23 to an A# in his analysis and 
interprets the bass as the end point of an inverted  augmented 6th span.152 An 
alternative analysis that heeds Chopin’s Bb spelling is shown in Example 5.10. 
The analysis considers the implied structural consequences were the Bb to 
take hold, showing that the chord directs toward a phantom Neapolitan 
resolution at the pause. In this reading, the Bb of m. 23 no longer functions as 
a chromatic lower neighbor to B-natural, but rather as part of a larger passing 																																																								152	Schachter,	“The	Prelude	in	E	minor	Op.	28	No.	4,”	172.	
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motion that forges a connection between the C in the bass of m. 21 and an 
implied A at the pause. As Example 5.10 shows, the middleground bassline 
would thus articulate C-B-C-A, recalling at pitch the Dies Irae motive when it 
first materialized in m. 15 of the A-minor Prelude. Moreover, had Chopin 
allowed the Phrygian to realize, it would constitute the only instance in the E-
minor Prelude when the ubiquitous B-C-B neighbor motive opens the door for 
C to link up with A at any level of the structure. In terms of the melodic 
structure of mm. 21-23, we sense the grip on F# loosening. For two measures 
since its structural arrival in m. 19, F# plants itself firmly on downbeats, yet 
after m. 21 F# is pushed onto beat four as a dissonant upper neighbor to E. 
The glue between F# and E seems to come undone as Bb in the left hand 
between mm. 21-23 signal for F-natural to once again displace F#. To be sure, 
replacing a diatonic scale degree with its chromatically altered form occurs 
frequently. Yet owing to the unusual gapped structure of the Urlinie, a 
resolution to F-natural in the melody at m. 23 would bring back the [015] 
trichord from the former prelude into the middleground voice leading (again) 
in pitch. A crystallization of the Phrygian so late into the piece would have 
proven destructive for the narrative discourse of the E-minor Prelude in light 
of its extensive processes of recuperation from the competing processes of the 
earlier prelude. 
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5.6 Musical Action and Musical Meaning 
 
I now return to the series of questions I posed at the beginning of this 
chapter: what is the structural and expressive significance of the Phrygian as 
an unrealized harmonic “horizon” and how might its surrounding musical 
actions (or non-actions) relate to its set of meanings? 
The ending of the E-minor Prelude creates a split in how meaning is 
constructed by each of the three principal musical actors—listener, reader, and 
performer—and their corresponding actions—listening, reading, and 
performing. Shielded from the notation, the sensitive listener might perceive 
an inherent ambiguity emanating from the chord in m. 23 in his first 
encounter. The momentum of the chromatic descent will have given him 
reason to suspect a pending resolution to the Phrygian. After the suspense of 
the fermata, however, he will be led to discard this suspicion at the 
dominant’s arrival, interpreting m. 23 in hindsight as an inverted augmented 
6th chord. Had he wished to keep the Phrygian conjecture alive, there would 
be no means to confirm one way or another without recourse to the notation. 
The situation is quite different for the performer, who does have access to the 
notation. The Bb feeds into his/her second level intentional content and 
renders the Neapolitan projection in m. 23 its attendant aspectual shape. The 
visual impact of the notation makes possible the embodiment of the 
Neapolitan resolution; the notation confirms the intended representation of 
the chord at m. 23 as a dominant 4/2 of the Neapolitan. 
	 138	
There exists a further distinction between the intentionalities of the 
performer, who creates music through actions, and the reader, who creates 
music internally, often without outward actions. Since both have access to the 
notation, both are compelled to hold the implication of the Neapolitan in their 
intentionalistic representations. However it is only the performer, by way of 
his physical actions, who is equipped to subdue the Neapolitan’s literal 
(re)emergence through a kind of negative action at the pause. The smorzando 
and fermata markings, I argue, are in this sense instructions for the pianist 
rather than descriptions of the music. They call upon the pianist to physically 
restrain a structural course set in motion since m. 21 at the onset of Bb in the 
tenor. I argue that the music comes to a halt not so much due to a decrease of 
directedness in the voice leading but because the agency of the performer 
prevents it from moving forward. The notation represents an appeal from 
within the internal narrative frame to the external agency of the pianist to 
“pull the plug,” as it were, on the resurgence of the Phrygian, replete with its 
“negative” expressive associations from the A-minor Prelude. Fearful of the 
impending return of the Dies Irae motive at deeper levels of the voice leading, 
the performer is called upon to execute a “negative action” marked by 
intentionalistic representations of restraint and perhaps even fear. It is almost 
as if the Dies Irae motive returns here at the end of the E-minor Prelude to 
once more possess the performer from within, compelling him to exercise his 
agency in order to suppress and dispossess its return. 
The full extent of the performer’s presence emerges at the final 
cadential progression (mm. 24-25). The surface discontinuity at the cadence 
	 139	
leads one to imagine a shift from the “past-tense” of the narrative voice to the 
“present-tense” of the pianist’s consciousness. In both rhetorical and physical 
dimensions, the cadence is disconnected from the rest of the prelude in the 
domains of texture, register, dynamics, and tempo. Its “add-on” quality 
signals the pianist’s agency as the one responsible for bringing about global 
closure, rendering the final chords both structural and performative. The final 
tonic chord recalls the low E-octave in the structural cadence of the A-minor 
prelude, now as tonic root of E-minor. The return of F# to structural status is 
likewise given subtle attention. F# returns in m. 24 joined with E at the 
downbeat to create a 5/4 dissonance over the bass. The F#’s “successful” 
return in this register reinstates the very same F# of the chorale music of the 
A-minor prelude. 
 
5.7 The Mazurka Op. 41 No. 1 and Chopin’s Tonal Experiments 
 
In terms of tonal structural, the drama between the two preludes in 
large part owes to F-natural and F#’s capacity to leverage between the tonal 
centers of A-minor and E-minor. I would like to comment here on one 
additional feature of the sketch that might shed further light on the network of 
meanings between the A-minor and E-minor Preludes.  
The inclusion and working out of the Mazurka in E-minor Op. 41 No. 1 
immediately above the E-minor prelude suggests that Chopin was alert to the 
tonal interplay between A minor and E minor across the two preludes and the 
critical roles that F-natural and F# have in this interplay. Example 5.11 shows 
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the Mazurka’s outer A-sections. The two basic four-bar units harbor an 
inherent ambiguity: they comprise two (PAC) cadential progressions with 
similar weight and emphasis, the first in A minor and the second in E minor. 
Taking the latter to be tonic, Schachter observes that the melodic structure of 
mm. 1-4 duplicates the gapped Urlinie of the E-minor prelude in miniature.153 
However, more astonishingly, in terms of the present discussion, the 
“structural cadence” at the end of the continuation (mm. 7-8) lacks a dominant 
and instead inflects heavily towards the Phrygian in bare octaves. Although 
such late chromatic inflections are not uncommon in Chopin’s mazurkas, the 
substitution of the expected dominant (and its accompanying F#) with the F-
natural Phrygian recalls the earlier ambiguity: between A-minor and E-minor, 
which of the two keys take precedence? Ultimately the piece ends in E, yet, the 
Phrygian undermines E as tonic and colors it with a distinctly dominant hue. 
As a point of leverage, the F-natural brings A-minor back onto the tonal 
horizon, even if only briefly.  
If we imagine the Mazurka to have been drafted during the conception 
of the E-minor prelude, it might have served for Chopin as a kind of testing 
ground, in miniature, to manage balancing tonal ambiguity between the two 
keys. We might conjecture that, through working out the Mazurka, Chopin 
honed different ways of balancing between A minor and E minor by way of 
the Phrygian. Of the three works, the E-minor prelude could be said to 
embody this notion with the greatest subtlety. Example 5.12 places all three 
works on a single continuum and depicts how each work calibrates the 																																																								153	See	Schachter,	“The	Prelude	in	E	minor	Op.	28	No.	4,”	166.	Of	note	too	are	additional	foreground	features	that	connect	the	melodic	structures	of	these	two	works.	
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shifting relationship between the two keys. The example aims to capture how 
F-natural and F# in each case inflect a different balance on the tonal axis 
between A and E. In terms of the A-minor Prelude, the displacement of F# by 
F-natural paves the way towards an A-minor closure. In terms of the E-minor 
Prelude, as we have seen, the suppression of F-natural at the pause allows F# 
as the structural 2^ to lead to global closure in E-minor (though we might now 
wish to question the degree of that closure). The Mazurka, I argue, stands 
midway on this continuum; owing to its formal modularity, F# and F-natural 
exert almost equally on the tonal fabric. 
 
5.8 Cycle or Fragments 
 
In this final section, I would like propose alternative ways to frame the 
question of cyclicism as related to Chopin’s Op. 28 in its published form. I 
wish to suggest that the occasion afforded by the autograph and the results of 
the above analysis might prompt a re-thinking of the two dominant (and 
competing) strands in the modern reception of the Preludes. As Kevin Korsyn 
has observed, one strand regards the individual Preludes as either structurally 
or performatively autonomous entities; the other maintains that they are 
cyclically unified.154 I believe that the compositional processes revealed by the 
sketch point to another way of conceiving this question. The kinds of 
structural, expressive, and somatic connections between the two preludes 																																																								154	Kevin	Korsyn,	in	Decentering	Music:	A	Critique	of	Contemporary	Musical	Research	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003),	100-123	offers	a	close	reading	of	the	contemporary	discourse	on	the	Op.	28	preludes	beyond	these	two	broad	categories.	
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proposed here are neither merely ephemeral nor binding within the set as a 
whole. Instead, their myriad relations constitute but one thread within a 
network of musical “plots” and “subplots” that can surface and submerge 
within the Preludes’ pre-determined tonal grid. The autograph, rather than as 
evidence of deserted paths on their way to “the finished work,” might be 
fruitfully construed as an instance in the creative process when possibilities 
for relations among disparate numbers were discovered, contemplated, and 
indulged. Such a perspective corroborates the known fact that Chopin himself 
performed at the most four preludes in one performance setting and that, as 
teacher, he assigned Stirling pairs of of non-adjacent but tonally related 
preludes to be studied.155 
With these principles, we might wish to explore whether the structural 
associations between the A-minor and E-minor Preludes of which I have been 
speaking ripple through other numbers of the cycle. I point here to three 
instances where such connections prove musically meaningful. First, given the 
balancing roles of F# and F-natural, one might detect a similar structural 
function underlying the prominent F#s and F-naturals in Prelude No. 3 in G-
major. These pitch-classes serve to balance tonicized harmonies a fifth on 
either side of the tonic. The antecedent phrase tonicizes the dominant while 
the consequent responds with a tonicization of the subdominant through a 																																																								155	According	to	Eigeldinger:	“The	fact	that	Chopin	never	played	the	complete	op.	28	in	public	is	irrelevant	to	my	argument.	At	most	he	performed	four	preludes	on	the	platform	(26	April	1841),	which	was	not	uncharacteristic	of	him	or	of	the	customs	of	the	period.	On	the	other	hand	the	tonal	relationships	between	eight	preludes	destined	for	a	pupil’s	studies	reveal	a	concern	for	organisation.	On	the	back	of	a	copy	of	the	Nocturnes	op.	9	presented	to	Jane	Stirling,	he	preserved	two	groups	of	four	preludes:	the	first	based	on	two	pairs	with	identical	tonics,	a	fifth	apart	(nos.	9,	4;	6,	11),	and	a	second	in	which	relationships	of	a	fifth	predominate	(nos.	15,	21,	24	(marked	Gb	major!)	and	17).”	See	Eigeldinger,	“Twenty-Four	Preludes	Op.	28,”	170.	
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lengthened and expressive setting of F-natural in mm. 16-17. To prepare for 
the return of the tonic, F# is reclaimed at a lower register in m. 25 (following 
the cadential dominant of m. 24, which already points to G major as tonic). 
Second, we might hear the climactic Phrygian outbursts in Prelude No. 6 in B 
minor as diametrically related to the Phrygian’s suppression in the E-minor 
Prelude. The Neapolitan outburst (set in hemiola) at mm. 13-14 is prepared by 
its own dominant, which contains a prominent F-natural in the left hand 
melody (m. 11). I will leave open here the hermeneutic implications of the 
Neapolitan in the context of the B-minor Prelude, and merely call attention to 
the potential for non-adjacent intertextuality with the E-minor Prelude. And 
finally, we might wish to hear a resonance with F-natural and the Neapolitan 
in the E-major Prelude: in m. 6 the Neapolitan harmony is implied (but 
unstated) via its dominant, in m. 10 a varied version of the opening phrase 
returns but now inflected towards F-natural.  
I wish to suggest neither that any of these connections necessarily 
constitute evidence of “unity,” nor that they are merely ephemeral. Rather I 
wish to challenge an either/or view that regards the Preludes as either 
systematically unified or merely fragmentary, to explore alternative narrative 
strands that weave throughout the set as a whole. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
A project such as this is inevitably shaped and informed by elements of 
one’s own autobiography. The ideas presented here reflect my experiences 
and intuitions as a practicing musician. In the broadest sense, the findings of 
this dissertation remain consistent with my overall artistic and scholarly 
outlook. I take it as an essential feature of the human condition that 
imaginative and creative acts partake coherently within the logical structures 
of the physical and biological world of which we are a part. Owing to this 
belief, I view rigor in logical thinking as a pre-condition for the cultivation of 
imagination and artistic creativity. These views are reflected in the formal 
structure of the dissertation itself, with Part I laying out the logical premise 
that then inspires the creative explorations in Part II. 
In Part I I lay out a series of arguments that aim to understand how 
musical materiality might be said to relate to culturally constructed meanings. 
Though this relation is manifested in endlessly flexible ways, I argue that they 
are bound by a set of logical relations and structures derived from how we, as 
biological beings, relate to the world more generally. I identify this general 
capacity as intentionality and adapt our current understanding of its 
structural features to think through the specific case of human musicking. The 
three chapters of Part II then explore, each in its own way, what such an 
understanding might offer in terms of creatively enacting this relation in 
actual musical contexts. For instance, in Chapter Three I explore how bowing 
gestures in a Haydn quartet might be called upon to animate the more abstract 
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notions of large-scale structural rhythm. On the other hand, in Chapter Five I 
reflect on the possible network of meanings that might be associated with a 
chord that is alluded to but left un-played. The space carved out by Part I for 
relating senses of bodily gestures with musical meaning inspires the network 
of relations featured in the analyses of Part II. 
The dissertation suggests several avenues for future work. I have 
focused for the most part on the relation between performative actions and 
meaning. One logical next step would be to understand the role of listening, 
framed likewise as a combination of two levels of intentionality, and from 
there to formulate a theory of musical communication and to explore how it 
overlaps with and differs from communication in ordinary language. Other 
forms of intentionality to explore might be the role of visual perception in 
both performance and listening, and how these participate within a holistic 
conscious field. 
Perhaps the most important feature of this dissertation is that it aims to 
chart a new way that returns the pursuit of meaning to a once again viable 
goal in music criticism. As musicology became suspicious of close reading and 
the status of canonical texts, attention first shifted toward erecting historical 
and cultural contexts as a way to break down the boundaries between text and 
context, representation and event. More recently, music criticism has called 
upon New Historicism and material studies as another way to complicate and 
transform the status of the canon. The new found objects, however, have 
become ever more obscure, strange, marginal, and at times even delightfully 
quirky. While the status of the canon has indeed been complicated and 
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unsettled, the perceived problems of close reading can be seen to persist 
despite the substitution of traditional texts by material objects. With every 
attempt to replace texts with something else—whether they be 
historical/cultural contexts or objets trouvé— new texts are born. Subjected to 
slow scholarly contemplation, objects, no matter how obscure or ephemeral, 
can have a tendency to stabilize. The result is that these discursive movements 
have moved us away from seeing meaning and its understanding as a goal of 
criticism. The search for meaning has been replaced by discrete micro-
narratives built around discrete objects that engender exotic aesthetic 
experiences in-and-of-themselves, in significant part owing to their perceived 
otherness. 
Yet as Nicholas Mathew and Mary Ann Smart have observed 
 
The music boxes, mechanical ducks, and the like may give the impression of being 
somehow neutral and inert, independent of (and often aggressively countering) 
conventional aesthetic attachments and elite values…Historians of every stripe have 
long accepted that there is no such thing as “wie es eigentlich gewesen,” yet the 
stubborn materiality of these objects, documents, and eccentric personalities seems to 
inspire trust, to obscure the fact that the quirk—no less than the artworks that many 
in musicology have learned to approach with caution—is apt to ventriloquize our 
own affective sympathies.156 
 
Rather than confronting scholars on these new practices of aesthetic advocacy, 
the dissertation aims to understand the more fundamental processes that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 Nicholas Mathew and Mary Ann Smart, “Elephants in the Music Room: The Future of 
Quirk Historicism,” Representations 132 (2015): 66. 
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underlie how agents impose (“ventriloquize”) their affective meanings onto 
material objects. The scholarly focus here has been to inflect back onto the 
active intentionalities of the agent rather than remaining with the materiality 
itself. 
Despite its concern with the central questions of meaning, this 
dissertation should not be seen as a nostalgic attempt to resuscitate earlier 
modes of close reading and textual criticism. Rather it seeks to engage in 
detailed exploration of musicking’s various features through a framework that 
understands the creation of any meaning as consistent with the structures of 
the biological world, regardless of historical and cultural differences. A one-
sided emphasis on materiality encourages scholars to locate meaning outside 
the human realm, in ways that efface the critical and fine-grain distinctions 
between the animate and the inanimate that are central to our basic scientific 
understanding of the physical and biological world. It is my hope that once a 
foundation based on the latter principles is established, meaning and its 
pursuit can then be explored both creatively and rationally in any and all 
contexts. 
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!!!Intentionality!!!!!!!!enables!!!!!!!!Actions!and!Objects!to!become!! Musical!Materialities!to!become!!Meaningful!Speech!Acts! Meaningful!Musical!Utterances!!!!!!!!!
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!
s,!t!! ! =!musical!objects!
i1   =!intentional!contents!of!musical!action!
i2    =!intentional!contents!of!musical!meaning!! ! =!relation!between!musical!materiality!and!meaning!!!!=!imposition!of!meaning!intention!onto!physical!action!
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